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This study is on the financing of the flour milling and cotton 
textile enterprises owned by the Rong brothers, namely the Maoxin-
Fuxin-Shenxin group. It shows that both entrepreneurship and the 
social networking system has played an important role in ,the making 
of a big business in modern China. Entrepreneurs are innovators of 
certain devices and strategies for business financing, while social 
networks facilitated the implementation and effectiveness of such 
devices and strategies. 
The main body of this dissertation is divided into four 
sections. The first section points out the business group's demand 
for capital and credit. Gigantic as it was in terms of the number of 
factory plants, machinery, branch and purchasing offices, and 
capitalization amount, the business group had to deal with the high 
cost of factory . construction and the huge expendi ture in raw 
material purchasing. To meet the demand, the business group made use 
of every possible means to explore financial resources. Especially 
significant were three channels of financing, namely internal 
financing, external financing, and closed financing. They are 
discussed in detail in Chapters three, four, and five. 
As innovators of these strategies of financing, the 
entrepreneurs, Rong Zongjing and Rong Desheng, did play a 
significant part in exploring possible resources of financing. Yet, 
the Rong brothers' entrepreneurship was brought into play through 
social networks with other people, inside or outside the business 
group. Therefore, a sense of trust and a sense of security among 
i 
them could be generated. Based on this personal rapprochement, they 
were able to effectively employ internal and external financing 
means. With entrepreneurial innovation and social networking, the 
constituent enterprises of the business group could also achieve a 
certain degree of "closed finance" against fluctuations in the money 
market. 
In the last section, the present study summarIzes the 
characteristics of Chinese big business as exemplified by the 
Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group. Undoubtedly, both entrepreneurship and 
social networks were indispensable to the growth and expansion of 
this Chinese big business. Nevertheless, the Chinese businessmen 
were living In a social context which was still marked by 
particularism. Under such a condition, economic rationalization, as 
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Note on Currencies 
Two Chinese currencies are used in this thesis: yuan and tael 
which are designated as Y and T respectively. Yuan refers to the 
silver dollar commonly used in Shanghai for commercial transactions 
and tael refers to "Shanghai Tael" which was used for accounting 
purpose. Fineness of silver determined the exchange rate of these 
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available. For illustrations and formulae of exchange rate between 
si 1 ver and yuan, see Eduard Kann, Tbe Currencies of China: An 
Investigation of Silver & Gold Transactions Affecting China 
(Shanghai, Kelly & Welsh, Ltd., 1927), pp.126-176. However, in some 
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1. Introduction: Big Business Financing in Modern China 
How to finance a big business1? This question has been raised 
by scholars of management studies; yet such an inquiry is also 
relevant to scholars of Chinese economic history as big business had 
already taken shape in the Chinese economy during the late Qing and 
early Republican period. 2 As an effective financing system is 
indispensable to a big business, it is natural to investigate the 
financial systems established by Chinese big business. To deepen our 
understanding, further questions can be raised: How was a Chinese 
big business financed? What strategies, if any, did Chinese 
businessmen adopt in exploring financial resources? What was the 
relationship between business and financial intermediaries? What 
were the characteristics of Chinese big business financing? This 
study is intended to be a contribution to the scholarship of this 
issue, though my answer may be a premature one to the above set of 
1 Big business here refers to, as making a summary of Glenn Porter's 
observations, an economic organization which is gigantic in terJls of capital 
investment, scale of production, managerial structure, variety of product, and the 
number of establishment in various locales. Besides, this organization also possesses 
a vertical integration of purchasing, production, and distribution systems under a 
single ownership of a firm or a business group. Porter's definitions mainly come from 
the American examples. Al though such criteria of big business are too general and 
quantitative, it is still worthwhile to use them as characteristics of the "ideal 
type". For the characteristics and definitions of big business, see Glenn Porter, The 
Rise of Big Business, 1860-1910 (Arlington Heights, Ill., AHM Publishing Corp., 
1973), pp.1-26. 
According to Sherman Cochran, big business in China (of t.he Republican period) 
not only includes national enterprises but also private companies; it does not 
include medium and small-sized, specialized companies and factories but includes 
other non-industrial companies, like banks and other financial institutions. For 
Cochran's definition, see Sherman Cochran (Gao Jialong), "Qiye, zhengfu yu Zhongguo 
. zhanzheng", (trans. Chen Ren) in Ru Jiangzhao (Akira Iriye) and Hong Huarun (Warren 
I. Cohen), eds., Juda de zhuanbian: Heiguo yu Dongya (1931-1949) (The Creat 
Transfor.ation: The United States and East Asia ,1931-1949) (Shanghai, Fudan daxue 
chubanshe, 1991), p.130, n.4. 
2 The typical examples were the British-American Tobacco Company (BAT), the 
Nanyang Brothers' Tobacco Company in cigarette manufacturing, the Swedish Match 
Company, the China Match Company matches manufacturing, the Dasheng Cotton Mill, the 
Yongan Cotton Mill in cotton textile, the Fufeng Flour Mill in flour milling, and the 
Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group in both flour milling and cotton textile. 
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questions. 
The domain of Chinese big business under investigation is the 
flour milling and cotton textile enterprises of the Rong brothers, 
Rong Zongjing (1873-1938) and Rong Desheng (1875-1952), who came 
from Wuxi of Jiangsu. For simplicity, these enterprises will be 
called the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin industrial group in the following 
analysis. This study attempts to analyze the characteristics of 
financing of this business group during the period starting from 
1901, the first year of operation, to 1936, a year before 
fundamental changes took place in the business during wartime. 
The innovation of a business strategy, such as a new system of 
financing, is a product of the entrepreneurial spirit possessed by 
the firm's leaders. Here, scholars usually follow Schumpeter's 
defini tion of entrepreneurship regarding an "entrepreneur" as a 
risk-taker, an innovator, and a far-sighted investor. 3 As business 
financing is one of the major concerns in a business organization 
vis-a-vis other concerns like purchasing, manufacturing, marketing, 
and management, the study of financial management in modern China is 
thus one way to uncover the entrepreneurial spirit of the people in 
the top-management and decisj.on-making body. 
The issue of entrepreneurship has long been raised by many 
scholars of China research. Relying upon the Weberian judgement on 
the religion of China, scholars like Marion Levy, Albert 
3 See Joseph J. Schumpeter, The Theory of Kcono.ic Develop.lent (Cambridge, 
Mass., Harvard University Press, 1934), pp.57-94. 
2 
Feue.rwerker, and Etienne Balazs, raised the proposi tion of the 
absence of entrepreneurship in Chinese business.~ Yet, such views 
have recently been rejected by other scholars, like Yen-p'ing Hao, 
Sherman Cochran, and Wellington K.K. Chan, who stress the opposite: 
entrepreneurial spirit did exist in Chinese business. 'With their 
thorough studies on several Chinese big businesses and businessmen, 
these scholars have constructed a picture that Chinese 
entrepreneurs, were indeed innovative, far-sighted, and risk-taking, 
organized various factors of production systematically and 
organically directed to preparing for market competition. S 
However, how could an entrepreneur "creatively respond" to 
market condition or opportunity? By a new technological device? By 
an institution? Or by social networking? This is a fundamental 
question that the entrepreneur had to consider in order to implement 
his business strategies. This study will show that the 
4 Marion J. Levy, Jr., "Contrasting Factors in the modernization of China and 
Japan", Econa.ic Develo~ent and Cultural Change, 2: 3 (October, 1953), pp.161-197; 
Albert Feuerwerker, China's Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-huai (1844-1916) imd. 
Handarin Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1958); Etienne 
Balazs, . "The Birth of Capitalism in China", in his Chinese Civilization and 
Bureaucracy (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964), pp.34-54. 
5 See Yen-p' ing Hao, The COIBpradore of Nineteenth Century China: Bridge between 
East and West (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970), particularly in 
pp.146-153, where Hao emphasizes the compradore entrepreneurship; also his 
"Entrepreneurship and the West in East Asian Economic and Business History", in 
Business History Review, 56:2 (Summer, 1982), pp.149-l54; and his recent work The 
COlIIaIercial Revolution in Nineteenth-century China.: The Rise of Sino-Jiestern 
Hercantile Capitalisa (Berkeley, Uni versi ty of California Press, 1986) ; Sherman 
Cochran, Big Business in China.: Sino-Foreign Rivalry in the Cigarette Industry, 1890-
1930 (Cambridge, Mass., .Harvard University Press, 1980); also Cochran, "Jinru 
Shanghai zujie de santiao daolu: 1895-1937 nian huochaiye lide Riben, xifang he Huazi 
gongsi", (trans. by Wang Shaoping) in Hong Ze, ed., Shanghai yanjiu luncong Vol.3 
(Shanghai, Shanghai shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 1989), pp.216-263; Wellington K.K. 
Chan, Herchants, Mandarins, and Modern Enterprise in Late Ch'ing China (Cambridge, 
Mass., Harvard University Press, 1977); also see his "The Organizational Structure 
of the Traditional Chinese Firm and its Modern Reform", Business History Review, 56: 2 
(Summer, 1982), pp.218-235; and Wellington K.K. Chan (Chen Jinjiang), "Zhongguo de 
qiye j ingshen yu xifang de yinxing", in Zhang Kaiyuan and Zhu Ying, eds., Duiwai 
jingji guanxi yu Zhongguo jindaihua (Wuchang, Huazhong shifan daxue chubanshe, 1990), 
pp.121-130. 
3 
entrepreneur's principal device was the social ' networking6 existing 
between him and his partners, patrons, and clients. 
The term "social networking" here connotes a range of social 
relationships, namely family, kinship, regional ties, friendship, or 
colleague relationships. Indeed, Chinese business has long been 
criticized of having poor organization and management because . of 
nepotism; owner-managers would like to employ their family or kin 
. . 
members in their business. 7 Yet, strong social networks have been 
viewed as supplementary to the Chinese weak organization by an 
observer of the Chinese family business in the East and Southeast 
Asian economy today. 8 By means of these social networks, a sense 
of belonging9 and particularistic trust are generated. Here, I would 
like to stress that social networks, as a social resource of the 
entrepreneur, facilitate the building of relationships, though 
6 The author is particularly indebted to the recent discussion of networks by 
Gary Hamilton, S. Gordon Redding and others, on East and Southeast Asian economies 
in which the Overseas Chinese constitutes a significant part. See Gary Hamilton, ed., 
Business Networks and Econa.ic Developlllent in East and Southeast Asia (Hongkong , 
Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hongkong, 1991). Although the focus of the 
articles in this anthology is more on the contemporary cases, there still is room for 
historians to make use of the concepts of networks and trust. 
7 See Zhou Xiuluan, Diyici shijie dazhan shiqi Zhongguo .inzu gong ye de fazhan 
(Shanghai, Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1958), pp.97-98; Zhu Cishou, Zhongguo jindai 
gongyeshi (Chongqing, Chongqing chubanshe, 1989), p.473; also see Kang Chao, rhe 
Developlllent of Cotton Textile Production in China (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard 
University Press, 1977), pp.154-155. 
8 See S. Gordon Redding, "Weak Organizations and Strong Linkages: Managerial 
Ideology and Chinese Family Business Networks", in Gary G. Hamilton, ed., Business 
Networks and Economic Developaent in East and Southeast Asia, pp.30-47, For more 
details on Overseas Chinese family businesses in contemporary Southeast Asia, see 
also S. Gordon Redding, The Spirit of Chinese Capitalis. (Berlin, WaIter de Gruyter, 
1990) . 
9 See Gary G. Hamilton, "The Organizational Foundations of Western and Chinese 
Commerce: A Historical and Comparative Analysis", Gary Hamilton, ed., Business 
Networks and ECfDOIIJic Developaent in East and Southeast Asia, p.60. 
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mutually exploi ting10 , between the entrepreneur and his partners, 
or between him and his creditors. 
. Business financing is nei ther new to students of Chinese 
economic history. In their attempt to rebuild the general economic 
history of modern China, scholars have analyzed the problems of 
financing of a typical Chinese industrial enterprise --- lack of 
working and fixed capital, high interest rate in the money market, 
lack of support from modern bankers, and speculative activities in 
the money market. Some scholars even put forward the thesis of 
"financial capitalism". According to this thesis, other sectors of 
the economy had to be subordinated to the "financial capitalists" 
(modern bankers) and so the whole economy was controlled by the 
financial capitalists. ll Yet, these studies analyze the issue from 
the perspective of the banking system instead of that from a 
business point of view. 
Another group of specialists have attempted to analyze Chinese 
economic history in general, and history of big businesses in 
particular. Among their scholarly works, several major issues and 
ideas have been examined. These issues and ideas include 
10 It is mutually exploiting because everyone in the social network system can 
make use of this system for his/her own interest. 
11 This view has long been held by some Chinese scholars of the Republican 
period. For their works, see Wang Yichang, "Zhongguo j inrong ziben zhi yanj iu" , 
Zhongguo jingji, 4:10 (October, 1936), pp.5-17; He Chao, "Guanyu Zhongguo jinrong 
ziben", ZholJl/l1uO jingji, 4:11/12 (November/December, 1936), pp.5-24; Wu Chengxi, 
Zhongguo de yinhang (Guoli Zhongyang yanjiuyuan shehui kexue yanjiusuo conglmn di yi 
zhong) (Shanghai, The Commercial Press, 1935); Wang Chengzhi, Zhongguo jinrong ziben 
lun (Shanghai, Guangming shuju, 1936). In fact, this view has been inherited by some 
Chinese historians of the post-1949 period. See Zhang Yulan, Zhongguo yinhangye 
fazhanshi (Shanghai, Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1957). Some scholars also support 
this view through their study of the problem of financing in the industrial sector. 
See Yan Zhongping, ZhoDgl1uo lIIianfan/Izhi shigao (1289-1937) (Beijing, Kexue chubanshe, 
1963), particularly pp. 228-239; also see Yang Tong ·, "Cong Dasheng qiye de lishi kan 
jinrong ziben de liangzhongxing", Jingjishi, 1989:6, pp.89-92. 
5 
entrepreneurship, technological breakthrough and transfer, Sino-
foreign commercial rivalries, business and politics, business and 
labor, culture In business, as well as changes in business 
strategies and structures. In their writings, business financing is 
usually the topic that is the least discussed. Wellington ' K.K. Chan 
analyzes the source of capital for modern industrial enterprises. I2 
Yet, his analysis is rather at the macro level. The aim of this 
study is to analyze the subject at the micro level, i.e., to study 
the process of big business financing from the perspective of the 
business. 
Even though numerous research has been done in Chinese, 
Japanese, and Western languages on the history of the Maoxin-Fuxin-
Shenxin group, business financing is still the least studied. In 
these previous cases of research, issues such as poli tics and 
business, labor and business, and business management and structure 
have aJl been discussed in detail. 13 Yet, these studies cannot 
12 See Wellington K. K. Chan, "Sources of Capital for Modern Industrial 
Enterprises in Late Ch'ing China", in the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, 
sponsored, The Second Conference on Hodern Chinese EconOl8ic History, Vol.3 (Taipei, 
The Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, 1989), pp.967-987. 
13 The study of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group and/or the Rong family's business 
is/are one of the major topics in the Chinese ec;onomic history. Literature on the 
Rong's study, are therefore quite numerous in quantity. Chinese historians' 
publications exceed that in other languages, and the major ones are as the follows: 
Huang Yifeng, Jiu Zhongguo Rongjia "ziben de fazhan", in Huang Yifeng and Jiang Duo, 
Zhongguo jindai jingjishi lun-wenji (Yangzhou, Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1981), pp.39-
56; Qian Zhonghan, "Minzu zibenjia --- Rong Zongjing, Rong Desheng", in J'iangsu 
-wenshi ziliao Jnmnji, No.2 (Yangzhou, Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1981), pp.131-141; 
XU Weiyong and Huang Hanmin, Bongjia qiye f/lzhanshi (Beijing, Renmin chubanshe, 
1985); Jiang Shaozhen, "Rong Zongjing, Rong Desheng", in Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan 
jindaishi yanjiusuo, comp., Hinguo renrmzhuan, Vol.1 (Beijing, Zhonghua shuju, 1978), 
pp. 278-284; Bo Zheng and Sheng Bin, "Cong Rongjia qiye de fazhan kan ziben jilei zai 
minzu ziben qiye z.hong de zuoyong" J Lishi jiaoKue, 1984: 5, pp.12-16 j Chen Wenyuan and 
Wu Jinchu, "Jindai Zhongguo minzu gongye de yige biaoben --- Rongjia qiye fazhan 
gaishu", Jianghai JnleJran, 1982:3, PP.92-96, 69; Wu Xuexuan, "Rongjia qiye guanli de 
gaige", in Qiye guanli, 1982: 1, pp. 54-55, 1982: 2, pp. 59-60, 1982: 3, p. 56; Qu Conggui, 
"Rongjia qiye de chuangban jiqi jingying guanli", Zhongguo shehui jingjishi yanjiu, 
1991: 2, pp. 67-78; also see the special issue on the "'Rongs study", see Jiangnan Daxue 
Rongshi yanjiu zhongxin, RorJgshi yanjiu zhuangji (J'iangnan dax.ue Kuebao, 1991:3). 
6 
provide the answer for my original inquiry of the characteristics of 
Chinese big business financing. Therefore, the subject must be 
discussed in detail. 
The Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group is chosen in this study as it 
was a real giant business in Republican China. It was founded by the 
Rang brothers of Rongxiang, Wuxi. 1{ Having received some classical 
schooling and training in nati ve banking15 , the Rong brothers 
Scholars in Taiwan and Hong Kong do have several works on this Chinese 
business, namely Lee Muk-miu, "Rongj ia qiyeshi yanj iu", Ph. D. dissertation, New Asia 
Institute of Advanced Chinese Studies, Hong Kong, 1990, and his, Hinguo chuqi de 
Rongjia qiyel 1912-1921 (Hong Kong, Modern Chinese History Society of Hong .Kong, 
Modern China Paper No.2, 1989), Zhang Meizhi, "Rongjia qiye jingying xingtai zhi gean 
yanj iu, 1896-1931", Cuoli Taiwan shifan daxue lishi xuebao, No .14 (June, 1986), 
pp.293-325. 
Japanese scholarship produces a number of literature on the Rongs' enterprise, 
see Ohno Mi tsunori, "Kokumin kakumei ki ni i taru Eike kigyo no tenkai to sono seikaku 
--- Moshin-Fukushin Seifun, Shinshin BOseki Gaisha", KDchi II.rJgyD ImtrJ S~n CakAn 
CalcujutsuKiyO, No.20 (February, 1984), pp.19-34; also Ohno, "Kokumin kakumei ki ni 
i taru EiIte kigyo r'r>d'r>sha no undou", in KlJchi II.rJgyrJ KlJtlJ Se..on CakkD Cakujutsu Kiy'D, 
No.22 (February, 1985), pp.9-25; also Ohno, "Nankin Kokumin Seifu seiritu jiki no 
Eike kigyo", in K'DclJi K'DgyD KlJtlJ S~n Cakko Cakujutsu Kiy'D, No. 24 (February, 1986), 
pp. 9-24; also see Suzuki Tomoo, "Kindai chngoku no kigyr> keiei --- Musyaku I Eike 
kigyo' no kenkyn", Gifu Yak.ka Daigalru KyDy'Dkli KiyO, No.l (1989), pp.77-98; also see 
Kanamaru Yuichi, "Guanyu Rongjia qiye shiliao shangce de jige wenti --- yi Shenxin 
shachang weili", in Zhongguo jindai jingjishi congshu bianweihui, comp., Zhongguo 
jindai jingjishi yanjiu ziliao, No.3 (Shanghai, Shanghai shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 
1985), pp.180-185. 
For the Western scholarship on the Rongs, Sherman Cochran explicitly attempted 
to use Rong Zongjing as a case of analyzing the mentality of Shanghai capitalists, 
see Sherman Cochran, "The Mentality of a Shanghai Capitalist: Rong Zongjing (1873-
1938)", paper prepared for a panel, "Culture of Republican Shanghai", at the annual 
meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, April, 6-8, 1990; Edmond Lee, 
(Lee Dawen) "Tiaoyue kouan de zhengzhi, touzi yu jingji fazhan --- Rongjia 
mianfangzhiye touzi chutan", (tra.ns. by Han Ming) in Zhang Kaiyuan and Zhu Ying, 
eds., Duiwai jingji guanxi yu Zhongguo jindai1JUD (Wuchang, Huazhong shifan daxue 
chubanshe, 1990), ·pp.590-600; also see Marie-Clarie Bergere, "Zhongguo de minzu qiye 
yu ZhongRi zhanzheng: Rongjia Shenxin fangzhichang", (trans. by Zheng Huixin) in 
Zhang Xianwen, Chen Xingtang, Zheng Huixin, eds., Hinguo Dang1an yu .inguoshi xueshu 
taolunhui wenji (Beijing, Dang'an chubanshe, 1988), pp.533-544; also see Richard C. 
Bush, The Politics of Cotton Textiles in Kuo.intang China I 1927-1937 (New York, 
Garland Publishing, Inc., 1982). ~ 
14 The genealogical record of the Rong family, as briefly studied by some 
scholars, reveals that the ancestors had moved into Wuxi during Qing times. Besides 
farming, the Rongs also took the imperial examination. See Amano Motonosuke, Shins. 
nDson za.kki (Tokyo, Seiltatsusha, 1942), pp.80-81; Suzuki Tomoo, Op.cit., p.78; also 
see Lee Muk-miu, "Rongjia qiye~hi yanjiu", p.11. However, as no more first-hand 
materials are available, there is no way to estimate the (economic and social) status 
of the. Rong kinsmen in the locale. 
15 See Shanghai shehui kexueyuan jingji yanjiusuo, comp., Rongjia qiye shiliao 
(Shanghai, Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1980), Vol.1, p.4; also see the memoir of Rong 
Desheng, Lenong ziding xingnian jisbi (pre-1935) (Shanghai, private publication, 
1943), p.4-12. 
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started their own business in native banking with the help of their 
father, Xitai (1849-1896).16 After they had operated their native 
bank Guangsheng Qianzhuang for five years, the Rong brothers began 
to invest in industrial activities. 17 The predecessor of the 
business group was a small flour mill, the Baoxing Flour Mill, which 
was established in 1901 in Wuxi. 18 In 1903, the mill was renamed 
tMaoxin' because of the change in partnership.19 In 1905, the Rong 
brothers also ini tiated another industrial venture, the Zhenxin 
Cotton Mill, in Wuxi. 20 Some partners of Maoxin also invested in 
this new cotton mill. In 1912, because of the invitation of the Wang 
and Pu brothers, the Rong brothers established another flour mill, 
the Fuxin Flour Mill.21 During the early 1910's, these three mills 
were making profit. 
Yet, during the period 1909-1915, while being the managers of 
Zhenxin, the Rong brothers had some conflicts with their kinsman-
16 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.12. 
17 During the Boxer Uprising, Rang Desheng, while working once again in the 
Guangdong lijin bureau, found that flour milling was profitable and promising as 
large quantities of wheat and flour were transported to North China to feed the 
people in emergency. Besides, the goods are exempted from taxation. Later, he went 
to Shanghai and discussed with his brother the possibility of investing in the flour 
industry. Having already noticed the same opportunities, Rong Zongjing agreed with 
Desheng's idea and started searching for capital. Finally, they asked their late 
father's colleague, Zhu Zhongfu, who had just come back from the lijin bureau. As 
both parties were interested in the business, the Rongs and the Zhus opened a flour 
mill (in the form of partnership). See Rong Desheng, Ope cit., pp.18-20; RQS. I, p. 9; 
also see "Maoxin di yi mianfenchang gaikuang", pp. 1-2, in Maoxin Fuxin Shenxin 
zonggongsi, comp., Haoxin Fuxin Shenxin zonggonsi sa zhounian jiniance (Shanghai, 
Maoxin Fuxin Shenxin zonggongsi, 1929). 
18 In fact, the mill was proposed to be established by Rong Desheng in 1900, and 
finished construction in 1901. -For details, see Rong Desheng, Op.cit., pp.18-22. 
19 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit. , p.24. 
20 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit. , p.27. 
21 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit. , p.37. 
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partner, Rorig Ruixin, who had shown his ambition in Zhenxin already. 
In 1915, after suffering a series of intrigues by Rong Ruixin, the 
Rong brothers were expelled from Zhenxin's top-management circle. 
They then started a new cotton mill in Shanghai, the Shenxin Cotton 
Mill, in the same year.22 Thus, since 1916, the Maoxin-Fuxin-
Shenxin group, which was under the common ownership-management of 
the Rong brothers, was formally established. 
In the next twenty years, the business expanded to a giant 
corporation which possessed a considerable degree of monopolistic 
power in the national market. By the first half of the 1930's, it 
owned nine cotton mills (the Shenxin enterprise) and eleven flour 
mills (Maoxin and Fuxin) in four major cities in China. The flour 
mills alone occupied by and large more than half of the total 
production capacity in both Shanghai and Hankou, about two-thirds of 
the total production capacity in Wuxi and less than one-eighth (of 
annual product ion) in J i ' nan. 23 The cotton mills also occupied 
about 39.9% of total production capacity of Chinese cotton mills in 
Shanghai, about one-third in Wuxi and about one-tenth in the Wuhan 
22 For the quarrels between the Rong brothers and Rong Ruixing and his allies, 
see Rong Desheng, Op.cit., pp.30-43; for the year of establishment of Shenxin, see 
Rong Desheng, Op.cit., pp • .42-43. 
23 Details of the weight of the Maoxin and Fuxin enterprises in these four 
cities are as follows: for Shanghai (in 1932), see Shanghai shangye chuxu yinhang 
diaochabu, Xiaa.ai ji .ianfen (Shangpin diaocha congkan de qi hao) (Shanghai, 
Shanghai shangye chuxu yinhang diaochabu, 1932), pp.71-72; for Hankou, see ".Wuhan 
gongchangye zuijin zhuangkuang", Gongshang banyueJam, 4:10 (May 15, 1932); p.11; for 
Wuxi, see "Wuxi mianf enye j inkuang", Congshang banyueJmn, 2: 3 (February 1, 1930), 
p.46, and Wuxi xianzhengfu, comp., Jluxi Cai!an ~Wuxi, Wuxi ~ia.nzhengf~r' 1935)., 
Chapter 17, pp.2-3; and for Ji'nan, see Lu Guox1ang, "Shandong Zh1 ml.anfenye , Cuo.1~e 
.aoyi daobao, 6:5 (May 10, 1934), pp.218-219. 
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region. H Besides, the business group also controlled several 
related businesses such as warehouses, machine-tool making 
factories, and packaging factories. It was, indeed, a typical 
example of big business in pre-war China. 
Business group (jituan in Chinese) here refers to an economic 
entity which consists of more than one constituent enterprise under 
a single share-holding body. Enterprise (qiye in Chinese) here means 
an economic enti ty which consists of several branch companies 
• (gongsi in Chinese) with the same name. In my study, a branch of 
Maoxin (or Fuxin, or Shenxin), such as Maoxin No.l, is a company. 
The four Maoxin companies are an enterprise. The combination of 
three enterprises, namely Maoxin, Fuxin, and Shenxin, is a business 
. 
group. Although the shareholders of these three enterprises were not 
the same group of people, the Rong brothers together held the 
overall majority of shares in each enterprise. By 1932, the Rong 
brothers together held 91.5% of Maoxin's shares, while they held 55% 
of Fuxin' s shares and 78.9% of Shenxin' s. 25 Under the ownership and 
management of the Rong brothers, these three enterprises had 
concerted actions in business. On the matters of financing, as will 
24 Details of the weight of the Shenxin enterprise in varies locales are as the 
follows: for the gross production~capacity of Chinese mill in Shanghai, see Shiyebu 
guoji maoyiju (Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Industry), comp., Zhongguo 
shiyezhi: Quanguo shiye diaocha baogao ziyi l .Tiangsusheng (China Industrial 
Handbooks: First Series of the Reports by the National Industry Investigation) 
(Shanghai, Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Industry, 1933), Chapter 8, p.1; the 
gross number of spindle of Shenxin mills in Shanghai is from Huang Hanmin, "Jiu 
yaoguan Shenxin shachang de tongji ziliao wenti da Riben duzhe", in Zhongguo jindai 
jingjishi congshu bianweihui, comp., Zhongguo jinda.i jingjishi yanjiu ziliao, No.3 
(Shanghai, Shanghai shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 1985), p.188; for Wuxi, see Wuxi 
xianzhengfu, Op.cit., pp.5-6, if we use the figures provided by Huang Hanmin about 
Shenxin No.3, the percentage is still very close to my original estimation; for 
\vuhan, see "Wuhan gongchangye zuijin zhuangkuang", pp.1-2, the figure of Shenxin No.4 
provided by Huang Hanmin is also very close to that of this article. 
25 See RQS.I, p.284. 
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be demonstrated by this study, these three enterp~ises also had a 
considerable degree of cooperation. Thus, it is justifiable to treat 
the group as a uni t of analysis for the study of big business 
financing. 
Nevertheless, the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group here is not the 
tautology of the "Rong fami ly' s business" (Rongj iB qiye in Chinese) 
which has been widely accepted by previous studies, particularly in 
Chinese and Japanese scholarships.26 To use the term Rongjia qiye, 
scholars refer to the business acti vi ties founded by the Rong 
brothers, and it included the Maoxin, Fuxin, and Shenxin enterprises 
and their related, subordinate businesses. It can also include other 
enterprises established by their descendents. However, such a 
definition is too broad which can embrace all kinds of enterprises 
owned by members of the Rong family. Since the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin 
group was only part of the Rong family's business, and the business 
group did not have direct financial linkage with other investment 
items of the Rongs', I do not equate this business group with the 
"Rong family's business". 
The period of research in this study is 1901-1936. Within 
these thirty-five years, the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group became one 
business uni t under the ownership and management of the Rong 
brothers and their affiliates. After the outbreak of the Second 
Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), the business group suffered from two 
events which changed the basic structure of the group. First, since 
26 See RQS.I, editor's preface, p.l; also Lee Muk-miu, "Rong~ia qiyesh~ yanjiu", 
p. 2 • In fact, this definition has also been used by the MaInland, TaIwan, and 
Japanese historians. 
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the war had broken out, the business group (which was mainly in 
Shanghai and Wuxi) suffered seriously under military attacks. Some 
of its factory plants moved to the Guomindang-ruled areas of Sichuan 
and Shaanxi. The business group began to have another power base in 
the inland provinces under the leadership of Li Guowei, who was the 
eldest son-in-law of Rong Desbeng and the original manager of the 
Hankou branch factories of the business group. Second, in 1938, the 
death of Rong Zongjing in Hongkong caused a fundamental setback to 
the business group. The corporation virtually split into several 
eli visions under the leadership of several branches of the Rong 
family and some of the original managers. The Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin 
group as a single economic unit disappeared. Therefore, this study 
ends in 1936. 
To analyze the system of Chinese big business financing, some 
basic conceptual tools from studies in financial management and 
business financing will be utilized. 27 Generally speaking, to 
finance a giant business, two kinds of capital, fixed and working, 
are needed while two kinds of costs, fixed and operating, should be 
considered. The main point of financial management here, however, 
refers to capital liquidity,' maximization rather than to just cost 
minimization. To maximize capital liquidity, a business firm needs 
to explore as much financial resources as possible. Bankruptcy will 
follow if the firm fails to achieve such liquidity. 
27 For most of the concept of business financing, I have consulted James E. Wert 
and Glenn V. Henderson, Jr., Financing Business Firm, 6th ed. (Homewood, Illinois, 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1979). 
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There are three channels of financing that a big business can 
make use of. The first channel is internal financing which refers to 
the making use of capital from the shareholders' fund, accumulated 
capital, and other kinds of reserve. This channel is fundamental as 
shareholders' fund is the basis of financing of any busi~ess firm. 
The second channel is external financing which refers to the 
use of loans and credits borrowed from external agencies. External 
agencies include two major kinds of market media. The first kind of 
financial media refers to the stock market and organizations of 
banking functions. The second kind of media refers to those 
suppliers which offer credit to the firm. External financing is a 
usual al ternati ve to internal financing in the firm's financial 
structure. 
The last channel is closed financing and refers to the use of 
all kinds of financial resources that can be exchanged between the 
constituent enterprises of the business group. It also includes the 
usage of fund from a banking or bank-like agency which is owned by 
the business group. Closed financing is important as it is an 
addit ional source to internal financing and it signifies a certain 
degree of independence of the business group from · the banking 
agencies. Since the funding' through closed financing is a kind of 
"internal borrowing" of the business group, it should thus be 
differentiated from the shareholders' fund in internal financing. 
The following chapters ?f this thesis are organized to expoun~ the 
above three channels of financing. 
These three channels of financing are affected by the 
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relationship and interaction between the decision-makers of the 
bus iness group and various soc i al groups of people, or 
organizations. For instance, internal financing involves the 
relationship between the major and minor shareholders in the 
decision-making process, while external financing involves the 
interactions between the business group and the market 
intermediaries. Closed financing concerns the relationship among the 
constituent enterprises on the matter of financial exchange. All 
these different relationships and interactions will also be analyzed 
in the following chapters. 
Business financing is seldom discussed by previous researchers 
because of the scarci ty of primary materials such as business 
records, minutes, and related documents. Archive materials, which 
may consist of company records, accounting books, and others, are 
badly needed in this research area. On my topic, although such 
archive materials are not accessible, the records published are 
nevertheless quite rich. Two collections of the company records, 
including accounting records and some other internal source 
materials, are published, first in 195628 , and then in 198029 • 
These collected materials provided me with some concrete data. More 
importantly, two contemporary publications, namely the memoirs of 
28 Shanghai Shenxin zongguanlichu and Shanghai caijing xueyuan, comp., Shenxin 
xitong qiye shiliao (Shanghai, n.p., 1956), eight volumes. Yet, only 2:1 and 7:1 are 
relevant to the present study. 
29 Shanghai shehui kexueyuan JlngJl yanjiusuo, comp., RODlIjia qiye shiliao 2 
vols. (Shanghai, Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1980). Volume One is relevant to t~e 
present study as it covers the period 1896-1937. In the following footnotes, thlS 
source material (volume one) will be abbreviated as RQS.I. 
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Rong Desheng30 and the commemorative volume of the Maoxin-Fuxin-
Sh ' 31 . enXln group , deepened my understanding as they are primary and 
internal source materials of the business group and its businessmen. 
Primary materials are also available in the following ways. 
Several collected source materials on Chinese industrial 
development, which consisted of some documents and contemporary 
descriptions on the business group, were compiled and published 
during the 1950's.32 Specific collections on flour milling 
industry, a major concern of the business group, are also available 
in 1966. 33 Several publications of materials on banking agencies, 
namely qianzhuang of Shanghai, the Bank of China and the Shanghai 
Commercial and Savings Bank, also came out of the press in recent 
years. 3( Besides these post-1949 publications of archive records 
and documents, I was also exposed to the pre-1949 li teratures, 
30 Rong Desheng, Lenong ziding xingnian jishi (Shanghai, private publication, 
1943) • 
31 Maoxin Fuxin Shenxin zonggongsi, comp., Haoxin FUrin Shenxin zonggongsi sa 
zbounian jiniance (Shanghai, Maoxin Fuxin Shenxin zonggongsi, 1929). 
32 Such source materials include Sun Yutang, comp., Zhongguo jindai gongyeshi 
ziliao, di yi ji, 1840-1895, (Beijins, Kexue chubanshe, 1957), 2 volumes; Wang Jinyu, 
comp., Zhongguo jindai gongyeshi ziliao, di er ji, 1895-1914, (Beijing, Kexue 
chubanshe, 1957),2 volumes; also Chen Zhen, comp., Zhongguo jindai gongyeshi ziliao 
(Beijing, Sanlian shudian, first collection, 1957, fourth collection, 1961, 2 
volumes) • 
33 See Zhongguo kexueyuan j ingj i yanj iusuo, Zhongyang gongshang xingzheng 
guanliju ziben zhuyi jingji gaizao yanjiushi, comp., .Tiu Zhongguo jizhi .ianfen 
gongye tongji ziliao (Beijing, Zhonghua shuju, 1966). 
34 On the Shanghai qianzhuang, see Zhongguo renmin yinhang Shanghaishi fenhang, 
comp., Shanghai qianzhuang shiliao (Shanghai, Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1960), 2 
volumes in one book; on the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank, see Zhongguo renmin 
yinhang Shanghaishi fenhang jinrong yanjiushi, comp., Shanghai shangye chuxu yinhang 
shiliao (Shanghai, Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1.990); and on the Bank of China, see 
Zhongguo Yinhang zonghang and Zhongguo dier 1 ishi dang J anguan, comp., Zhongguo 
yinhang hangshi ziliao huibian, shangbian (1912-1949) (Beijing, Dang'an chubanshe, 
1991), 3 volumes. 
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particularly books and journal articles35 with high research value. 
Equipped wi th such pre-1949 publications, I am able to reach a 
clearer understanding of the subject of discussion. 
Contemporary Engl ish and Japanese sources, such as books, 
journals and surveys, are also employed in this study, though they 
are not in great amount. In fact, primary records as well as 
research material in English on Chinese business are extremely 
scarce. Because of the scarcity of sources, I selectively used some 
available Japanese secondary sources, such as research done by the 
T~a n5bunkai during the 1910's and the 1920's, which are unusually 
rich in information and ideas. Some of them can even make up the 
limi tations of Chinese sources. 36 
Oral history is another possible way of collecting information 
for this study. Since many figures of the period concerned had 
35 There are several valuable pre-war Chinese publications which this research 
will count on. These are journals, especially those economic journals, organized, 
sponsored, or published by either official organizations (under both Beiyang and 
Guomindang authorities), economic organizations (banks, native banks, or chambers of 
commerce), or research institutes (such as Jinning University and Nankai University). 
These journals include: Zhongwai Jingji Zhoulmn (Beijing, 1923-1927); Jingji 
Banyuekan (Beiping, 1927-1928); Gongs hang Banyuelmn (Shanghai, 1929-1936); Cuoji 
Haoyi Daobao (Shanghai, 1930-1937); Bank of China Honthly Review( Zhonllhanll Yuekan, 
Shanghai, 1930-1938); Bankers' Jleekly (Yinhang Zhoubao, Shanghai, 1917-1950); Qianye 
Yuebao . (Shanghai, 1921-1949); Shangye Yuebao (Shanghai, insufficient information 
about the date of publication); Quarterly Review of Social Sciences (Shehul Kexue 
Zazhi, Beiping, 1930-1935, Nanjing, 1935-1937); Shehui Jingji Yuebao (Shanghai, 1934-
1939); and also The Quarterly Journal of Rcona.icB and Statistics (Jingji Tongji 
Jikan (Tianjin, 1932-1937). These economic journals contain many articles and news 
concerning the contemporary political and economic issues. There are also statistical 
tables and charts to demonstrate to the reader statistics of trade volume, interest 
rate, wage rate and price index, and the data from various markets (stock, money or 
bonds). These are first-hand economic data for the study of economic conditions and 
public opinion on economic issues of the period. More importantly, there are several 
general surveys (diaocha) on either general economic conditions or specific 
si tuations of a particular business. Frankly speaking, they are far from being 
systematic or sophisticated in t"rms of its methodology and conceptual framework, and 
are limited in the scope of their ~urvey on the situation of the late 1920's and the 
1930's. These surveys, however, are still undeniably the valuable materials for this 
study as no better surveys had been produced in earlier time. 
36 Although I do have a language barrier in Japanese, I am grateful for the 
translations from my dearest Japanese friend, Mr. · Kashimura Fujio. Through these 
translated materials, my understanding on Japanese sources has become enriched. 
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passed away, it is difficul t to make use of such source of 
information. Even though some of them may be alive, there still 
exist many complicated factors in arranging interviews wi th the 
surviving figures. Yet, I was kindly received by an ex-technician-
manager of the business group, Mr. Zhang Jianwei (1904- ), who 
introduced me to some management problems of the day. 37 His memoirs 
are also one of the items regarding first-hand materials in this 
study.38 Besides, some of the interviews with the surviving figures 
have been publ ished in China in recent years, as memoirs or "wenshi 
ziliao". These source materials were also helpful to my 
understanding. 
37 According to Mr. Zhang's account, he entered Shenxin No.4 in Hankou i~ 1924 
as a technician. During the wartime, he was promoted to the post of ass1stant 
manager. 
38 For his memoirs, see Zhang Jianwei, Xueni zaji (Hong Kong, private 
publication, 1984), 3 volumes. 
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2. The Demand for Capi tal and Credi t 39 
Starting from a small flour mill in 1901, the Maoxin-Fuxin-
Shenxin group in the following thirty-f i ve years became a big 
business which by 1932 possessed nine cotton mills (the Shenxin 
enterprise) and eleven flour mills (Maoxin and Fuxin) in four major 
ci ties in China. Such a large-scale production signi f ies large scale 
demands for capital and credit. To assess such a demand, several 
criteria are. selectively employed. They include the total number of 
factory plants established, the total number of machinery installed, 
the amount of gross capitalization increased, as well as the total 
number of branch and/or purchasing offices set up. All these 
consti tute a general picture of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group's 
demand in a quantitative sense. 
The first industrial venture of the Rong brothers and the 
Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group was the Baoxing Flour Mill which was 
established in 1901. In the next thirty-five years, the total number 
of factory plants of the business group increased continuously. 
Table 1 shows the location and the year of establishment of the 
twelve flour mills of the Maoxin and Fuxin enterprises and the nine 
cotton mills of Shenxin. All of them were completed before 1920. 
After 1920 no addi tional mill was buil t because both Maoxin and 
39 Capital here includes fixed and working capital. Fixed capita~ is used to 
install fixed assets like machinery, factory plant, and other relatively long life 
producer goods for production. Working capital refers to the kind of money used for 
routine operation. Fluidity of working capital is obviously higher than fixed 
capital. Credit here includes long-term and short-term loans from banking agencies, 
negotiable instruments from banking agencies and/or business firms, a s well a s 
credi ts from suppliers. They all have a common characteristics of enabling the debtor 
to defer the payment in a business transaction. 
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Fuxin suffered from heavy damages in fire. Fuxin No.2 was ruined and 
r~built in 1918. 40 Fuxin No.1 was also ruined by fire in 1925 and 
No.3 was renamed as No.1 hereafter. The vacancy of Fuxin No.3 was 
filled up by buying another mill.H Maoxin No.2 and No.3 were burnt 
down in 1926. No.2 was rebuilt in 1927 but No.3 remained vacant 
afterwards. (2 
Table 2.1 also shows the details of Shenxin cotton mills. As 
commented by contemporaries, Shenxin was created after the Rong 
brothers left the Zhenxin partnership in 1915.~3 Its expansion did 
not stop in the late 1910's. Even in the late 1920's, the Shenxin 
enterprise still continued its expansion. Within three years (1929-
1931), Shenxin took over three mills from its competitors, while 
establishing an additional one adjacent to No.1. 
40 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.47. 
41 See RQS.I, pp.182-3. 
42 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., pp.57-58; also see "Maoxin di er mianfenchang 
gaikuang", in "Maoxin gechang gaikuang", p.5 in HaoKin FUKin Sherucin zonggongsi sa. 
zhounian jiniance. 
43 See RQS.I, p.53. 
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Table 2.1. The Location and the Year of Establishment of Factory Plants under the 
Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin -Group 
Name of Mill Location Year of Establishment Maoxin No.1 Wuxi ' 1903 
No.2* Wuxi #1916 
No.3* Wuxi 191B 
No.4 Ji 'nan 1919 Fuxin No.1 Shanghai 1913 
No.2 Shanghai 1914 
No.3* Shanghai 1914 
No.4* Shanghai #1913 
No.5 Hankou 1918 
No.6* Shanghai #1917 
No.7 Shanghai 1919 
No.B Shanghai 1919 
Shenxin No.1 Shanghai 1915 
No.2* Shanghai 1919 
No.3 Wuxi 1921 
No.4 Hankou 1920 
No.·5* Shanghai 1925 
No.6* Changzhou/Shanghai #1925 
No.7* Shanghai 1929 
No.8 Shanghai 1930 
No.9* Shanghai 1931 
N.B. # stands for the year when the mill was leased to the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin 
group. 
* stands for those mills which were bought in from other mill owners rather than 
built by the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group itself. 
Maoxin No.3 burnt in 1926 and was not rebuilt afterwards. 
Source: Shanghai shehui kexueyuan jingjishi yanjiusuo, comp. Bongjia qiye shiliao 
(Shanghai, Shanghai renrnin chubanshe, 19B1)" Vol.1, p.107, 281. 
However, there exists divergence of data in both the year of establishment and 
location. For these divergent sources, see "Maoxin Fuxin mianfenchang yilanbiao" and 
"Shenxin fangzhichang yilanbiao", both in Maoxin Fuxin Shenxin zonggongsi, camp., 
Haoxin Fuxin Shenxin zonggongsi sa zhounian jiniance (Shanghai, Maoxin Fuxin Shenxin 
zonggongsi, 1929); Rong Desheng, Lenong ziding xingnian jishi (Shanghai, private 
publication, 1943); Lee Muk-miu, "Rongjia qiyeshi yanjiu (A Historical Study on 
Yungs' Enterprise), 1896-1956", Ph.D. dissertation, New Asia Institute of Advanced 
Chinese Studies (Hong I{ong), July 1990, pp. 221-223; Yan Zhongping, Zhongguo 
.ian£angzhi shigao, 1289-1937 (Beijing, Kexue chubanshe, 1963), pp.32B-351; Shanghai 
Shenxin zongguanlichu and Shanghai caijing xueyuan, comp., Sherncin xitong qiye 
shiliao (Shanghai, n. p., 1956), 2: 1, pp. 107 -lOB; "Chinese Flour Industry, 1930", 
Chinese Economic Journal, 8:2 (February, 1931), pp.10B-112; Shanghai shangye chuxu 
yinhang diaochabu, XiaOl8B.i ji .ian£en (Shanghai, Shanghai shangye chuxu yinhang 
diaochabu, 1932), pp.129-134; Yang Dajin, Xindai Zhongguo shiyefhi (Changsha, The 
Commercial Press, 1938), pp.636-645; Shiyebu Zhongguo jingji nianjian bianzuan 
weiyuanhui, comp., Zhongguo jingji nianjian (Shanghai, The Commercial Press, 1934), 
Chapter 11 [Industry], pp.K1-K9; "Flour Mills in China" Chinese Econmlic Journal, 2:6 
(June, 1928), pp.533-540; Tna Kenkyojo, Shina no seif~yD (Tokyo, Tna Kenkynjo, 
1941), pp.66- 76. (There are some other sources unlisted.) 
Increase in the number of factory plants also signifies a 
responding increase in the number of machinery installed. As shown 
in Table 2.2, between 1903 and 1936, the Maoxin and Fuxin 
enterprises altogether increased 86.75 times in the number of 
rollers and their production capaci ty increased about 321.666 times. 
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In the pre-1920 period, we can find a growth rate of 42.5 times in 
the number of rollers and 140 times of growth in production 
capacity. Yet, in the post-1920 period, as no new factory plant was 
found, there were only six occasions of increase in the number of 
rollers (1921, 1922, 1925, 1926, 1927, and 1930) for obsolescence or 
further expansion, and only an increase of 1.285 times in the number 
of rollers and 1.45 times in production capacity was witnessed. 
Table 2.2. Maoxin's and Fuxin's Growth in Production Capacity, 1903-1936 
Year Number of Annual Flour Year Number of Annual Flour 
Rollers Production Rollers Production 
Capacity Capacity 
1903 4 90,000 1920 270 19,950,000 
1904 4 90,000 1921 294 22,350,000 
1905 10 240,000 1922 318 24,900,000 
1906 10 240,000 1923 318 24,900,000 
1907 10 240,000 1924 318 24,900,000 
1908 10 240,000 1925 319 25,860,000 
1909 10 240,000 1926 343 27,660,000 
1910 18 900,000 1927 346 28,860,000 
1911 18 900,000 1928 346 28,860,000 
1912 18 900,000 1929 346 28,860,000 
1913 43 2,520,000 1930 347 28,950,000 
1914 64 4,170,000 1931 347 28,950,000 
1915 64 4,170,000 1932 347 28,950,000 
1916 89 6,030,000 1933 347 28,950,000 
1917 107 7,530,000 1934 347 28,950,000 
1918 115 7,650,000 1935 347 28,950,000 
1919 170 12,600,000 1936 347 28,950,000 
Unit: for roller, set; for annual flour productivity, bag, which is a unit of 
measuring weight. A bag of flour is 50 pounds before 1924 and 49 pounds after that 
year. 
Source: RQS.I, p.614. 
N. B. Here those plants leased to the business "group are not included, these include: 
1916-1917, Tailong Mianfenchang with 12 sets of roller, 1917-1918, Baoxin 
Mianfenchang with 6 sets, 1918-1922, Yuanfeng with 7 sets. 
Annual productivity counts 300 working days in a year. 
Shenxin also expanded its production capacity by increasing 
the total number of machinery. As demonstrated by Table 2. 3 and 
Table 2.4, the total number of spindles and looms in Shenxin mills 
increased continuously because the enterprise was expanding its 
number of factory plants. By 1936, the total number of spindles 
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installed by Shenxin was about 44 times of its number in 1916, while 
the total number of looms installed in 1936 was about 15 times of 
that in 1916. 
































































































































































N.B. Shenxin No.8 began production in 1930, and thus the figures of 1916-1929 are 
those of Shenxin No.1 only. 
Source: Huang Hamnin, "Jiu yaoguan Shenxin shachang de tongji ziliao wenti da Riben 
duzhe", in Zhongguo jindai jingjishi congshu bianweihui, comp., Zhongguo jindai 
jingjishi yanjiu ziliao No.3 (Shanghai, Shanghai shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 1985), 
pp.187-188. 
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Table 2.4. The Number of Looms in the Shenxin Enterprise, 1917-1936 (unit=set) 
Year No.1 & 8 No. '3 No.4 No.6 No.7 No.9 Total 
1917 350 350 
1918 600 600 
1919 700 700 
1920 1,111 1,111 
1921 1,111 1,111 
1922 1,111 504 1,615 
1923 1,111 504 1,615 
1924 1,111 504 1,615 
1925 1,111 504 1,615 
1926 1,111 504 273 1,888 
1927 1,111 504 273 1,888 
1928 1,111 878 273 2,262 
1929 1,111 878 273 446 2,708 
1930 1,111 878 400 447 2,836 
1931 1,111 878 400 920 448 1,000 4,757 
1932 1,111 1,478 400 920 448 1,000 5,357 
1933 1,100 1,478 400 920 440 515 4,853 
1934 1,100 1,478 400 920 448 515 4,861 
1935 1,304 1,478 400 920 448 516 5,066 
1936 1,387 1,418 657 814 452 516 5,304 
Source: Huang Hanmin, "Jiu yaoguan Shenxin shachang de tongji ziliao wenti da Riben 
duzhe ll , p.189. 
A continuous increase in the number of factories and machinery 
reveals a simultaneous increase in capitalization. Table 2.5 (in the 
appenqix) demonstrates, based on three major sourcesH, the 
significant years of capitalization of Maoxin and Fuxin, 
particularly at the time when new plant(s) was/were installed or 
restored. The growth is eminent: wi thin thirty-four years, the 
capitalization amount expanded roughly 192 times, from the original 
Y50,OOO to Y9,601,320. Some sources indicate that between 1916 and 
1936, the capi talization of Shenxin increased from Y300, 000 to 
Y10,120,OOO, i.e., almost 33.7 times : ~5 
44 This table is inconsistent with Table 2.1, especially on Maoxin No.2. On 
Table 2.1, the year of founding is 1916 which, as mentioned in the source, is the 
time when Weiyuan Flour Mill was leased to Maoxin. However, the contract was on a 
two-year term. Accordingly, the year of founding must be 1918. Thus, 1918 instead of 
1916 was used for the year of founding and increasing capital in this table. 
45 Because of inadequate information, the capitalization of Shenxin cannot be 
tabulated. Still, the capitalization of 1916 (only Shenxin No.1) and 1936 is 
available. See RQS.I, p.58, 546; for 1916, also see Rong Desheng, Op.cit., pp.42-43. 
The actual amount of capital paid in 1916 was reportedly Y217,488 and it was raised 
to Y300,OOO in the next year. 
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Parallel to the growth of the number of factories and rollers 
and the increase in capitalization is the expansion of the business 
scale in spatial terms --- to increase purchasing and marketing 
activities by means of setting up branch offices in varies locales. 
Establishing direct purchasing and marketing systems is to ' achieve 
t . l' t . 46 '7 ver lca In egratlon and to reduce transaction costs.' 
There were three kinds of branch offices under the Maoxin-
Fuxin-Shenxin group. The offices of wheat purchasing were called 
banmaichut8 and those for cotton buying were called ba.nhua.chu. 
Pifa.chu, or branch offices, were set up for marketing or 
distributing the finished flour or textile to the locales. Sometimes 
wheat buying and flour marketing would be performed by the same 
branch office. ~9 In some cases, cotton buying offices would also 
46 Vertical integration here refers to the building up of direct linkage of the 
production process, namely purchasing, production, and marketing, by a business firm. 
47 As summarized by a Chinese reporter (Lu Yan), the two main costs in domestic 
trade of China were transportation and transaction costs. Transportation costs have 
long been stressed by studies under the Skinnerian paradigm as an important factor 
in "cross-regional, long-distance trade". The transaction cost is stressed by Sherman 
Cochran as a factor far more important than the transportation cost. Cochran argues 
that big business of the twentieth century succeeded in reducing transaction costs. 
In fact, this paper is illuminated by Cochran's ideas. For details of the summary by 
the reporter, see Lu Yan, tiMe iguo xuezhe Gao J ialong (Sherman Cochran) tan xifang 
yanjiu Zhongguo jindai jingjishi de xindongxiang", in Zhongguo jindai jingjishi 
congshu bianweihui, ed., Zhongguo jindai jingjishi yanjiu zilia.o, No.4 (Shanghai, 
Shanghai shehui kexue chubanshe, 1985), pp.157-160. 
48 In Haoxin Fuxin Shenxin zonggongsi sa zhounian J~n~ance, banmaichu is used 
for "wheat buying offices", while.,in both Rong Desheng' s memoir and RQS. I, the term 
maizhuang is used. Here, these two words are interchangeable. 
49 Both were organized in a similar manner. But a maizhuang or banmaichu was 
established for wheat purchasing, while a pifachu for flour marketing. A banmaichu 
included several staff members who were headed by a zhuren (director). Under the 
zhuren there have zhangwu (accountant) J huozhan (warehousing assistant), kanhuo 
(commodi ty examiner), dabao (paokaging assistant), zhuangchuan (shipment assistant), 
and shiwu (miscellaneous assistant). See Xiaoaai ji .ianfen, p.47. Pifachu was 
staffed mainly with zhuren, sizhang (accountant) and jiuzhuang (marketing staff), and 
others were responsible to transport the flour. See Xiaa.a.i ji .ianfen, p. 62. 
However, a surviving document, which demonstrates that a pifachu was founded under 
the partnership of Maoxin-Fuxin group with some other merchants J tells us that 
maizhuang was a branch office under the firm but pifachu might be organized as an 
agent of the firm under a contract. For the document, see RQS.I, pp.99-100. 
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handle wheat purchasing and flour marketing, and vice versa. 50 
The earliest branc.h office was, as shown on Table 2.6, the one 
built in 1903 in Wuxi. Up to 1936, there were fourteen banmaichu, 
ten banhuachu, as well as thirty-one pifachu in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Anhui, Hubei, Henan, Shandong, Jiangxi, Shaanxi, Hunan, Sichuan and 
even Guangdong and Hongkong, being set up by the Maoxin-Fuxin-
Shenxin group. They signified a considerable degree of penetrating 
into both factor and product markets at the local and regional 
levels by the business group.51 Yet, they also necessitated a high 
cost in operation. 
Table 2.6. A Brief List of Purchasing and Marketing Offices of the Maoxin-Fuxin-
Shenxin Group, 1903-1936 
Name of Offices 
for Wheat Buying 
1. Maoxin Banmaichut 
2. Maoxin Maizhuang* 
3. Maoxin Banmaichut 
4. Maoxin Banmaichut 
5. Maoxin Maizhuang, 
6. Maoxin Maizhuang, 
7. Maoxin Maizhuang, 
8. Maoxin Banmaichut 






















50 From the list provided by the Maoxin-Fuxin authorities, two cotton buying 
offices of Shenxin (in Changshu and Jiujiang) were reportedly also purchasing wheat 
in their respective locales. The Taizhou Wheat Buying Office reportedly collected 
some amount of cotton for the business group also. See "Pifachu yilanbiao", in Haoxin 
Fuxin Shenxin zonggongsi sa zhounian jiniance. 
51 Skinner has demonstrated on several occasions the "regional marketing 
structure" of Chinese society which was well connected and supported by a hierarchy 
of local market towns at different levels. For further details, see G. William 
Skinner, "Marketing and Social Strilcture in Rural China", Journal of Asian Studies, 
24:1 (November, 1964), pp.3-43, 24:2 (February, 1965), pp.195-228, 24:3 (May, 1965), 
pp.363-399; also "Regional Urbanization in Nineteenth-Century China", in G. William 
Skinner, ed., The City in Late Imperial China (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 
1977), pp.211-249. From Table 6, I can take Hankou as an example of illustration. The 
city was supported by a hierarchy of local markets, for instance Fancheng, in the 
same drainage system, as the example of a regional marketing cent er in Skinnerian 
terms. Wheat was collected through local markets around Fancheng and then transported 
from Fancheng to Hankou. A similar pattern existed in other parts of Hubei. For 
materials on wheat and flour marketing in Hubei, especially focusing on Hankou, see 
Zheng Zhaoxing, ed., Hubei jindai jingji ..aoyi shiliao xuanji (1840-1949)(Wuhan, 
Hubei shengzhi maoyizhi bianjishi, 1984), Vol.1, pp.123-192; also see Huang Jiming, 
"Hankou zhi xiaomai yu mianfen shiye", Yinhang zazhi, 3:15 (June 1,1926), pp.I-4j o 








Name of Offices 
for Cotton Buying 
1. Shenxin Banhuachut 
2. Shenxin Banhuachut 
3. Shenxin Banhuachut 
4. Shenxin Banhuachut 
5. Shenxin Banhuachu* 
6. Shenxin Banhuachu* 
7. Shenxin Banhuachu* 
8. Shenxin Banhuachu* 
9. Shenxin Banhuachu* 
10.Shenxin Banhuachu* 
Name of Offices for 
Yarn and Flour Marketing 
1. Maoxin Pifachut 
2. Maoxin Shenxin Pifachut 
3. Shenxin Pifachut 
4. Maoxin Pifachut 
5. Maoxin Pifachut 
6. Mao-Fu-Shenxin Pifachut 
7. Shenxin Pifachut 
8. Maoxin Pifanchut 








































Fuqiao, Taicang, Jiangsu 
Liuduqiao, Taicang, Jiangsu 
Zhitang, Changshu, Jiangsu 
Hejiashi, Changshu, Jiangsu 
Datuanzhen, Pudong, Jiangsu 












































































• refers those branch offices, wheat buying offices, and cotton buying offices 
originally mentioned in "Pifachu yilanbiao", in Haoxin Fuxin Shenxin 
zonggongsi sa zhounian jiniance 
, refers to those branch offices, wheat buying offices, and cotton buying offices 
mentioned in Rong Desheng's memoirs, see Rong Desheng, Lenongziding xingnian 
jishi., p.40; however, the Ji'nan maizhuang was not included in RQS.I, p.97; 
these are not listed in the first source . 
• refers to those branch offices, especially for flour marketing, listed in RQS.I, 
p.9S. 
* refers to those branch offices~ wheat buying offices, and cotton buying offices not 
mentioned in the above three sources but cited from Lee Muk-miu, "Rongj ia 
qiyeshi yanjiu", pp.95-6 and pp.225-6. 
With such a large-scale production, the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin 
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group had to face the problem of financing. Their demand for both 
fixed and working capital was huge and continued to grow. 
First, the construction of flour and cotton mills was costly 
to the business group. This became a major item of expenditure of 
the factory concerned. For instance, Baoxing's construction 'cost was 
roughly less than Y20, 000 which occupied more than 50% of the 
ini tial capi tal paid by the shareholders, Y39, 000. 52 In 1905, 
Maoxin bought in several new British-made rollers. The cost of its 
construction was 80,000 taels. 53 The construction cost of Fuxin 
No.7 was 1,170,000 taels. 54 The pressure from high construction 
cost was yet to be released during the following years. Of course, 
in some cases, the construction cost occupied a lesser amount in the 
total capitalization. For instance, in 1920, Shenxin No.3 cost 
Y230, 00055 , which occupied less than 20% of the initial 
capitalization (Y1, 500,000 )56 • However, constructing a new plant 
continued to be burdensome to the business group even by the early 
1930's.57 Businessmen still did that only because of hoping to gain 
an upper hand in the face of keen competition from their rivals. 58 
52 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit. , p.22. 
53 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit. , p.27. 
54 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit. , p.48. 
55 See Rong Desheng, Ope cit. , p.50. 
56 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit. , p.48. 
57 Thi s can be shown by the case of Shenxin No. 9. I t was removed from its 
original plant site to a new one. The cost of constructing such a new plant was 
Y2,460,OOO, while the cost of preparing electrical facilities was roughly more than 
Yl,OOO,OOO. See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.64. 
58 The competition of Shenxin was particularly from the Yongan group, another 
big cotton milling enterprise in Shanghai. See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.59. 
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To reduce the cost of construction and ini tial establishment, a 
strategy of buying in established factories was adopted. Thus, as we 
can find from Table 2.1, the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group bought in 
many factory plants from companies which had problems in management. 
The purchasing cost of flour milling and cotton spinning 
machines was as high as the construction cost of a new factory 
plant. This is particularly true in the purchase of American-made 
steel roller, which was very costly. For instance, for the expansion 
of Maoxin's production capacity in 1909, the cost of machinery was 
about Y100,OOO. The company had to make the payment by instalment. 59 
Spindles and looms were imported from England and the United States, 
and prices varied from time to time. During the First World War, the 
cost of machinery was 58 taels per spindle and in the late 1920's, 
40 taels. 60 Cotton milling machines were also usually paid by 
instalment. Partly because of reducing the machinery cost, nearly 
half of the mills of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group were bought from 
others. 
Besides, there were other operation costs. These included cost 
for raw materials (cotton and wheat) and other materials, 
electricity bills, transport fees, laborers' wages, cost of 
maintenance, and the like. Roughly speaking, such costs were several 
times or ten times more than the capi talization of the business 
59 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.32. 
60 See Arno S. Pearse, Cotton Industry of Japan and China (Manchester, 
International Federation of master Cotton Spinning & manufacturers' Association, 
1929), p. Hi2. According to Pear se , the cost of 12.5 spindles = the cost of 1 loom. 
By the late 1920's, the exchange rate was 40 taels = £5 1s.9d. 
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group.61 For instance, the capitalization of Shenxin No.l & 8 in 
1936 was Y4,200,000; but its operation cost was Y20,034,370, i.e., 
almost five times of the mill's capi talization. 62 Fuxin No. 7' s 
operation cost in 1932 was more than five times of the mill's 
capi talization. 63 
To conclude, the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group possessed a large-
scale production capac'i ty and a huge volume of raw material 
consumption. To finance such a large-scale operation, the Maoxin-
Fuxin-Shenxin group had to fully utilize all its financial 
resources. By and large, these financial resources was raised by 
three channels, namely, internal financing, external financing, and 
closed financing. They involved different groups of people (or 
economic institutions) and different sources of loans and capital. 
As we will see in the following chapters, the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin 
group tried all these financial arrangements in order to support its 
business. 
61 From the available sources, only three cotton mills (Shenxin No.1 & 8, No.3) 
and three flour mills (Fuxin No.1 & 3, No.7) had the accounting records. These 
accounting records provide a general picture that the cost of operation was several 
or ten times of the mill's capitalization amount. For these accounting records, see 
RQS. I, pp. 619-637. . 
62 For the capitalization, See RQS.I, p.546; for the cost of operation, see 
p.626. 
63 For the cost of operation, see RQS.I, p.636; for the capitalization, see 
p.282. 
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3. Internal Financing 
This chapter is to understand the characteristics of financial 
management of the Chinese big business and the relationships among 
shareholders in the decision-making process. Internal financi,ng here 
means making use of the financial resources from within the business 
group to finance its routine operation and long-term expansion. The 
usage of such financial resources, which is called shareholders' 
fund in general, involves the interaction between different 
shareholders, principal or 
decision~making. Internal 




relationship between internal financial management and shareholders' 
social relationship. 
In general, shareholders' fund can be divided into two kinds. 
The first was shareholders' initial investment which constituted a 
considerable part of finance in the early capitalization process of 
a company. The second was all kinds of accumulated capital which 
included a provident fund, retained earnings, and other kinds of 
reserves. These two kinds of shareholders' fund are discussed in the 
following. 
3.1. Shareholders' Initial Investment 
The foundation of . internal financing in the Maoxin-Fuxin-
Shenxin group was the initial investment of shareholders. To discuss 
the shareholders' initial investment, it is necessary to show the 
source of such capital and the relationship among shareholders as 
manifested by the distribution of shares. Yet, as the predecessors 
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of the business group were the Baoxing Flour Mill (1901-1903) and 
the Zhenxin Cotton Mill (1905-1954)6(, it is necessary to start our 
discussion with the process of initial capitalization of these two 
mills. 
(A) Baoxing' s Ini tial Capitalization and the Formation of Maoxin and 
Zhenxin 
The ini tial capi talization of Baoxing was Y39, 000. Established 
in 1901, the company was organized under partnership with limited 
liability. The two major partners were the Rong brothers and the Zhu 
families. This partnership reveals that the Rong brothers were 
unable to provide all the needed capital themselves to materialize 
their plan of starting an industrial venture. They had to 
collaborate with their late father's superior, Zhu Zhongfu, who had 
just returned from the Guangdong lijin bureau. 65 
Having been interested in the business, Zhu Zhongfu promised 
Rong Desheng to raise Y15,OOO for the company. However, even a Rong-
Zhu coalition could not totally supply the needed capital 
themselves. Both parties had to raise the fund by floating shares. 
To do this, both parties turned to their familiars fr6m their native 
counties, namely Wuxi of the Rongs and Suzhou of the Zhus. 66 
The Rong brothers promised to provide totally Y6,000 for their 
64 This Zhenxin Flour Mill was opened in 1905. Although it continued to exist 
until 1949, the mill was reorganized in 1915 when the Rong brothers brok.o away from 
the original partnership. From 1915 onwards, it was no longer a constituent 
enterprise of the business group under the management of the Rong brothers. For the 
year of closure of Zhenxin, see t~e Muk-miu, "Rongjia qiyeshi yanjiu", p.22!. 
65 See Rong Desheng, Ope cit., p.1S. 
G6 From Rong Desheng' s memoirs, it is not clear about the composition of 
shareholders from both Suzhou and Wuxi except that one share from Wuxi came from a 
clansman of the Rong family, Rong Bingzhi; see Rong Desheng, Op.clt., pp.19-20. 
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part. The source of their capital is not too clear. Yet, the major 
part of it should come from the profit of their Guangsheng 
Qianzhuang. Fundamental and crucial (in Rong Desheng's own words) to 
the Rong brothers' planned venture in flour milling was the 
unprecedented and substantial gains (4,900 taels) made by Guangsheng 
in 1900, when there was a huge amount of remittances went through 
Shanghai to North China. 67 In this sense, Guangsheng' s revenue 
supplied the Rong's needed capital at the outset of Baoxing's 
formation. 68 
67 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., pp.17-20. 
68 Many scholars hold that the Rong brothers were using the profit of their 
qianzhuang, the Guangsheng Qianzhuang and a cocoon shop, Gong Dingchang. In his 
pioneering essay, Huang Yifeng did not even mention the origins of capital of the 
Rong brothers, except from the support of bureaucrats like Zhu Zhongfu. After the 
publication of the source materials and Huang' B essay, there are several articles and 
books from Mainland scholars on the development of the Rong family's business. Nearly 
all of them mention the capital for Baoxing from revenues of Guangsheng and the 
cocoon shop without providing substantial documentation. Their major evidence, 
indeed, comes from Rong Desheng's memoir. (For the material, see RQS.I, pp.5-9.) 
Perhaps misunderstood by these specialists is the relations between Guangsheng, 
Baoxing, and the cocoon shop. 
Gong Dingchang was said to be an investment made by Rong Xitai before his 
death in 1896. Yet, Rong Xitai (and his successors) was only a shareholder of this 
cocoon shop. In the same year of Xitai's death, the cocoon shop suffered great losses 
and needed to borrow money from Rong Desheng 'to clear the debts up. Later, Desheng 
got the money back but only after a long negotiation (see Rong Desheng, Op.cit., 
p.20). From this event, it is highly skeptical that the Rong brothers would/could 
rally the financial resources from a cocoon shop which was heavily indebted, 
bankrupt, and not mainly owned by themselves (or their father). 
The allegedly prosperous cocoon shop should be the one established in 1906. 
From Rong Desheng's description, this cocoon shop could give him an annual income of 
Y2,OOO-3,000 (see Rong Desheng, Op.cit, p.28). It was a sideline business of the Rong 
family (mainly Desheng's) until 1922, when the shop was demolished for residential 
purposes (Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.52, but Lee Muk-miu had mixed up this cocoon shop 
and Gong Dingchang and suggested that it operated until 1949, see Lee Muk-miu, 
"Rongj ia qiyeshi yanj iu", p. 221) . As mentioned, this cocoon shop was established in 
1906 rather than during the turn of the century and had no direct relationship with 
Baoxing's early capitalization. 
For detai Is of the concerned arguments, see Huang Yifeng, "J iu Zhongguo 
Rongjia ziben de fazhan", pp.39-56 . For other literatures besides Huang's, see XU 
Weiyong and Huang Hanmin, Rongjia qiye fazhanshi, pp.3-6; also Chen Wenyuan, Qian 
Jiang and Wang Jianzhong, "Rongshi xiongdi chuangye jiliie", Jiangnan daxue xuebao, 
1991:3, pp.1-B, particularly p.3; also see Bo Zheng Sheng Bin, "Cong Rongjia qiye de 
fazhan kan ziben jilei zai minzu- ziben qiye zhong de zuoyong", p.12; and Qu Conggui, 
"Rongjia qiye de chuangban jiqi jingying guanli", p.69. 
Non-Mainland Chinese or Japanese scholars, who also use the same source 
materials, do not have too much difference in interpretation with their Mainland 
counterparts. See Zhang Meizhi, "Rongj ia qiye j ingying xingtai zhi gean yanj iu (1896-
1931)", p.295; Li Muk-miu, "Rongjia qiyeshi yanjiu", pp.20-22, 25; for Japanese ' 
scholars, see Suzuki Tomoo, "Kindai chngoku no kigya keiei --- Musyaku 'Eike kigynJ 
no kenky"Q", p. 79; also Ohno Mi tsunori, "Kokumin kakumei ki ni i taru Eike kigyn no 
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Guangsheng's profit was also indispensable to the Rang 
brothers during the transition from Baoxing to Maoxin in 1903. The 
qianzhuang earned more than 5,000 taels annually between 1901 and 
1905
69
; it was totally more than 15,000 taels for the period 1901-
1903. Such an amount of capital enabled the Rong brothers to re-
organize Baoxing into Maoxin. It also enabled the Rang brothers to 
raise their share of holding (slightly more than Y20,00070) in the 
newly re-organized Maoxin mill.?1 Nevertheless J in spi te of having 
a stronger financial position in 1903, the Rong brothers once again 
had to raise fund by f loa t ing shares. They were s till unable to 
provide most of the capital. A new partnership was thus necessary.72 
The situation of Zhenxin was similar to that of Maoxin. The 
initial capitalization of Zhenxin was Y270,800. Established in 1905, 
the cotton mill was also organized under partnership of the Rong 
brothers and some Wuxi businessmen. The Rong brother was still 
unable to become the sole proprietor of the cotton mill. They could 
only supply Y60, 000 from Guangsheng Qianzhuang for their own part of 
the initial capital.?3 Partnership was the form of business since 
tenkai to sono seikaku --- Moshin-Fukushin Seifun, Shinshin B"Oseki Gaisha", pp.20-21. 
69 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., pp.23-27. 
70 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.24. 
71 On this point, Amano Motonosuke once recorded that the Rong brothers had to 
borrow Y I, 000 from the Rong 1 ineage ' s char i table estate. However, such a record 
cannot be confirmed by both the company's record and Rong Desheng's memoirs, we 
cannot take it into consideration. For further details of Amano's record, see Amano 
Motonosuke, Shins nDson zakki, . p.SI. 
72 However, the new partnership consisted of many new personnel. Zhu Lanfang was 
one of them. He was a compradore of Jardine, Matheson & Co. His investment in Maoxin 
was Y4,OOO. See Rong Desheng, Op,cit., pp.24 and 27. 
73 Yet, this time the Y60,000 came from Guangsheng's deposit rather than profit. 
See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.27. 
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the beginning. 
(B) The Formation of Fuxin and Shenxin 
Established in 1912, Fuxin's initial capitalization was 
Y40,000. The composition of shareholders is shown in Table 3.1. 



















Source: Rong Desheng, Lenong ziding xingnian jishi, p.37. 
Still ambiguous is the source of capital of Fuxin's 
shareholders, especially that of the Rong brothers. It is also 
unknown about the source{s) of their income. Maoxin and Zhenxin, 
besides, were known to have not been substantially making a profit 
during 1906-1911. 74 Where did the Rong brothers get the money to 
invest in Fuxin? 
Al though having been suffering losses in previous years, 
Maoxin managed to make a profit and expand its market share since 
1911-2 (because of higher quality75). By the end of 1912, Maoxin 
gained 128,000 taels. 76 On the other hand, according to Rong 
Desheng's memoirs, the decision of establishing Fuxin was made in 
74 At least after the largest gain made in 1905, Maoxin did not make substantial 
profit. See Rang Desheng, Op.cit., pp.28-34. 
75 The brand name of Maoxin, Bingchuan, was the most popular one in Shanghai and 
other Chinese market towns because of high quality. The price of Bingchuan was also 
higher than other previously famous brands. See "Maoxin diyi mianfenchang gaikuang", 
p.2, in Haoxin Fuxin Shenxin zonggongsi sa zhounian jiniancej also see Rong Desheng, 
Op,cit., pp.33-35. 
76 Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.38. 
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the eleventh month of 1912 (the Lunar Calendar). 77 The formal 
registration of Fuxin under the newly established Beij ing Republican 
Government was dated in July 1, 1913. 78 The Rong's initial capital 
for Fuxin probably came from the profit of Maoxin. 
Fuxin was also organized under partnership. 79 Yet, its 
establishment was no longer a result of a lack of capital on the 
part of the Rong brothers. I t was rather a resul t of the new 
partnership which emerged between the Rong brothers and their key 
assistants in Maoxin. 
The initiative to build up Fuxin was taken by Pu Wending and 
Wang Yuqing --- both of them were current key staff members or minor 
shareholders of Maoxin. In 1912, Wang Yuqing and Pu Wending {and 
later with his brother Wenwei} planned to set up in Shanghai their 
own venture --- a small flour mill. However, it required the two 
newcomers to provide about Y100,OOO of capital for the factory plant 
and machinery. Unable to finance the scheme, Wang and the Pu 
brothers agreed to cooperate with the Rong brothers who had learned 
and were interested in their plan. As Wang admitted, the reason for 
him and the Pu brothers to cooperate wi th the Rongs was simply "long 
time of good employer-employee relations". 80 
77 See Rong Desheng, Op,cit., · p.37. 
78 See BQS.I. p.34. 
79 According to its original contract of share-holding (1913), Fuxin was 
organized under partnership (hezi). Nevertheless, in another contract which dated 
1926, the enterprise was an unlimited company. There are no details showing the 
timing of such change in business organization. Yet. it should be around 1915 when 
the Rong brothers broke away from the Zhenxin partnership. For these two pieces of 
documents, see BQS.I, p.34, 1B2. 
BO See RQS.I, p.33; Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.37. 
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As for the Rong brothers, they were in a better financial 
po~ition, and they could have started a new venture totally owned by 
themselves. Nevertheless, they preferred to cooperate with Wang and 
the Pu brothers and agreed to provide half of the paid-up capital, 
without holding the absolute majority of shares. 
The rationale behind the Rong brothers' consideration is not 
totally clear. However, it is undeniable that if Wang Yuqing 
(marketing manager of Maoxin) and Pu Wendfng (purchasing manager of 
Maoxin) left Maoxin for their own business, Maoxin would be 
suffering not only from the departure of these two capable persons. 
It would have to face strong competition from a new comer, too. To 
cooperate with Wang and Pu, in other words, would mean expanding 
business and re-strengthening their relationship with their former 
employees --- hitting two birds with one stone. 
In both Maoxin and Fuxin, the Rong brothers could have 
controlled the majori ty of shares. 81 Yet, most of the Rongs' 
partners were their former employees who not only had a certain 
personal relationship with either Rong Zongjing or Desheng but also 
were specialized in certain aspects of the business. Indeed, such a 
transition from salaried employees to share-holding partners in both 
mills strongly indicates that the formation of a partnership was not 
necessari ly a resul t of inadequate capi tal but a strategy of 
achieving internal solidarity. 
81 Here the major share held by the Rong brothers in Maoxin and Fuxin should be 
further explained. In Maoxin, the Rong brothers altogether controlled 91.5% of 
shares, while they controlled Fuxin's shares with a great variety in the percentage -
-- they held 46.6% of Fuxin No.I's shares, 60.4% of shares of No.2,4,8, 26.7% of 
No.3's, 55.3% of No.S's, and 60% of No.7's. The 'overall shares held by the Rong 
brothers in Fuxin was 55.3%. For all these figures, see RQS.I, p.284. 
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Shortly after the establishment of Fuxin, the Shenxin Cotton 
Mill was set up. Its initial capitalization was Y300,000. As shown 
in Table 3.282 , the Rong brothers controlled the majority of shares 
of Shenxin. However, it signified a break of relationship with the 
former Zhenxin owners and the establishment of a new form of 
relationship between the Rong brothers and their partners. This was 
a resul t of the conflict between the Rong brothers and their 
kinsman-partner, Rong Ruixin, during the period 1910-1915. In 1910, 
Rong Ruixin took the ti tIe deed of Zhenxin and used it to make a 
mortgaged loan from the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, 
without notifying the Rong brothers who were then in charge of the 
mill. When the loan was matured but Rong Ruixin was not able to pay 
the debts, all the creditors (with documents from the provincial 
government) asked the Rong brothers for repayment. The problem could 
only be solved when cash was obtained from their own pockets and 
through borrow ing. 83 
82 However, this table is more detailed than the description by Rong Desheng. 
This table is also different from Rong Desheng's description on the matter of share 
distributions among the shareholders. See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.43. 
83 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.33. 
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Source: Shanghai Shenxin zongguanlichu and Shanghai caijing xueyuan, comp., Shenxin 
xitong qiye shiliao (Shanghai, n.p., 1956), 2:1, pp.29-32. 
'Having realized the ambition of Rong Ruixin, now, the Rong 
brothers prepared to break away with Zhenxin. In 1915, the chance 
came when Desheng tried to use the accumulated profit to expand the 
business and Ruixin in oppos~ tion aroused anti-Desheng sentiment 
among Zhenxin shareholders. The Rong brothers, believing that their 
proposal of further expansion was right, decisively withdrew from 
the cotton mill. But troubles from Ruixin did not end until the two 
parties agreed to exchange their shares in Zhenxin and Maoxin in 
1918. 84 From then on, Maoxin was totally owned by the Rong brothers 
while Rong Ruixin bought part of the Zhenxin shares from the Rong 
brothers. The remaining shares of Zhenxin which were owned by the 
Rong brothers remained, reportedly, in the mill. The departure from 
84 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.47. 
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Zhenxin was another starting point for the Rong brothers to enter 
the cotton milling - industry. In the same year, the Shenxin Cotton 
Mill was opened. 8S To avoid further challenges from shareholders, 
the Rong brothers adopted the form of "unlimi ted company" in all the 
flour and cotton mills. In all of this, Rong Zongjing was the 
general manager (zong jingli) and held in theory absolute power of 
the company. 86 
It was obvious that the Rong brothers should have suffered 
from this conflict with the Zhenxin shareholders. Nonetheless, the 
Rong brothers established a partnership relationship wi th their 
former employees in order to achieve internal solidarity at the top-
managerial level after such a crisis in business. People like Rong 
Yongda, Wu Kunsheng, Yan Yukun, Yang Shaotang, and Wang Yuqing, now 
became shareholders of the newly formed Shenxin Cotton Mill. This 
situation of including top-managerial staff members into the 
partnership also existed in Maoxin. (See Table 3.3) 
Table 3.3. Distribution of Shares in Maoxin No.1, 1919. 


























Source: Shenxin xitong qiye shiliao, 2:1, p.7. 
85 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., pp.41-43. 















Of course, some of the shareholders in both Shenxin and Maoxin 
were not former employees of the Rongs. Yet, their "good 
relationship" with the Rong brothers was still crucial. Zhenxin's 
shareholder, Zhang Shuhe, was an example. A Wuxi native, Zhang Shuhe 
was a compradore in Shanghai and purchased the daotai title from the 
Qing government. He was a powerful person in the ci ty. Since he 
disagreed wi th Rong Ruixin on the method of management, Zhang was in 
sympathy with the Rong brothers and encouraged them to open a new 
cotton mill in Shanghai. Through his influence, the Rong brothers 
managed to register Shenxin as an unlimited company. Zhang Shuhe 
even invested in the newly established cotton mill. After all, the 
Shenxin partnership counted on the "good relationship" between the 
Rong brothers and the shareholders like Zhang. 81 
After the establishment of Shenxin, the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin 
group was formed. All of the constituent enterprises were organized 
under partnership of unlimited liability. Among the shareholders, 
especially between the Rong brothers and the others, there existed 
two kinds of social relationship, namely long time employer-employee 
and shareholder-partner relations. As I will demonstrate, such 
relationships consti tuted an important social networking of the 
Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group which facilitated the business group's 
expansion in the latter years. 
87 For the brief description of Zhang Shuhe, see Shenxin xitong qiye shiliao, 
2:1, pp.27-:-28. 
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3.2. Accumulated Capital 
As mentioned above, a part of shareholders' fund consists of 
all kinds of accumulated capital. It includes retained earnings, 
prov ident fund, and other sorts of reserves. 88 To accumulate 
capital is obviously against the shareholders' wish to divide the 
profit among themselves (bonus issues). Thus, capital accumulation 
manifests the sacrifice of shareholders' immediate income from 
dividends. 
The distribution of profit in the business group was based on 
the contractual terms indicated in the share-holding deed. According 
to one share-holding deed of Fuxin No.1 and No.3 in 1917, annual 
profit would be divided into thirteen shares. 89 Shareholders would 
have ten shares as bonus issues (hongli). One share would be set 
aside for obsolescence, while two shares would be divided among 
staff (including the general manager) as bonus. 90 Dividend (gua.nli) 
had already been counted as the cost since it was promised to be 
given to shareholders in order to attract their investment. 
This was the method of profit distribution since the outset of 
Fuxin's establishment. In 1913, the profit of the first year of 
business was Y32,000 in which Y24,615 was for shareholders' bonus 
88 The author must admit that most of these terms are very modern concepts which 
probably were not familiar to the Chinese industrialists of the day. It would also 
be unfair to impose a modern perception of accounting terms into the early twentieth 
century Chinese economy. My aim is to clarify the process of capital accumulation 
rather than to go into details .of the definitions of these economic terms in the 
early twentieth century. 
89 In fact, from a share-holding deed of Shenxin No.I, we can find the same 
ratio of profit distribution among Shenxin shareholders. However, for the post-1915 
Maoxin, no such deed is available. For the document of Shenxin, see RQS. I, pp. 54-55. 
90 See RQS.I, pp.45-46. 
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issues, Y2,461.5 for obsolescence, while Y4,923.5 for staffs' 
bonus. 91 
Profit of Fuxin No.1 continued to be distributed. Through the 
accounting records of the mill, we learn that from 1919 to 1921 
Fuxin .No.1 had distributed its profits according to the 
shareholders' distribution agreement. (See Table 3.4) From this 
table, we can also find an additional provident fund (gongji) which 
was set aside for special purposes. 


























According to this principle of distribution, we can make use 
of the figures of profit margi~ to estimate the amount of such sort 
of funding after distribution. (See Table 3.5) 
91 See BQS.I, p.35. 
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Table 3.5. Annual Profit Margin and Estimation of Profit Distribution in the Fuxin 
Enterprise.(1913-1936) (unit: Y=yuan) 
Year Profit Bonus Issue~ Obsolescence Bonus 
1921 9,940 7,646 764.6 1,529.2 
1922 
-462,080 ? ? ? 
1923 194,560 · 149,660 14,966 29,932 
1924 688,130 529,330 52,933 105,866 
1925 2,444,810 1,880,623 188,062.3 376,124.6 
1926 1,861,040 1,431,569 143,156.9 286,313.8 
1927 
-106,950 ? ? ? 
1928 2,547,480 1,959,600 195,960 391,920 
1929 1,195,820 919,861 91,986.1 183,972.3 
1930 426,250 327,885 32,788.5 65,577 
1931 -1,907,400 ? ? ? 
1932 ? ? ? ? 
1933 905,170 696,285 69,628.5 139,257 
1934 869,250 668,653 66,635.3 133,730.7 
1935 1,150,080 884,677 88,467.7 176,935 
1936 1,132,250 870,960 87,096 174,192 
Source: Profit margin is tabulated from the accounting records in RQS. I, pp.167, 171, 
181, 207, 226, 234, 377, 492, and 526. 
Bonus issues, obsolescence, and bonus are calculated according to the profit 
distribution agreement. Under this agreement, anilUal profit is divided into 13 
portions, one portion for obsolescence, ten for shareholders' bonus issues, and two 
for bonus of managers and other staff members. 
? represents data unknown. It appears in two occasions: 1) it is unknown in the 
original record, and 2) the balance is a negative one. For the second occasion, since 
there is no explanation for the losses, the author choose to leave it blank until 
more information is available. 
As profit was distributed, how was capital accumulated? From 
the above description, it is clear that at least some part of the 
profit had been turned into a provident fund and obsolescence. A 
provident fund is another kind of fund set aside by a company for 
special purposes. I t can be regarded as a source of capi tal 
accumulation because it can be used for capi tal installment. 
Obsolescence usually appears as an expenditure for maintenance and 
capital reinstallment. It usually varies according to the rate of 
capital depreciation. In the situation of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin 
group, however, the term "obsolescence" varied · according to the 
1 f · t . 92 annua pro 1 margIn. It was something used by the company for 
92 The deed of Fuxin shows that some contemporary accounting concepts, like 
obsolescence, differ greatly from the current ones. Yet, we can still define these 
old concepts with the help of the current ones. 
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reparation and maintenance. Being set aside annually for 
obsolescence, this portion of money could be regarded as part of 
capital accumulation. 
In the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group, capital accumulation was 
usually shown In the form of using profi t to increase 
capitalization. For example, except for No.l and No.5, the initial 
capital of all the other six mills of the Fuxin enterprise came from 
the profits of No.l, No.2, and No.3. 93 From some surviving 
documents of Maoxin No.1 and Fuxin No.l, we also learn that because 
of huge profi ts they managed to expand their respective 
capitalization by re-investing profits to increase shares and to 
expand production scale. 94 'The rapid expansion of Fuxin No.1 and 
No.3 was said to be a result of using profit for capitalization. 95 
The rapid expansion of Fuxin No.5 was'more striking. With Y300,OOO 
initial capital, the milling company turned some Y200,OOO of profit 
in 1920 into additional capital for its expansion in 1921. It 
continued to make profit in the ' following years and Fuxin No.5 
further expanded its capi talization in several occasions. Up to 
1926, the amount of capital had been increased to Yl,500,OOO through 
. f . t . t . t I 96 turnIng pro 1 In 0 capl a • 
Shenxin cotton mill '.s expansion was reportedly a result of 
93 All the details of this 'point can be found in RQS. I. For Fuxin No.2 and No. 3, 
see pp.36-37; for No.4, see p.46; for No.6, see p.48; for No.7 and No.8, see p.80. 
94 For Maoxin No.1, there -are documents of 1904 and of 1912, see RQS.I, pp.29-
30, and descriptions from the archive, see RQS.I, pp.43-44; for Fuxin No.l, there are 
documents of 1918, 1919, and 1926, see RQS.I, pp.45, 78, 182. 
95 3 See RQS.I, pp.112-11 . 
96 See RQS.I, p.182. 
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using profit to increase capitalization. F,rom 1916 onwards, there 
were four occasions that the shareholders of Shenxin No.1 agreed to 
capitalize part of their p~ofit.97 After 1922, there were another 
three occasions of increasing capi talization. Again, these also 
resulted from capitalizing profit. 98 
The performance of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group In capital 
accumulation was impressive. We learned from Chapter 2 that from 
1903 onwards, the amount of capi tal was ever- increasing. The 
estimated gross capitalization of the flour milling sector increased 
from Y50,000 in 1903 (Maoxin only) to Y9,601,320 {Maoxin and Fuxin} 
in 1936; the growth rate was approximately 42 times in Maoxin, while 
it was 187.5 times in Fuxin. The Shenxin enterprise also experienced 
a 33.7 times of growth between 1916 and 1936. Table 3.6 demonstrates 
the process of capital accumulation which includes other kinds of 
reserves, provident fund, as well as capital. 
Table 3.6. Growth of Shareholders' Fund in the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin Group, 1903-1932 
(Unit:Y=Yuan) 
Year Maoxin Enterprise Fuxin Enterprise Shenxin Enterprise 
Amount Index Amount Index Amount Index 
(1903=100) (1913=100) (1916=100) 
1903 Y50,000 100.0 
1913 Y277,780 555.6 Y40,OOO 100.0 
1916 Y277,780 555.6 Y351,930 879.8 Y217,490 100.0 
1920 Y800,OOO 1,600.0 Y2,936,910 7,342.3 Y1,892,460 870.1 
1923 Y879,130 1,758.3 Y2,968,140 7,420.4 Y6,563,090 3,017.7 
1925 Y774,020 1,548.0 Y3,084,430 7,711.1 Y5,989,920 2,754.1 
1932 Y2,949,580 5,899.2 Y8,159,410 20,398.5 Y18,022,180 8,286.4 
N. B. Shareholders' fund includes capital, provident fund, reserves and retained 
earnings. 
Source: RQS.I, pp. 111 and 269. 
97 These four occasions are 1919 (Y1,OOO,000), 1920 (Y1,500,000), 1921 
(Y2,400,OOO) and 1922 (Y3,000,000). See RQS.I, p.112. 
98 The other three occasions were 1930 (Y3,OOO,OOO), 1933 (Y4,200,OOO), and 1937 
(Y6,OOO,000) before the outbreak of the Marco-Polo Bridge Incident in July. See 
Shenxin xitong qiye shiliao, 2:1, pp.29-32. 
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To account for the high capi tal accumulation rate of the 
Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group, scholars follow closely the source 
materials which suggested the so-called "high-capital-accumulation-
rate policy" explanation. 99 The accumulation phenomenon was, 
according to this explanation, a result of the policy of the owners 
to have less profi t distributed but more accumulated. At the 
beginning of the operation, Fuxin No.1's shareholders even had an 
agreement among themselves: 
"The Fuxin capitalists did not pay any capital during the period of expanded 
capitalization of Fuxin No.1 & 3 ••••••• We can say that it (the expanded 
capitalization of Fuxin) materialized through the method of snow-ball 
(accumulation). At the outset of the opening of No.1, investors agreed: 
within three years, shareholders should not take away their extra dividends 
(bonus issues, hongli). For the sake of expanding the enterprise, dividends 
(guanli) of every shareholder should also be kept in the company for 
enhancing the firm's financial power. Later No.1 followed this policy, and so 
did the others. Although in this aspect it is now difficult to know the exact 
I 
situation, from the surviving accounting records of No.1 we can still see the 
overall picture. In 1913-1923, this mill transferred some investment fund to 
No.2, 3, and 7 with more than 2,BOO,000 Taels, which is roughly equal to more 
than Y3,900,000.,,100 
On this foundation, some scholars investigated further into 
the firm's organizational structure. They found that all the three 
consti tuent enterprises of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group were 
organized into an unlimited company since the early 1910's. Under 
this structure of organization, there would be no board of directors 
99 In fact, this is a general consent of scholars of the field. See Huang 
Yifeng, "Jiu Zhongguo Rongjia ziben de fazhan", pp.45-46; XU Weiyong and Wang Hanmin, 
Op.cit. pp.44-51; Qu Conggui, "Rongjia qiye de chuangban jiqi jingying guan1i", 
p . 73; B~ Zheng and Sheng Bin, "Cong Rongjia qiye de fazhan kan ziben jilei zai minzu 
ziben qiye zhong de zuoyong", pp.13-14; Zhang Meizhi, "Rongjia qiye jingying xingtai 
zhi gean yanjiu", pp.307-30B; Lee Muk-miu, "Rongjia qiyeshi yanjiu", pp.BI-B2; and 
Suzuki Tomoo, "Kindai chngolm no kigyr, keiei --- Musyaku I Eike kigyr,' no kenkytl", 
pp.B5-B7. 
100 See RQS.I., p.113. 
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to check and balance the power of and decisions made by the general 
manager (zong jingli) , Rong Zongjing himself, who was also the 
principal shareholder of the company. 101 Under this organizational 
structure, Rong Zongjing himself, the general manager, was generally 
perceived as a person possessing central authority and had the final 
say in business decisions. As a result, the general manager, who 
preferred rapid expansion and high level of accumulation, could 
strongly implement his policy of "high-capital-accumulation-rate", 
and to concentrate all the available financial resources on further 
expans ion .102 Some of these scholars finally point out that . under 
such situation, the interests of the minor shareholders were 
forsaken .103 
The source of Rong Zongj ing' s power was not merely the 
I 
authority generated from formal business organization. Behind the 
facade of his position in the firm, there existed personal networks 
and trust which were more important than the formal business 
structure. Personal linkages through family, kinship, lineage, 
regional ties, colleague relationships, and friendship ties would 
generate trust among business partners, between employer and 
employee, producer and consumer, creditor and debtor, as well as 
among maj or and minor shareholders. Wi th such networking, Rong 
101 For information about the organization of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group, 
see RQS.I, pp.54-56. 
102 See Huang Yifeng, "Jiu Zhongguo Rongjia ziben de fazhan", pp.46-47; ~han~ 
Meizhi, ItRongjia qiye jingying xingtai zhi gean yanjiu", p.309; Suzuki Tomoo, "K1nda1 
Ch~goku no kigyO keiei --- Musyaku tEike kigyn' no kenkyO". p.87; also see Lee Muk-
miu, "Rongjia qiyeshi yanjiu", pp.81-82. 
103 See Huang Yifeng, "Jiu Zhongguo Rongjiaziben de fazhan", p.46. 
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Zongjing established a "good relationships" (hao guanxi) with his 
colleagues. Such "good relationship" enabled him to win the support 
and co-operation of his partner-managers. Such networks and trust 
strengthened the mechanism of self-financing. 
To begin with, there was a strong tie between Rong Zongjing 
and his younger brother, Desheng. In most cases, Rong Desheng would 
consul t Zongj ing to seek his approval in business dealings .10t He 
seldom objected to his elder brother's decision. 105 Thus, although 
within the business group Rong Zongjing did not hold the majority of 
shares, he could effectively hold absolute power wi th his brother's 
full support --- this is the reason why the Rong brothers were 
regarded altogether as "the Flour King of China" by 
contemporar ies. 106 
Besides, in Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group, there existed 
different categories of people whose relationship wi th the Rong 
brothers was mostly multi-dimensional. There were different kinds of 
relationships with the Rongs, namely shareholder-managers, clansmen 
of the Rong family, former assistants, as well as technicians, 
inside the top-management of the group. (See Table 3.7). 
Table 3.7. List of Principal Staffs and Their Relations with the Rongs (1928) 
104 This can be seen in the case in the planning to establish Baoxing in 1900 
and the investment decision of Fuxin No.1. This is also true in the purchase of the 
Hengchangyuan Cotton Mill in 1917. 
105 Rong Desheng had once conflicted with his elder brother on the matter of 
Shenxin Cotton Mill No. 2. Desheng thought that the mill would not turn out profit in 
both short-run and long-run, while his elder brother insisted in his own opinion. For 
this case, see Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.45. 
106 See Wu Chengluo, Jinshi Zhongguo shiyezhi, Vo1.2 (Shanghai, The Commercial 
Press 1919) p.10; also see Yang Dajin, Xindai Zhongguo shiyezhi (Changsha, The 
Comme;cial p;ess, 1938), p.636. Rong Desheng himself also mentioned this title in his 
memoirs of 1919, see Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.49. 
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Name of Mill 

































General Manager Rong Zongjing 
Manager Wang Yaochen 











Assistant Manager Wang Yaochen 
General Manager Rong Zongjing 
Manager Wang Yuqing 
Manager Wang Yaochen 





Assistant Manager Wang Yaochen 
Acting Assistant Wang Qizhou 
Manager 
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Relations with the Rongs 
Wuxi native, shareholder 
of Fuxin No.2 & No.5 
assistant of the Rongs 
Wuxi native 
Co-founder, and a major 
partner of the Rongs, 
later, affinity with 
Rong Zongjing 
Assistant of the Rongs, 
minor shareholder of 
Fuxin No.2 & 3, a 
relative of another pair 
Fuxin co-founder, the Pu 
brothers 
Assistant of the Rongs, 
small shareholder of 
Fuxin No.3 & 5, later 
affinity of Rong 
Zongjing 
See the above 
Assistant of the Rongs, 
minor shareholder of 
Fuxin No.3 & Shenxin 
No.1 & No.3 
Clansman, shareholder of 
Fuxin No.5 (moved to 
Shanghai in !929 and so 
replaced by Li Guowei) 
The eldest son-in-law of 
Rong Desheng, former 
engineer of Fuxin No.5, 
later a shareholder of 
this mill and Shenxin 
No.3 & No.4 
Relative of the Rongs, 
Li Guowei's cousin 
Shareholder of Maoxin, 
Shenxin No.! & No.3, 
Fuxin No.2, assistant of 
the Rongs 
See the above 
Former assistant of the 
Rongs, a shareholder of 
Maoxin No.!, co-founder 
and major partner in 
Fuxin, brother of Wang 
Yaochen -
See the above 
Shareholder of Fuxin No.3, 
assistant of the Rongs 
Shareholder of Shenxin 
No.1 and No.3, assistant 
of the Rongs 








General Manager Rong Zongjing 
Manager Zhu Xianfang 
Assistant Manager Rong Puren 
General Manage~ Rong Zongjing 
Manager Rong Desheng 
Assistant Manager Rong Esheng 















General Manager Rong Zongjing 
Manager Rong Esheng 
Assistant Manager Rong Jiren 
General Manager Rong Zongjing 
Manager Zhu Xianfang 
Assistant Manager Rong Weiren 
Technician 
The eldest son of Rong 
Zongjing 
Kinsman of the Rongs, a 
minor shareholder of this 
mill 
The second son of Rong 
Desheng 
See the above 
See the above 
See the above 
See the above 
The eldest son of Rong 
Desheng 
See the above 
Kinsman of the Rongs, a 
minor shareholder of 
Shenxin No.3 
See the above 
See the above 
* The source material mentioned that Wang Qizhou was the son of Wang Yaochen. 
However, all the available materials cannot confirm that. 
Source: Name list and their posts, see "Zonggongsi ji gechang zhiyuanlu", pp. 3-9, in 
Maoxin Fuxin Shenxin zonggongsi, comp., Maoxin Turin Shenrin zonggongsi sa zhounian 
jiniance (Shanghai, Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin zonggongsi, 1929); for the relations with 
the Rongs, see Rong Desheng, Lenong ziding xingnian jishi (Shanghai, pri vate 
publication, 1943); Shanghai Shenxin zong guanlichu and Shanghaicaijing xueyuan, 
comp. Shenrin xitongqiye shiliao, 2:1 (Shanghai, n.p., 1956), pp.7, 12-17; also see 
RQS. I, p. 288 • 
On the other hand, the term family business, as used by some 
scholars107 , is insufficient to describe the picture of business 
networking at least of the pre-1920 period. 108 To have personal 
107 See Marie-Clarie Bergere, The Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie, 1911-
1937, pp .154-155, 157-158; also see Suzuki Tomoo, "Kindai Chtlgoku no kigyt» keiei ---
Musyaku 'Eike kigyt)' no kenkyn", pp.89-92; Zhang Meizhi, Rongjia qiye jingying 
xingtai zhi gean yanjiu", pp.317-319. Also see Lee Muk-miu, "Rongjia qiyeshi yanjiu", 
pp.75-77. However, in Lee Muk-miu's paper, (p.75, line 1-4), this point is 
plagiarized from Li Guowei' s memoirs, see Li Guowei, "Rongjia jingying fangzhi he 
zhifen qiye liushinian", in Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi quanguo 
weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanj iu weiyuanhui, comp., Gongshang shiliao, No. 1 (Beij ing, 
Wenshi ziliao chubanshe, 1980), p.2, line 11-16. 
108 In fact, the group had the first sign of being a family business only since 
1918 when Rong Desheng' s son-ip-Iaw, Li Guowei, also an engineer himself, entered 
Fuxin No.5, first as the chief engineer and then as manager. In the 1920's, Rong 
Zongjing and Desheng's sons and other sons-in-law also entered the mills as managers 
or assistant managers of either flour or cotton mill. Later, the affinity network 
between the Rong brothers and some of their partners, like Wang Yaochen and Ding 
Ziren, was established. Thus, in the 1930's, the business group can be regarded as 
a "family business" as almost the major shareholders were having kin-ties with each 
other. 
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trust and a sense of security within the top-management circle might 
be an important factor in the eyes of the Rong brothers. Yet, family 
or other blood-ties relationships alone could not generate such 
trust and the sense of security, especially among the co-founders of 
the business. For instance, without trust in Rong Ruixin, a kinsman 
of the Rong family, the Rong brothers decided to break the 
partnership wi th him and have no more cooperation. 109 Wi th trust, 
people like Wang Yuqing and Pu Wending were accepted as partners 
with whom the Rong brothers were willing to work with. 
In later years, the social networks between the Rong brothers 
and other partners were multiplied. People like Wang Yaochen and 
Ding Ziren married their children into the Rong family. Such action 
was probably to strengthen the already established non-blood-tied 
social relationship between the Rong family and other partner-
families (like the Wangs and the Dings) and to multiply the social 
networks with blood-tied elements. Nevertheless, a family business 
was not the original concern of the Rong brothers. 
Friendship and colleague relationships, indeed, were another 
important source of trustfulness. From the illustrations of the last 
section, we learnt that Wang Yuqing agreed to cooperate with the 
Rong brothers because of ," "long time of good employer-employee 
relations". Li Guowei also revealed that "Rong Desheng seemed to be 
proud of having r familiars of the old days now all becoming 
109 This can be seen in the case of establishing Fuxin No. 2 in 1913. Rong 
Ruixing was excluded from the partnership establishment. See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., 
p.39. 
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managers,,,.110 Most of the non-Rong people on the list 
definitely thpse familiars of the Rong brothers. 
are 
How did" good relationship" and social networks help the group 
to accumulate capital? The answer is obvious. With a "good 
relationship", there existed trust between the Rong brothers and 
their partner-managers, whose interest also coincided with that of 
the Rong brothers. They agreed wi th the Rong brothers to expand 
production scale and increase capitalization instead of dividing 
profit immediately. 
However, when some social networks and certain sense of trust 
changes over time, the so-called "good relationship" would also 
change and conflict might emerge. Al though the social networks 
between the Rong brothers and their partners had been multiplied 
over time, this change in "good relationship" did take place in the 
1930's when economic conditions affected the business very much. The 
most obvious case was the separation of the Fuxin enterprise from 
the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin Headquarters Company. Under the leadership 
of Wang Yuqing, Fuxin now established its own headquarters company. 
Later, Wang even denied all his obligations of being the guarantor 
of the Rong brothers .111 The previous trust between Wang and the 
Rong brothers became dissolved. 112 
110 See Li Guowei, "Rongjia jingying fangzhi he zhifen qiye liushinian", p.2. 
This is in turn paraphrased from Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.45. 
111 See RQS.I, pp.493-495. ' 
112 In fact, there was another conflict between the small shareholders and the 
Rong brothers on the problem of increasing capitalization and pro!itdis~ribution. 
In this case which happened after the outbreak of the Marco Polo Br1dge Inc1dent, the 
shareholders of Shenxin No.4 demanded the distribution of profit among themselves 
rather than converting such profit into shares. For aetails, see Shenrinxitong qiye 
shiliao, 2:1, pp.BB-92. 
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Changes in shareholders also affected the original trust and 
working relationship between the small shareholders and the Rong 
brothers. The share-holding of the.Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group was, 
in legal terms, highly exclusive. Any transaction of shares could 
only make between the current shareholders. Outsiders could not buy 
the shares wi thout the approval of all the other shareholders .113 
Social networks also restricted the number of shareholders. A sense 
of stability might be said was achieved. Only through inheritance 
could a new member be admitted into the circle of shareholders. In 
fact, during the 1920's and the 1930's, the number of shareholders 
of the business group increased because old shareholders had passed 
away and their shares were inheri ted by their descendants. For 
instance, the original number of shareholders of Shenxin No.1 was 
23. In 1922, the number increased to 49 persons. In 1933, the number 
jumped up to 56. Yet, all the additional shareholders were 
descendants of the original ones. 1H From another list of 
shareholders (Table 3.8), we also learn that Fuxin No.2 experienced 
an increase in its number of shareholders in the 1920' s. Such 
increase was also a result of inheritance. To have new partners, 
thus, the original social networks must be adjusted. Yet, if the new 
members did not wish to follow the previous policy of capi tal 
accumulation, they might raise their objection to the principal 
shareholders. This problem of breaking up social old networking was 
more acute during the wa;time (1937-1945) when shares were passed 
113 See RQS.I, p.55. 
114 See Shenxin xitong qiye shiliao, 2:1, pp.29-32. 
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from the original shareholders to the their remnants. 
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N. B. The source cited does not clearly show the year of the first increase of 
apitalization. But it is clearly to be the 1920's. 
Source: Shenxin xitong qiye shiliao, 2:1, pp.12-13. 
Based on trust, the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group established its 
strategies of internal financing. In the process of internal 
financing of the group, various kinds of shareholders' funds were 
involved. The results of internal financing were the substantiation 
of increase In capi talization and expansion on the scale of 
production. Such method of internal financing definitely counted on 
a social networking between the Rong brothers and the minor 
shareholders, based on kinship, family, marriage, regional ties, 
friendship, as well as colleague relationships. Through such social 
networks, a sense of trust could be generated between the Rong 
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brothers and the minor shareholders. 
Nevertheless, internal financing could not provide full 
financial support to the expanding giant firm. As I have 
demonstrated, the cost of production and other operations were very 
high. Al though big business had tried its best to accumulate 
capital, it still had to borrow money from the external sector. In 
the next chapter, we can see how the big business financed its 
operation through external financing and the problems it faced in 
employing such means of financing. 
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4. External Financing 
This chapter is to investigate the means of external financing 
of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group, so as to understand the 
characteristics of financial practices of Chinese big business, and 
their relationships with some market intermediaries, either a bank 
or a mercanti le house, in the matter of credi ting and lending. 
External financing here refers to the arrangements made by the group 
to extract financial resources from economic institutions outside 
the group's ownership and management, As shown in the following, it 
includes borrowing money from both foreign banks115 , and Chinese 
modern116 and native banksl1? I t also includes making use of 
credits provided by the sellers or intermediaries of raw materials 
and machinery. External financing, in other words, signifies the 
dynamic relationship between the group and its market intermediaries 
in the factor market. 
115 Foreign banks here refers to those banks formed under a fully-foreign or a 
Sino-foreign joint-stock holding. Such a distinction is commonly used by Chinese 
scholars since the 1910's. 
116 Chinese modern banks refer to those banks at least which bore a "bank" title 
and were under the legislative control of the banking ordinances of the Republic of 
China. 
117 Here the Chinese native banks refer to those defined by Frank M. Tamagna as 
Ita financial firm established in the form of single proprietorship or partnership by 
members of a family, a clan or a closed circle of friends J for the purpose of 
handling deposits J lending J remittances and exchange of money, with unl imi ted 
liability guaranteed by all resources of the proprietor or of the partners." See 
Frank M. Tamagna, Banking and Finance in China (New York, International Secretariat, 
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942), p.57. However, such a definition can also 
refer to all other native banking organizations like pia.oha.o and yinliu. To 
differentiate qia.nzhus.ng and other types of financial institutions, I would rather 
like to use the romanized characters in the following discussion. 
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4.1. Economic Background and Rationale behind External Financing 
In the modern business world, particularly that of Western 
Europe and the Uni ted States, there are two ways of business 
financing. The first is the selling of stocks to the public in order 
to increase the amount of the firm's capitalization. 118 The second 
way is the borrowing of money from the money market, that is to make 
use of credi ting services provided by the financial market and 
financial agencies. The firm can borrow money from commercial banks 
on a short-term, medium-term, or long-term basis. It can also issue 
corporate bonds to the open market .119 Of course, all these means 
of financing count on an effective financial market, as well as a 
strong and supportive banking system. 
An open market system was not properly established yet in 
China during the early twentieth century. Money or financial houses 
in China then refers to a variety of markets including those of 
foreign exchange, internal currencies exchange, bond and securities 
exchange, commodi ties exchange, and so on .120 Important to 
business financing is the stock or securities exchange market. 
Nevertheless, the Chinese stock exchange market did not appear until 
118 As mentioned in the las~ chapter, it can be regarded as a self-financing 
means as far as it mainly involves "the firm itself. Yet, such means would risk losing 
control of the original owners to other people. 
119 See James E. Wert and Glenn V. Henderson, Jr., Financing Business Fiz-.s, 6th 
ed. (Homewood, Illinois, Richard D. Irwin, 1979). 
120 For further illustration of these different markets and their history, see 
Yang Yinpu, Yang zhu Zho~guo jinrong lun (Shanghai, Liming shuju, 1932); also Yang 
Yinpu, Shangha.i jinrong zuzhi gaiyao (Shanghai, The Commercial Press, 1930); also see 
Shi Baiheng, Shanghai jinrong shichang lun ( Shanghai, Shanghai shangye zhusu~n 
xueshe, 1934); Jiaotong yinhang zong guan1ichu, Jinrong shichang lun (Sh~~ghal., 
Jiaotong yinhang zong guanlichu, 1947); Zhongguo renmin yinhang zonghang Jl.nrong 
yanJ1USUO jinrong lishi yanjiushi, comp., Jindai Zhongguo de jinrong shicha.ng 
(Beijing, Zhongguo jinrong chubanshe, 1989). 
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1918. 121 In the same year, Japanese merchants in Shanghai set up 
another exchange market which sparked off a tide of setting up 
exchange houses among Chinese merchants of the ci ty .122 The tide 
was however short-lived. A serious crisis, which was caused by 
severe speculation, happened in 1921 which greatly hindered the 
development of the exchange market in China. Only six out of 140 and 
more exchange markets survi ved. 123 
Yet, even these surviving exchange markets did not seem to be 
specialized in doing stock and debenture exchange. In these markets, 
government bonds were more common and popular because of high 
interest. Shares of foreign companies would also be exchanged. 
Nevertheless, the exchange of Chinese company 'shares was seldom 
seen. Chinese businessmen, including the Rong brothers, seemed 
unlikely to raise capital through the stock market. The reason is 
simple: it might risk loosing the original owners' control to 
outsiders .124 Those corporate bonds were, moreover, not widely 
121 According to Yang Yinpu, before the first exchange market was built up in 
Beijing, there were a lot of discussions and debates about the idea of setting up an 
exchange market in China. But most of the proposals were suggested by Shanghai 
entrepreneurs or Southerners (even Sun Yatsen). Finally, the first exchange market 
was built by Beijing merchants and it was originally designed for securities 
exchange. See Yang Yinpu, Shanghai jiaoyisuo lun, p.7. 
122 In fact, some people like XU Cangshui condemned this Japanese exchange 
market as a tool of Japanese imperialism and urged the Chinese business community to 
establish their own exchange market, see XU Cangshui, "Shanghai quyinsuo zhi 
jinkuang", in Yinhang zhoubao6:B (No.23B)(March 7,1922), pp.1-2; also XU Cangshui, 
"Lun Shanghai quyinsuo", Ibid., pp.2-4. 
123 In Chinese financial history, it is called the "Exchange Market Crisis of 
1921". After the emergence of the Japanese exchange market, a trend of establishing 
exchange markets prevailed in both Shanghai and other major cities in China. The peak 
was reached in the winter of 1921 when more then 140 exchange houses were reported 
, to be found. But then the whole market was suffered and only six survived thereafter. 
See Yang Yinpu, ZhoQgguo jiaoyisuo lun, pp.39-44. 
124 Of course, the classical example is the Maoxin Flour Mill and the Zhenxin 
Cotton Mill under the management and ownership of the Rong brothers. As mentioned in 
the previous chapters, before 1915, these two companies were organized into a 
partnership of limited liability. Yet, since having quarrels with Rong Ruixing, the 
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exchanged in the market but mainly mortgaged to several big 
banks .125 Accordingly Chinese businessmen could only turn to 
bankers for loans .126 
As mentioned above, banking agencies here refers to three 
kinds of financial insti tutions, namely foreign banks, Chinese 
modern banks, and Chinese native banks (only qianzhuang). They were 
the largest and the most influential group among the financial 
institutions in Republican China. They appeared in China at 
different times. They were different from each other in 
capitalization, business practices, business interest, as well as 
nationali ty. Their importance in financing economic acti vi ties 
varied from period to period according to their respective power in 
the financial market .127 Thus, they will be separately analyzed in 
Rong brothers finally broke the partnership. They retained Maoxin and lost Zhenxin. 
Then, the Rong brothers set up Maoxin and the Shenxin Cotton Mill as companies of 
unlimited liability. Under this new organization, the stocks of the company was not 
permitted to sell to people other than the original owners. 
Another example of forming a joint stock company is the Nanyang Brothers' 
Tobacco Company. Its owners, the Jian (Chien) family members, had argued about the 
pros and cons of selling stocks to the public and forming a joint stock company in 
the late 1910's. One of the major consideration of them is the risk of losing their 
control to other people, or at least to those they were not familiar with. See 
Sherman Cochran, Big Business in China: Sino-Foreign Rivalry in the Cigarette 
Industry, 1890-1930, pp.96-102. For the original documents of these arguments, see 
Zhongguo kexueyuan Shanghai jingji yanjiusuo and Shanghai shehui kexueyuan jingji 
yanJlusuo, comp., Nanyang xiongdi yancao gongsi shiliao (Shanghai, Shanghai renmin 
chubanshe, 1958), pp.107-130. 
125 See Sheng Zuhang, "Wuguo yinhang yu gongshangye", Yinhang zhoubao (June 2, 
1936), pp.3-10j also see Yan, "Woguo qiye zhaiquan diaocha", Zhonghang yuelran (April, 
1937), pp.55-56. 
126 This point is also raised by Marie-Clarie Bergere, The Golden Age of the 
Chinese Bourgeoisie, 1911-1937, pp.79-80. 
127 This paper is not going to discuss all these in detail. Instead, selective 
discussions on relevant details will be held. Roughly speaking, both foreign bank and 
qianzlluang prevailed since the ' second half of the nineteenth century. Meanwhile, 
there also existed the Shanxi piaohao (Shanxi banks) which played an important role 
in remitting imperial funds · but declined rapidly after the 1911 Revolution. Chinese 
modern banks first appeared in China in 1897, as Sheng Xuanhuai set up the Imperial 
Bank of China (Zhongguo Tongshang Yinhang). Only during the Republican period, 
especially since the late 1910's, can one see the growing. infl~ence of the mod~rn 
Chinese banks in economic activities. After all, their flnanclal power was qUlte 
heavily concentrated in Shanghai, where the nation's major industrial concerns were 
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the following paragraphs. 
Although the banking system of Republican China was far from 
satisfactory128, the.re was no other al ternati ves to the Chinese 
industrialists. More important was to explore the ways employed by 
Chinese businessmen to obtain loans and credits from these banking 
agencies. The meaningful questions are, then, "what the firms got 
from them" and "by what means" in addi tion to "'''hat the banks could 
offer". 
located. 
For interested readers, there is a long list of reference on this topic. But 
the major works are provided in the following. Most of them focus either on the 
general history, or functions, or relative importance, or all of these three aspects 
of the three financial institutions. See Zhou Baoluan, Zbonghua yinhangshi (Taibei, 
Wenhai chubanshe, reprinted from 1919 ed., 1972); Yang Yinpu, Yangzhu Zhongguo 
jinrong lun; also Yang Yinpu, Shanghai jinrong zuzhi gaiyao; Yang Duanliu, Qingdai 
huobi jinrong shigao (Beijing, Sanlian shudian, 1962); also see Wang Yeh-chien, 
Zhongguo jindai huobi yu yinhang de yanjin (1644-1937) (The Development of Money and 
Banking in China, 1644-1937)(Studies of Modern Economy Series, No.2, Taibei, 
Insti tute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taibei, 1981); Andrea Lee McElderry, 
Shanghai Old-Style Banks (Ch'ien-Chuang), 1800-1935 (Ann Arbor, Center for Chinese 
Studies, the University of Michigan, 1976); Zhang Yulan, Zhongguo yinhang fazhanshi 
(Shanghai, Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1957); Zhang Guohui, Wanqing qianzh~ he 
piaohao yanjiu (Beijing, Zhonghua sbuju, 1989): Cb en Qitian, Sha.nxi piaozhuang kaoliie 
(Shanghai, The Commercial Press, 1937); Wei Juxian, comp., Shanxi piaohao shi 
(Shanghai, Shuowenshe, 1944); Zheng Yifang, Shanghai qianzhuang (1843-1937) ---
Zhongguo zhuantong jinrongye de tuibian (Taibei, Institute of the Three Principles 
of the People, Academia Sinica, 1981); Tang Zhuansi and Huang Hanmin, "Shilun 1927 
nian yiqian de Zhongguo yinhangye", in Zhongguo j indai j ingj ishi congshu bianweihui, 
comp., Zhongguo jindai jinejishi yanjiu ziliao, No.4 (Shanghai, Shanghai shehui 
kexueyuan chubanshe, 1986), pp.57-89; also Guo Xiaoxian's articles on Chinese 
financial system, "Shanghai de neiguo yinhang", Shanghaishi tongzhiguan qilcan, 1:2 
(September, 1933), pp. 441-498; "Shanghai de qianzhuang" Ibid., 1: 3 (December, 1933), 
pp.803-857; "Shanghai de chuxu jigao", Ibid., 1:4 (March, 1934), pp.1025-1091; 
"Shanghai jinrong zai Yuan Shikai dizhi shidai", Ibid., 2:1 (June, 1934), pp.139-171; 
"Shanghai de waiguo yinhang", Ibid., 2:2 (September, 1934), pp.547-602; and 
"Shanghai de Zhongwai heban yinhang", Ibid" 2:4 (March, 1935), pp.1339-1354. 
128 The system has long been criticized, by both the contemporaries and scholars 
today, of having a lot of inter-locking defects. These defects include an absence of 
a central bank, under-capitalization of Chinese modern banks, dominance by foreign 
banks in foreign exchange, persistence of traditional banking institutions 
(particularly qianzhuang), confusion in currency system, speculative activities of 
Chinese modern and native banks, subordination of commercial and industrial interests 
to financial interest, and so on. 
These criticisms came, in fact, almost exclusively from Chinese 
contemporaries, for example, Ma Renchu, Zhonghua yinhang lun (revised ed. )(Shanghai, 
The Commercial Press, 1934); 'Wu Chengxi, Zhongguo de yinhang (Shanghai, The 
Commercial Press 1935)· Wang Chengzhi, Zhongguo jinrong ziben lrm (Shanghai, , , . 
Guangming shuju, 1936), and other contemporaries who published articles and books 1n 
the pre-war period. Nowadays, both Mainland and Taiwan Chinese scholars have also, 
at various degrees, criticized the banking system. The two major represen~atives are 
Zhang Yulan, Op.cit. (Shanghai, Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1957) from Ma1nland, and 
warig Yeh-chien, Op.cit. 
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Banks and other financial institutions are merely 
intermediaries of the market of one factor, capital. Intermediaries 
or sellers of other factor markets may also provide the firm with 
credits. These markets include land (raw material), capital 
(machinery), and, to a lesser degree, labor. 129 The sellers or the 
intermediaries may want to attract more business by offering credi ts 
to their customers. In the case of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group, 
sellers' or intermediaries' credits did play an important role in 
the group's financing and crediting. 
In addition, Chinese industrial establishments (including both 
flour and cotton milling) have been described as being "under-
capitalized", short of working capital, and thus heavily 
indebted .130 These comments are correct but incomplete. They 
demonstrate a fact that Chinese industrialists could also make use 
of credits and loans from various sources. Otherwise, there would be 
no way to borrow or to become indebted. Again, to explore this 
business crediting is important and meaningful to understand 
business financing of that period. 
On the other hand, the industrialists were willing to use 
loans and credits --- deficit-financing --- to pursue large-scale 
129 In the present study, labor is not included. It is because although labor 
is one factor of production, there is no evidence showing that the Maoxin-Fuxin-
Shenxin group was making use of credits from the labor market. Of course, there was 
one occasion that Rong Desheng had once issued a gongzi piao to temporarily pay for 
the labor cost during the financial difficulties created by the aftermath of the 1911 
Revolution. However, this was the only case I can find on this question. Thus, it is 
pre-mature to have further generalization of external financing in labor. On the 
issue of gongzi piao, see Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.34. 
130 These are general comments made by many people of various period and 
summarized by Kang Chao on cotton textile industry, see Kang Chao, TheDevelo~ent 
of Cotton Textile Production in China, pp.142-155. 
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production. That can be clearly seen from Rong Desheng's own 
account. On the eve of the Russo-Japanese War, Rong Desheng realized 
that the market condition was favorable to flour milling. He planned 
to expand the scale of production of Maoxin. However, 
"it is not easy to increase capital. I myself do not have such hundred and 
more thousand of dollars (of capital). To float shares is more difficult. 
Even having collected the needed capital, there will be nobody working hard 
with the same goal.,,131 
Later, in 1909, Rong had a chance to buy a new set of millers 
by instalment. He said once again: 
"I heard about the news (of paying by instalment). (I) have long been 
admiring the American millers but (r) am not able to buy. Shareholders are 
definitely not able to supply such amount of capital. The only way is to 
borrow to buy it, and to repay later, so that there would be profit in 
future.,,132 
The effect to raise both quali ty and quanti ty of Maoxin' s 
product was successful and impressive. Hav ing installed the new 
machinery, the production capacity was enlarged and the quality of 
the product was raised. It made both Rong Desheng and Rong Zongjing 
believe that the Zhenxin Cotton Mill should also follow the same 
path of reform .133 Thus, both Rong brothers agreed to adopt 
"deficit-financing" as a business strategy. 
To obtain credits and loans from the banking agencies, the 
interest rate seemed to be an important factor determining a firm's 
choice between Bank A and Bank B, or Banking Group X and Banking 
131 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit. , p.26. 
132 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit. , p.32. 
133 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.37. 
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Group Y. Yet, as I cannot obtain the complete data of interest rates 
of these banking agencies, it seems quite difficult to reconstruct 
the business consideration base on interest. My analysis, as we will 
see later, will show that loans were made because of a certain 
degree of personal trust, social linkages, and business 
relationships. 
4.2. Loans and Credits ' from Qianzhuan;3( 
The first source of loans used by the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin 
group was qianzhuang~ particularly the huihua qianzhuang in 
Shanghai. The huihua qianzhuang was the most powerful group of 
qianzhuang among all the qianzhuang in Shanghai and other regions in 
China. 135 Only the huihua qianzhuang was able to provide huge 
credits and loans to satisfy the huge demand for loans and credits 
from the industrialists. 
134 Before discussing the whole matter, I must distinguish the Guangsheng 
Qianzhuang (1896-1908) from the other qisnzhusng, and Guangsheng will be discussed 
in Chapter 5 as a closed financing means. 
135 Qianzhuang was a kind of financial institution existing long before the fall 
of the Qing Dynasty. Among them, those in Shanghai were the most powerful in China. 
In 1934, there were 64 native banks in Shanghai. Their capitalization ranged from 
Y100 , 000 to Y840, 000 and the average was Y320, 000. Al though Shanghai native banks 
might not exceed their counterparts in other cities in terms of number, they could 
be regarded as the mo~t powerful in terms of average capitalization. (See Frank M. 
Tamagna, Op.cit., pp.59-60.) Shan~hai qianzhuang of the Republican period consisted 
of several types, namely huihua, yuanzi, hengzi, lizi, and zhenzi, according to their 
services and capitalization. Generally speaking, huihua was the most powerful one 
which could issue the highly creditable native bank orders (zhuangpiao). Yuanzi 
qianzhuang could also issue zhuangpiao but its circulation was very limited. Hengzi 
qianzhuang was less capitalized ' compared with the former two groups, while lizi 
qianzhuang merely provided money exchange services. Zhenzi qianzhuang was actually 
a sideline business of some retailing shops and thus were regarded as the least 
powerful one among all the qianzhuang. For further details, see Shi Baiheng, 
"Shanghai qianzhuangye shiwu", pp.I-20, in his Qianzhuangxue (Shanghai, Shanghai 
shangye zhusuan xueshe, 1934); Yang Yinpu, ShaQghai jinrongzuzhi gaiyao, pp. 30-32; 
Li Quanshi and Zhao Weiren, Shanghai zhi qianzhuang (Shanghai, Dongnan shudian, 
1929), pp.4-6. Pan Junhao and Guo Xiaoxian divided Shanghai qianzhuang into three 
main categories which consisted of the above five groups, see Pan Junhao, Zhongguo 
qianzhuanggaiyao (Taibei, Xuehai chubanshe, reprinted from 1929 ed., 1970), pp.36-
31; also Guo Xiaoxian, "Shanghai de qianzhuang", pp.8l0-8ll. 
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Why did the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group want to make use of 
such traditional financial institution for its external financing? 
What kind(s) of service could the group get from the qianzhuang? 
These questions can be tackled first by examining the services 
provided by the qianzhuang. 
In general, huihua qianzhuang received deposits, offered 
loans, issued negotiable instruments including native bank orders 
(zhuangpillO) , bills of exchange, and checks, offered remi ttance 
service, provided discount service, offered foreign exchange 
service, bought and sold specie and silver, and received and offered 
exchange papers (duihuan quan) of banks. 136 Important to our 
discussion are the services of offering loans and issuing negotiable 
instruments. In the following, the issuance of negotiable 
instruments will be discussed first. 
There were three kinds of negotiable instruments issued by the 
huihua qianzhuang" The first kind of check (zhipiao) was a document 
that "could be drawn by a client of a bank in his own ' name on his 
own account or on overdraft. ,,137 The second kind of bill of 
exchange (huipiao) was "an unconditional order in writing addressed 
by one person to another, signed by the person giving it, requiring 
136 For a full description of all these services, see Tna nnbunkai, Shins. Keizai 
Zensho (Tokyo, Tna nnbunkai Hens'anbu, 1908), Vol.6, pp. 586-591; Tna Dnbunkai Chnsa 
Hensanbu Shina kinyD kikan (Tokyo, Tna DObunkai Chnsa Hensanbu, 1919), pp.447-456; 
also see'Li Quanshi and Zhao Weiren, S~hai zhi qianzhuang, pp.17-26; Shi Baiheng, 
ItShanghai qianzhuang zhi yewu ji jingyinglt , pp.57-69, see his Qianzhuang xue; Pan 
Junhao, Zhongguo qianzhuaqg gaiyao, pp.67-99; Yang Yinpu, Shanghai jinrong zuzhi 
gaiyao, pp.39-50i Guo Xiaoxian, "Shanghai de qianzhuang", pp.818-825; Frank M. 
Tarnagna, Op.cit., pp.70-77; also see Tna Kenkynjo, Shins. KyDshiki Kinyn ni Ok~ru 
Ka.nkf} --- Tokuni GingD, Sens'D no Tokushitsu wo Ka.da.i to shite (Tokyo, Tna KenkynJo, 
1944), pp.98-104. 
137 See Frank M. Tamagna, Op.cit., p.74. 
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a designated bank to pay, on demand or at a fixed or determinable 
future".138 The third kind of native bank order was "a negotiable 
instrument issued by a native bank (qianzhuang) at the request of 
its clients and representing an unconditional promise of the bank to 
pay" .139 Its origin can be traced back to the nineteenth century 
when the expansion in Sino-foreign trade brought about an expansion 
of credi t. HO It was widely accepted that the financing of both 
domestic and foreign trade also counted on it. In addition to 
various kinds of loans and overdrafts, these qianzhuang-issued 
instruments were another source of credit provided to the creditable 
businessman who had business connection with the qianzhuang 
concerned. 
The Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group was benefitted from the usage 
of negotiable instruments, particularly huipiao and zhuangpiao in 
the purchase of raw materials (cotton and wheat) of domestic and 
foreign origins. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin 
group established its system of raw-materials purchase in local or 
regional marketing centers. Even so, the group still had to make the 
transactions through a number of market intermediaries (lianghang 
and lianghao in wheat marketing, huahang and huahao in cotton 
purchasing) at different levels of marketing hierarchy. In the 
138 See Frank M. Tamagna, Op.cit., p.75. 
139 See Frank M. Tamagn8:, Op.cit., p.75. For further details, apart from 
Tamagna's account see also Pan Junhao, Zhongguo qianzhuang gaiyao, pp.109-151; Shi 
Baiheng, "Shanghai qianzhuang zhi zhangfang ji danju", pp. 93-109, in his Qianzhuang 
xue; also see Nishiyama Eikyn, "SohyO Ran", TDa Keizai Ken1cyT1, B: 1 (1924), pp. 96-120. 
140 See Yen-p' ing Hao, The Caa-ercial Revolution in Nineteenth Century Chi~: 
The Rise of Sino-Western Hercantile Capitalia., pp.BO-90; also see Zhang GUOhU1, 
Op.cit., pp.58-65. 
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purchasing of foreign wheat and cotton, the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin 
group also needed to ask f~reign mercantile houses to act as its 
agent in the transaction. HI In fact, purchasing of raw materials 
was costly to the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group. It occupied more than 
60% of total expenditure in both flour milling and cotton textile 
sectors of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group. This information is 
derived from several. avai lable financial accounts of Shenxin No. 1 & 
8, and No.3, together with Fuxin No.l & 3, and No.7. In the cotton 
textile sector, the cost of raw materials (cotton) was around 60-
80%. On the other hand, raw materials occupied 70-80% of the total 
expenditure of flour mills. 142 
Important to the firm's financing was the acceptance of 
zhuangpiao as the medium of exchange. Zhuangpiao (of five or ten 
days) was commonly accepted not only in purchasing domestic wheat 
and cotton. In buying foreign commodities, the native order was also 
accepted by the foreign mercantile houses. From some descriptions, 
huipiao was also used in purchasing raw materials. H3 In so doing, 
the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group could gain from the convenience o! 
using negotiable instruments instead of cash. To the group, this 
141 On the purchasing of wheat, see Shanghai shangye chuxu yinhang diaochabu, 
Xiaomai ji lII.ianf.en (Shangpin diaocha congkan, di qi bian) (Shanghai, Shanghai shangye 
chuxu yinhang diaochabu, 1932), pp.47-62; also see Shehui jingji"diaochasuo, Shanghai 
maifen shiehang diaoeha (Liangshi diaoeha congkan di JiU hao) (Shanghai, Shanghai 
shehui jingji diaochasuo, 1935), pp.1-7; TOa Dnbunkai, Shina Keizai Zensho (Tokyo, 
Tna Dnbunkai Hensanbu, 1908), " Vol. 8, pp. 289-293; also see TOa Dobunkai, Shins 
ShDbetsu Zenshi, Vol.15 (Koso-shn) (Tokyo, TOa Dnbunkai, 1920), pp.795-799; also see 
BQS.I, pp.97-102. On the purchasing of cotton, see Shanghai shangye chuxu yinhang 
diaochabu, Hian (Shangpin diao9ha eongkan di er bian) (Shanghai, Shanghai shangye 
chuxu yinhang diaochabu, 1931), pp.48-73; also see Shiyebu guoji maoyiju, camp., 
ZJJOngguo sJJiyezhi: Quanguo shiye diaoeha baogao ziyi, ,Iiangsusheng, Vol. 5, Chapter 
7, pp.153-158j also see BQS.I, pp.98-101. 
142 For these accounts, see RQS.I, pp.619-637. 
143 See RQS.I, pp.34-35. 
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meant a crediting service provided by the market (both the 
qianzhuangand the market intermediaries) as it could use negotiable 
ins~ruments to supplement its limi ted working capi tal. Such a 
credi ting service benefi tted business by providing more working 
capital in advance in purchasing raw materials. It was indispensable 
and beneficial. 
Another important service provided by huihua qianzhuang is the 
granting of all kinds of loans. But they would extend loans only to 
those who had deposi ted into the current account of the qianzhuang. 
Loans could roughly be divided in three types. The first type was 
unsecured loan (xinyong fangkuan) which was available to those who 
opened a current account in the qianzhuang. It was further divided 
into three kinds of loan according to the period of maturity, namely 
call loans (fuque) , fixed loans (changque) , and intermediate loans 
(duanqi changqi). It was made on the basis of personal trust of the 
qianzhuang in the debtor. Mortgage was by no means required. There 
were also a lot of flexibility in terms of the amount of loans and 
the date of maturi ty. That means the debtor could ask for an 
overdraft. Most of these loans would have to be cleared at .the end 
of the year. The second type of loan was on security (diya daikuan). 
It was similar to unsecured loans except that it required the debtor 
to mortgage some properties or commodi ties to the qianzhuang .lU 
The third type was "overdraft on current account secured" (diya 
144 Items of properties are as follows: gold or silver, foreign currencies, all 
kinds of securities, shares, bonds, or debentures, as well as documents o! landed 
property, including land and accommodations. See Pan Junhao, Zhongguo q~anzhuaQg 
gaiyao, p. 76. 
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wanglai touzhi). It was a mixture of the above two. Qianzhuang made 
loans specifically to the borrower (who was also a current 
deposi tors of the qianzhua.ng) as overdraft but a mortgage was 
required at the same time. Being a kind of overdraft service, more 
fund would be available to the borrower. 145 Sometimes a huihua 
qianzhuang would also invi te the other one to offer a joint 
mortgaged loan to a big firm (hezuo cha.ngqi). To issue such a loan, 
the bank (or the banking group) would usually send a team of 
investigators to the company to check over the latter's financial 
arrangements. 146 Such action virtually meant intervention in the 
firm's financial autonomy. Thus, it was not the usual way adopted by 
businessmen. 
As stressed by contemporaries, the most important 
characteristic of loans from qianzhuang was the stress of personal 
trust. H7 Particular ly important was the unsecured loan which 
modern banks did not offer because of high risk. Asking for some 
properties for mortgaging, as usually did by modern banks, might be 
regarded as a "distrust" of the businessman or intervention in the 
firm's financial matters. To offer unsecured loans, qianzhuang could 
145 See Shi Baiheng, "Shanghai qianzhuang zhi yewu ji jingying", pp.60-63, see 
his Qianzhuang xue. However, there are other writings using other classifications but 
stressed similar characteristics of qianzhuang. See Yang Yinpu, Shanghai jinrong 
zuzhi gaiyao, pp.44-46; Li Quanshi and Zhao Weiren, Slmnghai zhi qianzhuang, pp.19-
23' T'r>a nnbunkai Chnsa Hensanbu, SIJina kiny'tJ kikan, pp. 449-450; and Guo Xiaoxian, 
, . . 
"Shanghai de qianzhuang", pp. 822-824; and Pan Junhao, Zhongguo q~anz/Juang ga~yao, 
pp.75-78. 
146 See Shi Baiheng, "Shanghai qianzhuang zhi yewu j{ jingying", p.63; also Li 
Quanshi and Zhao Weiren, Shanghai zlJi qianzhuang, pp. 22-23. 
147 Apart from the above mentioned Chinese contemporaries, Western commentaries 
also stressed that the system of credit in China "has been more or less personal" 
which is very peculiar in China. See Srinivas RI Wagel, Finance in China (Shanghai, 
North-China Daily News & Herald, Ltd., 1914), p.286. 
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attract a certain number of merchants who disliked mortgaged loans. 
Such unsecured loans, in fact, constituted the backbone of financing 
activities of qianzhuang, particularly in providing a firm with 
working capital. In addition, in time of difficulties, businessmen 
could also negotiate with some of the qianzhuang to extend the date 
of maturity. (Yet, for security reasons, particularly since the late 
1920's, both mortgages and a guarantor were sometimes required.) In 
summary, unsecured loans gave the qianzhuang room to continue being 
a banking agency of business firms. U8 
Based on personal trust, the qianzhua.ng established the 
business relationship with the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group. Yet, it 
is necessary to see how the business group interacted wi th the 
·qianzhuang. To see the actual interaction between these two parties, 
let us first look at several pieces of description in the early 
history of the group. 
The first piece of description is dated 1908, the first 
financial crisis which happened to the group: 
tt •••••• This (financial crisis) is the first difficult time since (we) came 
into the market. Current accounts (wanglai) also suffered from indebtedness. 
There is no way to get the needed funds. The situation was critical and we 
were nearly to go bankrupt. Only Jusheng (Qianzhuang) still kept the current 
account. Shukang (qianzhuang) came to collect the debts .•••••• At the end of 
the year, Yang Songnian of Shukang (qianzhuang) made a special trip to Wuxi 
~ 
to ask for the payment of current debts (wanglai). (He) asked for the payment 
in the usual way. Otherwise, it (the debt) would be treated as bankruptcy 
(daochang). I promised to pay. At the end of the year (I) gave him 8,000 
taels, all from the mortgage of my own land deeds and documents from the 
property bought from S~zhou. He still did not agree. The manager Mr. Mu, 
however, seemed to be understanding. He persuaded his assistant that '(Rong 
148 See Marie-Clarie Bergere, Op.ci~., p.80. The contemporaries also commented 
on the similar issue, see Ma Yinshu, ttYinhang zhi shili heyi buru qianzhuang", 
Dongfang zazhi, 23:4 (February 25, 1926), pp.17-21. 
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Desheng) had honestly mortgaged his own property. There should be no problem 
to delay the payment of the remains. I (Mr. Mu) could deal with the boss (of 
Shukang)'. (1) Thanked him so much ....••• Li Yucheng (the manager of Jusheng 
Qianzhuang) also fully understood my situation. Now 1 am still indebted to 
him. From this (we) can see that in every event 1 should leave some leeway 
(to others).II149 
The second piece of description dated in 1910, when Rong 
Ruixin mortgaged the deeds of both Maoxin and Zhenxin to the 
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation: 
" ...... Ruixin did not have money to buy (the documents) back, Huifeng (the 
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation) referred the case to Shanghai 
Daotai Cai Naihuang, then to the (Wuxi) merchants' association, (which) sent 
Wang Buying. The government (Daotai) sent Kuang Fengyi, together with a seal 
to the factory. Clearly stated the reason, and if no solution was reached, 
(they) must close the factory for compensation. Rumors spread all over the 
ci ty. Those with wanglai (current accounts) all arrived to get their money 
back. The manager of Xincheng Bank would come later to get the commodities 
(mortgages). Because it was late, I (Rong Desheng) disapprove. (We) Sat 
overnight and did not sleep for the whole night. Yuning (Qianzhuang) asked 
the Viceroy to refer the closure order to the county (government). Since it 
is a mortgage, (I) argue (with them) forcefully with just ground. It (the 
closure order) was stopped as the merchants' association presented the case 
on our behalf. Then, (we) started (to look for) solution. (1) went to 
Shanghai to' discuss with my brother, tried everywhere to ask people for re-
mortgage ....... Later Li Yucheng and Zhou Shunqing of Xincheng lent (us) 
80,000 taels in total, (we) used qianzhuang's short-term loan of 40,000 
taels, and collected (borrowed) some 40,000 taels from the factory itself to 
redeem the documentso" 150 
The third piece was dated in 1912 of the second financial 
crisis of the business caused by the 1911 Revolution and its 
aftermath. Rong Desheng and his assistant had to go to Shanghai to 
look for a solution: 
149 See Rang Desheng, Op.cit., pp.30-31. 
150 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.33. 
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It (Rong Desheng' s assistant) went to Jusheng and saw the accountant 
(zhangfang) Mr. Hao Yin. Mr. (Hao Yin) asked, 'Why do you come to Shanghai 
today?' and he answer, 'In the last year, because of high interest rate, 
Zhenxin cleared out all the stock. The wanglai (current accounts) of all the 
qianzhuang haye been cleared up. Yet no new account was opened. So (we) don't 
have cash to pick up the zhendan (go-down warrant) .•..•• ' Mr. Hao Yin said, 
tOur qianzhuang (Jusheng) is closely related (with Maoxin and Zhen~in), (it) 
should not be heard by the head (means the manager Mr. Kong) for he would be 
frightened, as having such problems would be severe to our 
qianzhuang ...•.. ,,151 
All these three pieces of description quoted above are in 
crisis situations. Yet, they reveal some aspects of routine 
financial arrangements in Maoxin and Zhenxin ~ For routine 
operations, like purchasing cotton, issuing bills of warehousing, 
and so on, the mills had to make use of the current accounts, call 
loans, overdrafts, and mortgaged loan services provided by the 
qianzhuang. -They surely provided the mills wi th needed working 
capital and these current accounts had to be cleared at the end of 
every Chinese New Year. Otherwise, the firm would he treated as 
being bankrupt, as demonstrated in the case of Maoxin and Zhenxin. 
Among a number of qianzhuang, only Shukang, Yuning, and 
-Jusheng can be identified. Yuning was not a member of Shanghai's 
qianzhuang, the other two were huihua qianzhuang in the ci ty .152 
They should have current accounts with Maoxin and Zhenxin, or at 
least Rong Desheng. It means that the mills' external financing, 
generally speaking, depended on the banking services of some huihua 
151 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.35. 
152 Shukang Qianzhuang was a member of association of qia~zhuang in the Norther~ 
Market (Beishi) and was set up in 1908 but closed soon, 1n 1911. See Shangha~ 
qianzhuang shiliao, Vol. I, p. 96. Jusheng Qianzhuang was located in the Southern 
Market (Nanshi) which had already existed in 1903, see Ibid., p.95. 
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qianzhuang in Shanghai. 
It is known that Jusheng Qianzhuang lent 80,000 taels to 
M . • 190 153 aOXln In 8 and 40,000 taels in 1910. Shukang Qianzhuang 
also agreed to extend the due date of Maoxin's and Zhenxin's debts. 
Such a deferment of payment was crucial to the mills' crisis 
situation at that time. The reason for the extension is not clear. 
Yet, from the above description, there might be two reasons. 
Firstly, because of business interest, qianzhuang did not want to 
see the firm's bankruptcy, which might also affect their own 
business. The second reason is, as demonstrated above, that the 
trust in Rong Desheng's sincerity was an important element of native 
banking. Nevertheless, such a kind of trust was only given to Rong 
Desheng himself and not the mills. 
Why did other qianzhuang not offer help? The reason is 
manifold. But the major reason, at least for the second and third 
events, were the problems encountered by the qianzhuang themselves 
during 1910 and 1911. In 1910, as also revealed by Rong Desheng 
himself15(, there was the so-called "Rubber Shares Crash" in the 
Shanghai financial market. Three deeply-involved qianzhuang went 
bankrupt. It turned out to be a "disaster" to the financial market 
of Shanghai as these three qianzhuang also connected with many other 
qianzhuang in the city. Many qianzhuang were in bad condition or 
went bankrupt. It was reported that sixteen qianzhuang were closed 
153 See RQS.I, p.2l. 
154 See Rang Desheng, Op.cit., p.33. 
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in 1910. 155 The tr~uble was temporarily settled only by official 
intervention. 156 After this event, the 1911 Revolution had another 
serious blow to the Shanghai qianzhuang. Again, as revealed by Rong 
Desheng, the interest rate in Shanghai was very high. Many people 
withdrew their deposits from the qianzhuang, and many qianzhuang 
went bankrupt. It lvas reported that forty-two qianzhuang were 
actually closed in 1911. 157 In short, the Shanghai qianzhuang had 
serious trouble themselves in these two years and did not have extra 
resources to help any business like Maoxin and Zhenxin. 
Li Yucheng, the manager of Jusheng, is a person who needs to 
be discussed further. On several occasions, he and his qianzhuang 
saved the Rong brothers business. He might also be the sole banker 
of Maoxin and Zhenxin during the period 1908-1912. He kept an 
extremely good relationship, based on friendship, with the Rong 
brothers. He was almost the only person who, being neither member of 
the families, which formed the Fuxin partnership. Not being a 
former-assistant of the Rong brothers, he held some of the shares of 
F . 158 UXln. • Such a case of good relationship is, indeed, not 
155 Some sources state that sixteen qianzhuang closed, see Shanghai qianzhuaqg 
sbiliao, Vol.1, p.96; but other sources state that it was more than twenty, see Yang 
Yinpu, Shanglmi jinrong zuzhi gaiyao, pp.28-29; some even state that it was several 
tens, see Shi Baiheng, "Qianzhuang zhi shengshuai jiqi jinkuang", p.11, in his 
Qianzhuangxue. But as the first group of materials is more systematic in collecting 
data from newspapers, it is more reliable than the other two. 
156 For more details, see Andrea Lee McElderry, Op.cit., pp.105-119; also see 
Shanghai qianzhuang shiliao, Vol. 1, pp. 74-88; also see Guo Xiaoxian, "Shanghai de 
qianzhuang", p.808; and Zhang Guohui, Op.cit., pp.170-176. 
157 See Shanghai qianzhuang shiliao, Vol.1, p. 96. For other details of the 
problems created by the Revolution of 1911, also see Ibid., pp. 88-93, 101-104; 
McElderry, Op.cit, pp.119-123; and Guo Xiaoxian, "Shanghai de qianzhuang", pp.808-
809. 
158 See RQS.I, p.7; also see Shenxin xitong qiye shiliao, 2:1, pp.12-13. 
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common. 
The business relationship (for both routine operation .and 
business expansion) between the Rong brothers' business (first 
Maoxin and Zhenxin, later the whole Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group) and 
Shanghai qianzhuang continued to be close in the years to come. 
However, some qianzhuang underwent changes. At least, Jusheng was 
shut down in 1916. 159 On the other hand, after ·the early 1910's, 
the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group flourished. It expanded rapidly in 
both production scale and marketing scope. The demand for loans and 
credits of course increased. Thus, it is certain that the group had 
to turn to a number of qianzhuang for financial support in the 
expansion period. 
For this problem, let us consider another piece of description 
which was dated in 1922, the third financial crisis of the business: 
"Maoxin No.1 to No. 4, Fuxin No.1 to No. 8, Shenxin No. 1 to No. 4, were all 
opened, but (they were) heavily indebted and were clearly detected by the 
financial sector. BY the end of the ninth month they (the financial agencies) 
all withdrew their support. (The enterprise) owed three million (yuan) to the 
(financial) market. At that time, those always indebted were Fuxin No.2 and 
No.7, Shenxin No.3 and No.4. Hankou (Fuxin No.5) also needed some help. (We) 
All join together to find a solution. Flour and textile also had an exchange 
market. Market had been manipulated, and the difficulty to have autonomy 
meant difficulty to get profit. In the financial aspect, because of being 
affected by the failure of stock exchange of the exchange markets, profit 
made during the European War (WWI) was either spent for business expansion, 
or lost in speculation. A ~omantic dream has now been broken. Those cautious 
ones (qianzhuang) became more cautious, and were not willing to make loans. 
My factory (company) was so large in scale, all our forces (resources) were 
invested in the enterpri'se. It would be empty words just to say of gathering 
such amount of money. So (we) ask somebody to search for a mortgaged loan. 
Since the tenth month ('we) were determined to make (a mortgage), but there 
was no progress. All the qianzhuang were also worried, as the amount of debt 
159 The reason for the shut-down of Jusheng is unknown. See Shanghai qianzhuang 
shiliao, Vol.1, p.189. · 
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was really great. I myself then, when having some spare time, went to 
Shanghai to (help) find a solution. The two Mr. Hangs (Yuqing and Yaochen) 
did· that too, since they were also related (involved) and thus (they) must 
try to solve the problem. The cotton and textile sector had no profit. 
Although Maoxin and Fuxin also had a little profit, it did not help much. The 
financial pressure is relieved to a certain extent by reducing the stock of 
finished products. By the eleventh month, it. was known that two million and 
more were actually owed. On the twentieth day of the twelfth month (February 
18, 1922) the loan was successfully made and (the bill) signed, all people 
were calm down and happiness was shown on the faces. Since all qianzhuang did 
not offer help and spread rumors of my elder brother, he decided to repay the 
debts at the end of the year. It made paojie xiansheng (marketing assistant 
of qianzhuang) worried. Paojie xiansheng saw calmness on his (my elder 
brother's) face. He (paojie xiansheng) immediately spoke warmly and said, 'To 
clear (the debts) earlier we will still have some good feelings (relations) 
next year.' On the twenty-third the bill was paid, and toucun (excessive 
deposit in the qianzhuang) of twenty hundred thousand and more (yuan) was 
made. 160 
From the above description, it seems that the group still had 
a close relationship with some qianzhuang which were not willing to 
help the group at its crucial moment. 161 I t reveals that the 
financial routine of the group remained unchanged for a decade. The 
business always relied on the daily services, especially unsecured 
loans, provided by the qianzhuang to finance its operations. What 
had been changed in the early 1920's is that the capital for routine 
business of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group was now roughly a hundred 
times more than that a decade ago. 
Unlike the financial difficulties a decade ago, Shanghai 
qianzhuang did not offer further credi ts to the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin 
160 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.52-53. 
161 Besides Rong Desheng's explanation, the qianzhuang did not offer help to the 
group can also be understood as a collective conservative policy of Shanghai's 
qianzhuang. 
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group in the third crisis of 1922 because of some other reasons. As 
mentioned earlier, there was a fever of setting up many kinds of 
exchange market appeared in Shanghai in 1921. It was reportedly to 
have more than 140 exchange houses established wi thin several 
months. Many qianzhuang in the municipality became cautious about 
the event. They even took some steps against the current of setting-
up exchange markets. For instance, the native bankers' association 
sent a telegram to the central government of Beij ing to ask for 
government intervention. The association also ordered its members to 
forbid their staff to become involved in the exchange market 
activities. Meanwhile, the association restated that in order to 
cool down the market situation, the interest rate would be 
restr icted by the association .162 Nevertheless, Rong Zongj ing and 
Wang Yuqing, the two main representatives of the Maoxin-Fuxin-
Shenxin group, were initiators of the textiles and flour exchange 
markets .163 Under these si tuations, they might have had 
difficulties in getting credits from qianzhuang. 
After the third crisis, the business still continued its 
expansion. Indeed, as will be seen in the next section, such an 
expansion was supported by another financial intermediary, modern 
banks. Nevertheless, it is clear about how many qianzhuang still had 
close business ties wi th the group. On the other hand, it was 
witnessed both unsecured and mortgaged loans offered by some 
qianzhuang to the 'Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group. (See Table 4.1) That 
162 See Shanghai qianzhuang shiliao, Vol.1, pp.120-122. 
163 See RQS.I, pp.69-71. 
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means the qianzhuang also had to consider to make some mortgaged 
loans in addition to unsecured loans and overdraft. 
Table 4.1. Industrial loans made by four Shanghai qianzhuang to the Maoxin-Fuxin-
Shenxin group, 1925-1933 




























































































Source: Zhongguo renmin yinhang Shanghaishi fenhang, comp., Shanghai qianzhuang 
shiliao, Vol.2 (Shanghai, Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1960), pp.784-787, 802-805, 822, 
842-845. 
In Table 4.1, it is not clear about the names of the mortgaged 
property. On one list of mortgages, several qianzhuang made secured 
loans on such property as shares of a bank and a cement company, as 
well as documents of landed property .16~ Yet, since the demand for 
credit and loans was too . large, usually a qianzhuang could not make 
a mortgaged loan alone. It had to cooperate with several qianzhuang 
to offer a joint-qianzhuang-mortgaged-loan (hezuo changqi). For 
instance, in 1931 Rong Zongjing wanted to buy the Housheng Cotton 
Mill which had been heavily indebted to several qianzhuang in 
164 See RQS.I, p.407. 
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Shanghai. As the amount of loan was too large, two banking groups 
jointly raised the needed fund. 165 
After all, loans from qianzhuang in the 1930's seemed to have 
become relatively insignificant to the total debit of the group, 
particularly in the cotton textile sector. The flour milling sector 
was still making profit at that time. The fact is, that by the end 
of 1934, the total debi t of Shenxin was Y63, 759,150166 • Including 
all kinds of qianzhuang, the loans were valued at Y6,502,680 which 
occupied about one-tenth of the total debi t .167 That means the 
qianzhuang were not the major source of credi t for the company 
during this fourth "financial crisis" .168 In fact, It were the 
modern banks which performed a larger role in financing the Maoxin-
Fuxin-Shenxin group during the 1930' s. This si tuation will be 
discussed in detail in the next section . 
. The business relationship between the businessmen of the 
Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group and the qianzhuang bankers can roughly be 
regarded as a matter of personal, particularistic trust. From the 
business regulations of qianzhuang, we learn that the native bank 
would not trust those merchants wi thout a relationship wi th the 
165 Of course, it is important to explain why these qianzhuang accept to make 
the loan. They might find that if Housheng could not be re-mortgaged, it should go 
bankrupt which was mostly unwelc~·me to all the bankers. On the other hand, the 
establishment of two banking groups might also be a result of some arrangements made 
by the owner of Housheng in order to materialize the plan. For the source, see BQS. I, 
pp.253-254; also see Shenxin xitoag qiye shiliao, 2:1, pp.58-6B. 
166 See BQS.I, p.405. 
167 For the total amount of loans from qianzhuang, see BQS.I, p.554. 
168 Al though Rong Desheng did not clearly state that it was a "financial 
crisis" he mentioned that 1934 was the most busy time he ever experienced as he had 
to go between Shanghai, Wuxi, and Nanjing to seek help for Shenxin' s financial 
crisis. I thus regard it as the fourth financial · crisis of the group. For Rang 
Desheng's descriptions about the crisis, see Rong Desheng, Op.cit., pp.67-68. 
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bank. Such a relationship was started with the businessmen's deposit 
in the qianzhuang. In return, the qianzhuang trusted such a 
"depositor" by offering unsecured loans to them. 
Besides, Rong Zongjing was reportedly to have other special 
connections with some qianzhuang. Rong Zongjing's second son, Rong 
Hongsan, was the son-in-law of Sun Zhizhai, the owner of several 
qianzhuang .169 These qianzhuang also provided different kinds of 
loans to the Shenxin Cotton Mill. 170 At the time when Rong 
Zongjing decided to buy Housheng, he could borrow the needed T50,000 
from Sun .171 
Perhaps the relationship between some qianzhuang bankers and 
the Rong brothers could be traced back to the early years of the 
twentieth century, when the Rong brothers' Guangsheng Qianzhuang 1:;as 
still being operated in the Southern Market of Shanghai. Even though 
Guangsheng was not a huihua, it might provide a common ground for 
the Rong brothers to establish social networks with other native 
bankers. 
Besides having a social network with ~ome qianzhuang owners, 
Rong Zongjing was in fact a shareholder of several qianzhuang. Of 
course, if deposit can be regarded as a means of establishing ties 
169 Before 1929, Sun Zhizhai was the major shareholder of the Yida Qianzhuang. 
In 1935, he also invested in the .Rongkang Qianzhuang and became the sole proprietor 
of the Weifeng Qianzhuang in the same year. In 1934, Sun became the major owner of 
another qianzhuang, Weichang, the one Rong Hongsan also had investment. For all the 
details, see Shanghai qianzhUJl..!l!1 shiliao, Vol.1, pp.264-269; XU Jiqing, Shanghai 
jinrongshi (Taibei, Xuehai chubanshe, 1970 reprinted from 1926 ed.), pp .114-126; Shi 
Baiheng, "Shanghai qianzhuang zhi leibie", pp. 2-16, in his Qianzhuangxue; and Guo 
Xiaoxian, "Shanghai de qianzhuang", pp.B49-B54. 
170 See Shenxin xitong qiye shiliao, 7:1, pp.114, 117, and 119-120. 
171 See RQS.I, p.24B. 
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between Rong Zongj ing and native bankers, direct investment in 
qianzhuang can also be interpreted as an extension of Rong 
Zongjing's business networks to the native banking circles. The link 
between Rong and the bankers was now tightened by another stronger 
relationship, partnership. Being a partner, Rong Zongjing no~ could 
directly influence the decision-making of the related qianzhuang. 
Rong Zongj ing did not seem to have invested in qianzhuang 
before 1927 as his name did not show up 'On the list of huihua 
qianzhuang shareholders. 112 Rong's name first appeared on the list 
of huihua qianzhuang shareholders of 1929. From this list, we find 
that Rong had only invested in one qianzhuang named Huichang (Dej i) 
Zhuang. His investment was valued at 24,000 taels ,173 It was 
reported to be closed in 1932. 174 In 1930, he invested in another 
qianzhuang named Tongxin and this investment was valued at 40,000 
taels. But it was closed in 1932. 175 Again in 1932, he invested in 
another two, namely Shengchang (40,000 taels)176 and Zhentai 
172 For the list of pre-1926, see Shanghai qianzhuang shiliao, Vol.1, pp.193-
202. Although I do not have the name list of shareholders and managers of two 
qianzhuang, namely Hefeng and Jinde, I still believe that Rong Zongjing did not 
invest in some qianzhuang before 1926. For the list of 1927, see Ibid., pp.264-26B. 
For double checking, also see the list of 1926 in XU Jiqing, Shanghai jinrongshi, 
pp.114-123. Besides, Xu ' also showed the list of yuanzi qianzlluang in which Rong 
Zongjing's name also did not appear, see XU Jiqing, Ibid., pp.123-126. 
173 See Shi Baiheng, "Shanghai qianzhuang zhi leibie", pp.12-13, in his 
Qianz/Juangxue. 
174 See Guo Xiaoxian, "Shanghai de qianzhuang", p.848. 
175 See Shanghai qianzhuang shiliao, Vol.1, p.269. 
176 See Shanghai qianzhuang shiliao, Vol.1, p.269. 
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(Songji) (Y48,000)177. From some internal materials from the Rang 
family, the number of qianzhuang might be larger. It w,as reported 
that by 1931-1932 Rong Zongj ing himself had invested in eight 
qianzhuang. Apart from Huichang, Shengchang and Zhentai, there were 
also Xinkang (35,000 taels), Rongkang (20,000 taels), Juntai 
(unknown), Zifeng (unknown) and Futai (10,000 taels).178 In 
addition, Rong Zongjing's eldest son, Hongsan, was also reported to 
have investment in Weichang Qianzhuang in 1934 (Y90,OOO).179 
To invest in these qianzhuang, Rong Zongjing once had to face 
criticisms from both Rong Desheng and Wang Yuqing who thought such 
investments might di versi fy some of the needed capi tal from the 
normal usages. But Rong Zongjing's response was that such investment 
was rather like a business strategy: 
"It is still early for them (Rong Desheng and Wang Yuqing) to learn that 
principle. I myself put in (invest) ten thousand (dollars) of shares, then I 
will be able to use one or two hundred thousand from them (qianZhUang).J80 
I f the internal materials from the Rong family are valid, 
then, from the fact that all these qianzhuang actually were lending 
177 Zhentai was opened in 1917 (or 19181). Its initial capitalization was 
160,000 taels and the original sub-title of the qianzhuang was Yurun. But Rong 
Zongjing's name did not show up on the list then. In 1932, this qianzhuang changed 
its ownership and Rong joined the partnership. Then this sub-title was also changed. 
For the original ownership, see S~anghai qianzhuang shiliao, Vol.1, p.266; for the 
new ownership, see Cuo Xiaoxian, "Shanghai de qianzhuang", p.852. 
178 It is said that the source comes from the records of the Rong family. 
However, when cross-checked with Cuo Xiaoxian' s list, Rong' s name is not on the list 
of qianzhuang shareholders of these five qianzhuang by 1932. Thus, it might be an 
indirect and confidential investment as it was actually violating . the regulations of 
the native banks' association. For the source of this list, see BQS.I, p.553. 
179 See Shanghai qianzhuang shiliao, Vol.1, p.269. However, from some other 
sources used earlier, this Weichang Qianzhuang had already built up business ties 
with the group in 1931 when the latter bought in the Housheng Cotton Mill and asked 
for a joint-qianzhuang mortgaged loan. 
180 See RQS.I, p.553. 
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money to the Rongs' business (at least to Shenxin under Rong 
Zongjing's control), this business strategy seemed to be a 
successful one. Besides those who had already been involved in the 
joint-qianzhuang mortgaged loans to Shenxin No.6 (previously 
Housheng), some qianzhuang also offered many kinds of loans to the 
group .181 Even so, they were merely minor lenders of both 
unsecured and mortgaged loans when compared with the total of amount 
of loans to the company by qianzhuang. If the internal information 
from the Rong family is invalid, or not applicable to the 1930's or 
earlier, the effectiveness of such strategy for the Rongs was even 
more limited. In short, this strategy might not be successful as it 
did not supply enough credits to meet the group's financial demand. 
The cri ticisms from Rong Desheng and other colleagues were thus 
reasonable. 
In a nutshell, qianzhuang performed a consistent and 
fundamental role in the external financing of the Maoxin-Fuxin-
Shenxin group. It provided both fixed and working capital to the 
group. The Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group also benefitted from the usage 
of native bank orders in purchasing raw materials. However, the 
capaci ty of qianzhuang in offering loans to the business group 
finally came to its limi t ,' when the group expanded its scale of 
production and its demand for credit exceeded what the qianzhuang 
could offer. Thus, modern banks' role became more and more important 
in the business group's external financing. 
181 See Shenxin xitong qiye shiliao, 2:1, pp.58-60; also see 7:1, pp.114, 117, 
119·-120. 
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4.3. Loans from Modern Chinese Banks 
Modern banks during this period could be classified under 
several categories, acc'ording to their specialties and 
backgrounds. 182 Most of the modern banks established their 
headquarters in Shanghai. Because of proximity, industrialists of 
the ci ty could build up business connections wi th these modern 
banks. Like qianzhuang, modern banks provided all kinds of banking 
services, namely receiving all kinds of deposit, offering various 
kinds of loans, providing remittance and ~oreign exchange services, 
issuing bank orders, offering discount services, as well as issuing 
bank notes .183 Thus, modern banks were in theory, as well as in 
practice, business rivals of qianzhuang. 
The Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group did not use the loans from 
modern banks in the early twentieth century. It did not use it too 
often either. Modern Chinese banking was developed at a low pace. 
Even though several banks were established before ' the 1911 
Revolution, many of them concentrated their business mainly on 
government financing, local or central. Their interest in providing 
industrial loans was still very low. The group did not use bank 
loans too often because most of these modern banks did not offer 
182 There were several criteria of classifications of Chinese modern banks. I 
am not going to give a full discussion here. In my classification, there were two 
main groups of modern banks, namely state banks (only the Bank of China and the Bank 
of Communication) and local banks (established by local or provincial governments), 
and commercial banks (opened by private businessmen). For more details of different 
classifications, see Zhou Baoluan, Zhonghua yinhangshi; Xie Lin and Li Zhi, Yinhang 
zhiduo ion (Shanghai, Zhongguo tushu gongsi heji, 1915); also see Srinivas R. Wagel, 
Finance in China, pp.224-229. 
183 For a general description on the services of modern Chinese banks, see 'Xie 
Lin and Li Zhi, y~ jingying lun (Shanghai, Zhongguo tushu gongsi heji, 1915); 
also see Guo Xiaoxian, "Shanghai de neiguo yinhang", pp.461-469; also see the whole 
book of Ma Renchu' s Zhonghua yinhang lun. 
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unsecured loans .184 Mortgage was usually indispensable in most of 
the bank loan transactions .185 As mentioned, mortgages might be 
regarded as "distrust" of the debtor. More importantly, to issue a 
mortgaged loan, a bank -would usually send a team of investigators to 
the company. Such action virtually meant intervention in the tirm's 
financial matters. A firm thus would not take mortgaged loans from 
banks except in emergency. In this sense, the relationship between 
the group and modern banks became ad hoc and short-lived. 
In fact, there were only two records about the business 
contact between a modern bank and the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group 
before 1915. The first one was about the Xincheng Bank which was 
established by Zhou Shunqing in 1906 lvi th a capi talization of 
Y500, 000 .186. I t also shows that Maoxin and Zhenxin during that 
time had some business connections with a small-sized, local 
commercial bank. 1ST As mentioned above, loans from this bank 
enabled Maoxin and Zhenxin to survive a crisis in 1910. Their 
relationship should be traced back to an earlier date, though hard 
data is lacking. Xincheng's name appeared first in Rong Desheng's 
184 Al though there was a kind of unsecured ldan on fixed term, it was not 
usually issued by the banks. It was only issued to those with close business ties and 
with supportive guarantors. Moreoyer, the interest charged was higher than other 
kinds of loans. See Guo Xiaoxian, "Shanghai de neiguo yinhang", p.464. 
185, According to Ma Renchu, modern bank's loan is based on property in which the 
debtor's reputation or social status, or the position of the guarantor is not 
considered, but the major concern is the property. See Ma Renchu, Zhonghua yinhang 
lun, p.86. 
186 See Shanghai Tongshe, comp., Shanghai yanjiu ziliao xuji (Shanghai, Zhonghua 
shuju, 1937), p.218. 
187 It was small-sized when compared with other banks of t~e time. For the 
comparison, see Shanghai Tongzhe, comp., Shanghai yanjiu ziliao xuji, p~. 243-278'0 It 
was a local bank as its branch did not exceed the boundary of Shangha1, see Ib~d., 
p.218. 
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memoirs of 1909 when the bank sent some staff to collect the loans 
previously made to Maoxin and Zhenxin. The help from Xincheng 
eventually ended, however. The bank was closed in 1913 because the 
assistant manager of the bank fled elsewhere after the crashing down 
of the Second Revolution. 18B 
Another bank which had a business contact with the group was 
the Jiangsu Bank. The bank was established in 1912 by the 
revolutionary authori ties during the 1911 Revolution and later 
reorganized by the provincial authorities. Its initial 
capitalization was Y600, 000 .189 I n other words, it was more or 
less like Xincheng as a small-sized bank. Its major business concern 
was to offer mortgaged loans and to recei ve deposi ts .190 When the 
Rong brothers leased Zhongxing Flour Mill in 1913191 , the mill was 
short of working capital. Thus, the mill asked the Jiangsu Bank for 
mortgaged loans. In response, the bank sent some investigators to 
stay in the mill to supervise the financial arrangements. 192 This 
188 See Shanghai Tongshe, Shanghai yanjiil ziliao xuji, p.219. 
189 See · XU Jiqing, Shanghai jinrongshi, p.46. However, by 1935 its 
capitalization was raised up to Y1,000,000. See Shanghai Tongshe, comp., Shanghai 
yanjiu ziliao xuji, pp.260-261. Shiyebu guoji maoyiju (Bureau of Foreign Trade, 
MinistrY ,of Industry), comp., Zhongguo Shiyezhi: Quanguo shiye diaocha baogao ziyi, 
Jiangsusheng (China Industrial Handbooks: First Series of the Reports by the National 
Industrial Investigation) (Shanghai, Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Industry, 
1933), Vol.10, Chapter 1, p.24. 
190 See XU Jiqing, Shanghai jinrongshi, p.46. 
191 For the brief history of Zhongxing before it was leased, see Shanghaishi 
liangshiju, Shanghai gongshang xingzheng guanliju, Shanghai shehui kexueyuan jingji 
yanjiusuo jingjishi yanjiushi, Zhongguo jindai .ianfen gongyeshi (Beijing, Zhonghua 
shuju, 1987), pp.114-115; for the contract of leasing, see RQS.I, pp.35-36. Later, 
this mill was bought into the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group as Fuxin No.4, see Ibid., 
p.46. 
192 See Shenxinxitong qiye shiliao, 2:1, p.18. But in the descriptions of Rong 
Desheng, he did not mention this issue, see Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.39. The.loan was 
a mortgaged as this bank would not offer unsecured loans, a team of superV1sors was 
sent by the bank. This was a typical method used by the banks in issuing mortgaged 
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loan might only be an occasional one because materials do not show 
other loan transactions between the two parties .193 
On account of expanding scale of production during the second 
half of the 1910's, the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group had a greater 
demand for both fixed and working capital. Such demand for capital 
and credit pressed the group to start to make use of loans from 
modern banks. As we will see in the next section, the Maoxin-Fuxin-
Shenxin group began to make use of loans from Japanese banks or 
Japanese developing companies in China. However, modern Chinese 
banks and the business group seemed to have little business contact 
before 1920. 194 The reason is still unclear. Yet, after 1920, this 
situation started to change. It may be a result of the efforts made 
by several major banks to keep themselves distant from the 
bureaucratic intervention between 1916 and 1920. 195 Unlike 
loans. 
193 There are two other possibilities. First, offering loans to industrialists 
was not the major concern of the bank. From one source, the major portion of loans 
offered by the bank was to the local government (especially the finance of railway 
construction). (See Zhou Baoluan, Zhonghua yinhangshi, Chapter 5, p.20.) Second, the 
operations and personnel of the bank were changed after the removal of their general 
manager J Chen Guangfu, from the office. Ch en was the founder of the Jiangsu Yinhang. 
However, after the Second Revolution, the supporters of the revolution in the local 
government were removed. They include the Governor of Jiangsu, Cheng Dequan. Because 
of Chen's disobedience to the new governor's orders, Chen was also removed. (See Yao 
Songling, Chen Cuangfu de yisheng, Taibei, Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe, 1984, pp.14.) 
As we will see, Chen was Rong Zongjing's friend. Chen's presence would give a 
business. For instance, the Jiangsu Bank made a loan to Zhongxing (Xingji). Chen's 
removal from the office, thus, would also affect the relationship between the bank 
and the group. 
194 For the Bank of .China, there is no record of the 1910's on its the business 
relationship with the group. For the Shanghai Commercial and Saving Bank, there is 
a telegraph record dated December 30, 1920 stating that the Ji 'nan branch of the bank 
hoped to obtain establish some business relations with Maoxin. See Shanghai shangye 
chuxu yinh~ shiliao, pp.128-129. 
195 This is particularly so with the Shanghai branch of the Bank of China and 
the Bank of Communication. In 1916, when Yuan Shikai ordered that all the branches 
of these two banks ceased to do currency exchange, they disobeyed the order. After 
this event, the Bank of China began its reorganization and the relative importance 
of governmental share-holding in the bank declined in the following years. For the 
details, see Yu Jieqiong, "Minguo wunian ZhongJiao lianghang de tingdui fengchao" , 
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qianzhuang, which had to call for a collecti ve offer of loans, 
individual modern banks, particularly the top-rank onesl96 , usually 
it could offer a large amount of loans to big business. Here, they 
were in a better posi tion to provide loans for the large-scale 
enterprises. Of course, for a really large amount of loans, se~eral 
banks would sometime offer a joint-bank loan to the group. In making 
these loans, modern banks in general would usually make mortgaged 
offers .197 
The business group, however, would be more likely to ask for 
a mortgaged loan, as it might not have better alternatives. As it 
still had to continue its exp,anding but costly operation, the only 
way out was to find other kinds of financial intermediaries, the 
modern banks, and to borrow money from them. 
Nonetheless, as revealed from Table 4.2, the Maoxin-Fuxin-
Shehui kexue zazhi, 6: 4 (December, 1935), pp. 67-153; also see Deng Xianhong, 
. "Zhongguo Yinhang yu Beiyang zhengfu de guanxi", in Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan jingji 
yanjiUBUO jikan, No .11 (1988), pp. 275-381; also see Weng Xianding, "Jiaotong Yinhang 
guanchang huodong yanjiu (1907-1927)", Ibid., pp.382-430; also see Guo Xiaoxian, 
"Shanghai jinrong zai Yuan Shikai dizhi shidai", pp.139-171. 
196 The top-rank banks included both state banks of the Bank of China and the 
Bank of Communication, as well as private banks of the following: the so-called 
"Southern Three Ba.nks" (nan san hang), namely the Shanghai Commercial and Saving 
Bank, the Zhejiang Xingye Yinhang, and Zhejiang Shiye Yinhang, as well as the 
"Northern Four Banks" (bei si hang), namely the Jincheng Yinhang, the Yanye Yinhang, 
the Zhongnan Yinhang, and the Dalu Yinhang. 
197 This can be supported by several telegram records on loan contracts dated 
between 1922-1924. All of them were joint-bank offers: one contract was made between 
Shenxin and the Bank of China and the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank (for 
500,000 taels); another one was made between Shenxin and the Shanghai Commercial and 
Savings Bank and the Zhejiang Xingye Yinhang (for 180,000 taels); the third one was 
between Maoxin and six banks, namely the Bank of China, the Shanghai Commercial and 
Savings Bank, the Zhongnan Yinhang, the Zhongyang Xintuo Gongsi, the Bank of 
Communication, as well as the Zhejiang Xingye Yinhang (for 500,000 taels). All of 
these loans were mortgaged. For the documents, see Shanghai shangye chuxu yinhang 
shiliao, pp.160-161. 
The Bank of China also had a long list of lending contracts (Table 4.2) with 
the group, particularly with the cotton-textile sector. It started from 1923 to 1933. 
From this list, we can see that loan contracts between the bank or the banking group 
and the Shenxin Cotton Mill were nearly all for mortgaged loans. For this list, see 
Table 4.2. 
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Shenxin group could have more bargaining power against the modern 
banks in the 1920's than in the 1930's. This can be revealed in two 
ways. Firstly, contracts seemed to be renewable and deferrable .198 
Secondly, during the 1920's, there was no team of supervisors sent 
from the bank or bankl' ng group. Thl's SI' tuat' Ion was, in fact, 
contradictory to the si tuation of the 1930' s, when almost all 
contracts clearly stated that a team of supervisors would be sent 
from the banks to the key departments. This reveals that previous 
. bargaining power possessed by the business group was now reduced. 
Now, the banks must also demand for more security or supervising 
power over the group. 199 No more trust was put in the group 
without controlling its finance. 
The relationship between the business group and two modern 
banks, namely the Bank of China and the Shanghai Commercial and 
Savings Bank, was particularly close. 200 Of course, business 
potential and credi tabili ty were very important for the building up 
of linkage between banks and the industrial group. From various 
198 Several other documents show that there were cases where Shenxin, Fuxin, and 
Maoxin delayed payment of the debts for several months after the due date. See 
Shanghai shangye chuxu yinhang slJiliao, p.161. 
199 In the report made by the Bank of China, the reporters stated that the 
banking group could gradually exercise its supervision power only in the 1930's. By 
then, the banking group had more authority to supervise the financial arrangements 
of the Shenxin Cotton Mill. See Zhongguo Yinh~ haQeshi ziliao huibianl shaqgbian 
(1912-1949), Vol.2, p.1083. 
200 From a 1 ist of creditors of Shenxin' s fixed unsecured loan, there were 
eighteen modern banks (incllldin~ one trust company), providing nearly half of the 
unsecured loans to the company. Some of these eighteen banks included top-rank banks 
like Zhongnan Yinhang, Dalu Yinhans, and Yanye Yinhang. But the Bank of China and the 
Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank were not included. It means that these two banks 
were not the only two modern Chinese banks providing loans to the company. It can 
also mean that the two banks offered mainly mortgaged loans which demanded more 
funding, while small and medium-sized banks offered mainly the unsecured loans which 
demanded less capital. For this list, see Shenxin xitong qiye shiliao, 7:1, pp.119-
120. 
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sources, it is clear that these two banks constituted the backbone 
of the group's external financing. By the end of 1926, the Shanghai 
Commercial and Savings Bank lent Y226,027 to Shenxin (=11.8% of the 
banks' loan to the cotton-textile industry), Y116, 999 to Fuxin 
(=8.5% of the loan to all flour mills) and Y884,030 to Maoxin 
(=64.2% of the loan to all flour mills).201 The Maoxin-Fuxin-
Shenxin group absorbed 34% of all the industrial loans made by the 
bank. 202 From Table 4.2, it is clear that the Shanghai Commercial 
and Saving Bank was the major partner of the Bank of China. By the 
end of 1935, these two banks together provided half of the fixed 
mortgaged loans needed by Shenxin. 203 
Table 4.2. Simplified List of Banking Group's (and the Bank of China's) Lending 
Activities to the Shenxin Cotton Mill, 1923-1933 
Source: Zhongguo Yinhang zonghang and Zhongguo dier lishi dang'an guan, comp., 
Zhongguo yinhang hangshi ziliao huibian, shangbian (1912-1949) (Beijing, Dang'an 
chubanshe, 1991), Vol.2, pp.ll00-ll03. 
By the end of March, 1934, the total amount of loans to Shenxin was: the banking 
group, Y14,461,OOO; the Bank of China, YI0,340,OOO. 
N.B. SCSB: The Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank; Zhentai, Dingsheng, Yongfeng and 
Juntai were huihua qianzhuang in Shanghai. 
T=Tael; Y=Yuan, used after 1933. 
yinchai, the interest rate of silver in the Shanghai money market. 
(continued on the next page) 
201 There is no clarification on the nature of these loans. Thus, it is better 
to regard them as "all kinds qf loan". See Shanghai Shangye chuxu yinhang shiliao, 
p.162. 
202 The total amount of loans made by the bank to the industrial sector was 
Y3, 607,942. The amalgamation of the loans made to the group was Yl, 227,056. The 
latter is approximately equal to 34% of the former. 
203 See Shenxin xitong qiye shiliao, 7:1, p.117. 
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Factory plant Shenxin No.3's 





Changed into a new 
contract 
Shenxin No.3 used 
the factory plant 
and machinery to 
mortgage under the 
Anderson Meyer & 
Co., but the latter 
turned to the Bank 
of China for re-
mortgaging. At the 
time of maturity, 
Shenxin could not 
clear the debts. It 
was re-mortgaged by 
adding some pro-
missionary notes. 
(to be continued in the following pages) 
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1925.7 
To remove Shenda 










1925.10 1926.7 1927.5 1928.5 
Shenxin No.3 & 4 Shenxin No.3 & 4 Shenxin No.3 Shenxin No.3 & 4 
& 4 
T650,000 T400,000 
Zhentai T200,OOO Zhentai T100,000 
Dingsheng T150,000 
Juntai T100,000 
T200,000 T300,OOO T200,000 T500,000 
9.5%/month 9.5%/month 9.5%/month 9.5%/month 
T289,928.40 
yinchai + T4 
Factory plants and Factory plants & Factory plants Factory plants & 
machinery of Shenxin machinery of & machinery of machinery of Shenxin 
No.3 & 4 Shenxin No.3 & 4 Shenxin No,3 & 4 No.3 & 4 
Changed into a new Changed into a Changed into a Changed into a new 




1929.10 1930.6 1930.12 1922.1 1932.11 
Shenxin Shenxin Shenxin Shenxin No.6 Shenxin No.5 
No.4 No.3 & 4 No.3 & 4 · 
T1,300,OOO T2,400,OOO 
(The Gongli SCSB T800,000 
Banking Yongfeng T800,OOO 
Group) 
Y300,OOO T1,OOO,OOO T1,000,OOO T480,000 T500,OOO 
8%/month 8.5%/month 8.5%/month 8.5%/month 8.5%/month 
T300,000 T300,OOO. Interest 
paid once 3 months 
yinchai + T3.5 
Cotton Factory plants Factory plants Factory plant Factory, machinery 
& machinery of & machinery of & machinery of and cotton and all 
Shenxin No.3 & 4 Shenxin No.3 & 4 Shenxin No.6 other materials 
A team of super-
visors were sent 
to the factory 
Cleared Changed into a Cleared on Changed into a new 
new contract March 3, 1934 contract 
Zhentai, Juntai, Increased the 
& Dingsheng all amount of loans 
withdrew. Only 




1932.10 1932.12 1933.1 1933.12 
Shenxin No.3 & 4 Shenxin No.2 Shenxin No.1 Shenxin No.3 
& 8 
T2,400,000 T5,600,000 
(SCSB T800,000) SCSB T4,360,000 
Zhentai T560,000 
Zikang T280,OOO 
T2,500,OOO T900,OOO T1,000,000 Y2,700,OOO(interest 
paid once/3 months) 
8.5%/month 8.5%/month 8.5%/month 8.5%/month 
T250,OOO (interest T540,OOO (pay T400,OOO 
paid once 3 months) interest once 3m 
yinchai + T3.5 yinchai + T3.5 yinchai + T3.5 
Factory, machinery Factory, cotton 
and cotton and other & machinery, and 
materials other materials 
Same as Shenxin A team of 
No.5 supervisors was 
sent in the 
factory 
Changed into a new Changed into a Not yet renewing 
contract new contract the contract 




1933.12 1933.11 1933.12 
Shenxin No.4 Shenxin No.5 Shenxin No.2 
Y3,357,OOO Y3,272,OOO 
SCSB Yl,119,OOO SCSB Yl,309,OOO 
Yongfeng 
Yl,119,OOO 
Yl,300,OOO(interest Y699,OOO Yl,207,OOO 
paid once/3 months) 
8.5%/month 8. 25%/month 8. 25%/month 
Y420,OOO Y756,OOO 
Same as the old Same as the old 
contract contract 
Sending supervi- Sending supervi-
sors and setting sors and setting 
up an office of up an office of 
banking group banking group 
New contract New contract 
(the end of Table 4.2) 
In order to establishca closer relationship with the bankers, 
owners of the group even approached the banking circle by becoming 
members of the board of directors of some of these banks. In 1919, 
Rong Zongjing used the name of Maoxin to invest Y200,OOO in the 
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Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank204 and thus was made a member 
of the board of directors of the bank. 205 In 1921, he increased 
such investment in the name of Fuxin (Y100,OOO) and Shenxin 
(Y1 00 , 000) 206 • As illustrated by Ch en Guangfu, Rang's purpose was 
clear --- just to facilitate the operations of his business.~7 In 
other words, Rang Zongj ing' s aim was to influence the decision-
making body of the bank in his favor. Besides the Shanghai 
Commercial and Savings Bank, the Rang brothers were also 
shareholders of the Bank of China. However, the date of Rang 
brothers' investment In the Bank of China is difficult to 
identify.208 It might be as late as the second half of the 1920's. 
In 1932, Rang Zongj ing also became a director of the Bank of 
China. 209 From the results that large amount of loans were made 
from these two banks, Rang Zongjing seemed to have succeeded in his 
strategy of becoming a member of the board of directors of these 
banks so as to affect the latter's business decision. 
204 See Shanghai shangye chuxu yinhaqg shiliao, p.39. 
205 See the meeting records of the banks' board of directors in 1919, in 
Shanghai shangye chuxu yinhang shiliao, pp.29-30; also see pp.48-49, 51-53. 
206 See Shanghai shangye ChUKU yinhang shiliao, p.40. 
207 This is a speech made by Ch en in August 7, 1919 on the meeting of the board 
of directors of the bank. See " S~hai shangye chuxu yinhang siJiliao, p.29. 
208 The available document shows that in 1937, they were shareholders of the 
bank. But it does not show the amount of shares they held and the date of holding. 
See Zhongguo Yinhang zonghang and Zhongguo dier lishi dang'an guan, comp., Zhongguo 
yin~ hangshi ziliao huibian, shangbian (1912-1949), Vol.l, p.229. 
209 See RQS.I, pp.272-273. Also compare the name lists of the board of directors 
of 1929 and 1931. On the list of 1929", Rong Zongjing's name cannot be found. However, 
it can be identified on the list of 1931. For the list of 1929, see Zhongguo Yinhang 
zong guanlichu, Hinguo siJiba nianferig Zhorigguo Yi~ baogao (Shangha~, Zhongguo 
Yinhang zong guanlichu, 1929), p.23; for the list of 1931, see Zhongguo Y1nhang zong 
guanlichu, Zhongguo Yinhang .inguo ershi niandu yingye baogao (Shanghai, Zhongguo 
Yinhang zong guanlichu, 1931), p.51. 
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Rong Zongj ing' s investment in the Shanghai Commercial and 
Savings Bank and the Bank of China can be interpreted, like his 
investment in qianzhuang, as an extension of Rong's social networks. 
The trust on mortgage was now changed into a trust on partnership. 
More importantly, through the social circles of the board of 
directors of these banks, Rong Zongjing was able to meet many people 
who were either famous industrialists or prominent bankers of the 
day. 
There were other social networks through which industrialists 
and the bankers came together for the contract. As we will see, 
family or regional ties could provide linkages between the two 
parties. 
The general manager of Xincheng, Zhou Shunqing, had a special 
relationship with the Rong brothers. As the owner of several cocoon-
shops and filatures, Zhou was the first president of the Wuxi 
M h t ' A . t' 210 erc an S ssocla Ion. More important, Zhou was a classmate 
and a friend of the Rongs' late father, Xi tai. 211 Zhou might even 
have been the referee of Rong Desheng after completing the 
. h . t' h' 212 qlanz uang-appren Ices lp. Through the merchants' association, 
Zhou had another kind of relationship (patron-and-client 
210 For the brief history of Zhou, see Qian Zhonghan, "Zhou Shunqing", in 
Zhongguo rerunin zhenzhi xieshang huiyi . quanguo weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu 
weiyuanhui, comp., Co~shang jingji shiliao congkan, 1983, No.4 (Beijing, Wenshi 
ziliao chubanshe, 1984), pp.10S-1iO; also see Qian Zhonghan, "Wuxi wuge zhuyao chanye 
ziben xi tong de xingcheng yu fazhan", in Zhongguo renmin zhenzhi xieshang huiyi 
quanguo weiyuanhuiwenshi ziliao, yanj iu weiyuanhui, comp., 1Ienshi ziliao xuanji No. 24 
(Beijins, Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1986), pp.123-126. 
211 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p~8. 
212 As stated by Rong Desheng himself, his father had a lot of friends like Zhou 
who could recommend him to the business world but the name of Rong's referee is 
unknown. 
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relationship} with the Rong brothers, as Zhou was the president of 
the association and the Rong brothers the members. 
Some members of the Rong family were also affiliated with the 
bankers. The classical case is Song Meiyang. He was the second son 
of Song Hanzhang who was a general director and later became the 
general manager of the Bank of China. Sdng Meiyang married the third 
daughter of Rong Desheng in 1928. 213 Because of Song, some of the 
banking business was reportedly shifted from the Shanghai Commercial 
and Savings Bank to the Bank of China. 214 
Rong Desheng' s other son- in-law, Yang Tongyi, was another 
case. Yang was the second son of Yang We iyun, a famous cotton-
textile industrialist in Wuxi and North China. 215 Yang Tongyi 
married Rong Desheng's the sixth daughter in 1934 and entered Maoxin 
the following year. 216 Because of Yang, the Rong family's social 
connections wi th the bankers was further strengthened. Yang Tongyi' s 
kinsman, Yang Weizhang, was the manager of the China Industrial 
Bank. Yang's close friend, Wu Weibai, was the Wuxi branch manager of 
the Bank of Communication. 217 Through these two persons, Yang was 
213 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.S9. 
214 See RQS.I, pp.275-276. 
215 In fact, Yang Weiyun was a member of a branch of the Yang family which built 
up the first Chinese cotton mill in Shanghai (Shanghai Zhizaoju), for the history of 
the Yang family and Yang Weiyun, see Qian Zhonghan, "Wuxi wuge zhuyao chanye ziben 
xitong de xingcheng yu fazhan", pp.101-109; also see Yang Tongyi, "Wuxi Yangshi yu 
Zhongguo mianfangye de guanxi", in Zhongguo renmin zhenzhi xieshang huiyi qianguo 
weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanj iu .weiyuanhui I comp. I eongshang shiliao, No. 2 (Beij ing, 
Wenshi ziliao chubanshe, 1981), pp.54-70. 
216 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.68; also see Yang Tongyi, Op.cit, p.6S. 
217 Wu's name appeared on the list of banks in China, see Zhongguo Yinhang 
jingji yanjiushi, comp., Zhongguo .inguo ershiliri nian Quanguo yinhang nianjian 
(Shanghai, Zhongguo Yinhang j ingj i yanj iushi, 1937), Vol.1, Chapter 10, p. 41. 
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reportedly to have made some plans for Shenxin and Maoxin and 
enabled the mills to survive crises. 218 
In a word, modern Chinese banks play a fundamental role in the 
group's external financing. However, the choice of using modern bank 
loans was not simple. The entrepreneurs had to consider the r 'isk in 
bank loans. Even though there were quite a number of possibilities 
to borrow money from the modern banks, a mortgage from the borrower 
was almost a must. To carry out the plan of expansion through 
defici t financing, the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group chose to take 
mortgaged loans from modern banks. Yet, entrepreneurs still tried to 
establish social networks with the bankers so as to keep a "good 
relationship" with the banks. 
4.4. Loans from the Foreign Banks in China 
The last source of bank loans was foreign banks in China. 
Foreign banks first established their offices in China in the mid-
nineteenth century. Services provided by foreign banks were various. 
Similar to their Chinese counterparts, foreign banks in China 
received various kinds of deposit, making nearly all kinds of loan, 
issuing bank orders and currency, offering discount and remittance 
services, as well as doing foreign exchange. However, the main 
purpose of these services was to finance the trading services of 
foreign merchants in China. Besides, foreign banks took part in 
offering international loans to the central or local governments of 
218 See Yang Tongyi, Op.cit., p.66. 
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China. 219 
The first contact220 between the owners of the business group 
and foreign bankers was the making of a series of loans from 
Japanese banks and investment companies. As shown in Table 4.3, the 
Bank of Taiwan221 , the Chu-Nichi Jigyo Kabushiki Gaisha (the Sino-
Japanese Industrial Co., Ltd. )222, as well as the Toa Kogyo 
Kabushiki Gaisha (the East-Asian Developing Company, Ltd. )223 lent 
a large amount of capital to the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group during 
the expansion period of the latter. To understand the background of 
219 For readers interested in foreign banks in China in general, see Frank M. 
Tamagna, Banking and Finance in China, pp.89-120; Guo Xiaoxian, "Shanghai de waiguo 
yinhang"; Zhou Baoluan, Op.cit., Chapter 7, pp.1-36; Zong Xiejun, "Waizi yinhang zai 
woguo zhi shili", Jingjixue jikan, 2:3 (September, 1931), pp.38-69; "Waiguo yinhang 
zai Hua zhi shiyeguan", Zhongwai jingji zhoukan, No.19 (July 14,1923), pp.7-14; Wang 
.1ieqing, "Waishang yinhang zai Hua shili zhi fazhan yu fenbu jiqi yinxiang", 
Zhongshan wenhua jiaoyuguan jikan, 4: 3 (July, 1937), pp.1055-1080; also see Tl)a 
DObunkai Ch~sa Hensanbu, Shina kinyO kikan, pp.245-385. On specific study of foreign 
banking groups, the HKSBC is the one mostly studied, see Frank H.H. King, The History 
of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1988-1989) Vols.1-3; also see Frank H.H. King, ed., Eastern Banking: Essays 
in the History of The Hongkong and Shanghai Banlring Corporation (London, The Athlone 
Press, 1983); Wang Jingyu, "Huifeng Yinhang de chengli jiqi zai Zhongguo de chuqi 
huodong", Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan jingji yanjiusuo jikan, No. 5 (1983), pp. 267-297. 
220 As mentioned in the second section of this chapter, in 1910, when Rong 
Ruixin used the documents of Maoxin and Zhenxin to mortgage to the Hongkong and 
Shanghai Banking Corporation. However, this is not a normal transaction between the 
two parties. The Rong brothers were not notified in advance. It was an abuse of power 
of a Maoxin-Zhenxin shareholder (Rang Ruixin). Thus, I would not include this case 
in my analysis. 
221 The Bank of Taiwan and the other two companies were, in fact, semi-official 
organizations. Established in 1899, the Bank of Taiwan was jointly owned by the 
government and private businessmen. The Bank aimed at developing Taiwan Island and 
to finance the Japanese interest, in Central and South China. See Kokka Shihon 
Yushutsu J{enkyakai, ed., Ni/Jon no Shihon Yushutsu --- Tai CltDgoku Syaldmn no Kenlcy'D 
(Tokyo, Taga Shuppansha, 1986), p.21. 
222 The Chn-Nichi Jigyt> J{abushiki Gaisha was established in 1913 by Dr. Sun 
Yatsenand several Japanese businessmen, including Shibusawa Eiichi and those from 
Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and others. Its aim was to create a Sino-Japanese joint venture 
in developing industrial activi t.ies in China. See Kokka Shihon Yushutsu Kenkytlkai, 
Op.cit., pp.193-194. 
223 The Tna ]{'Ogyn ]{abushiki Gaisha was established in 1909 by several Japanese 
companies including the Mi tsui Bussan and the Okuka Gumi. It was an investment 
company which was specified to invest in heavy industries (mining, forestry, a~d 
railway constructions, shipbuilding) in China. See Kokka Shihon Yushutsu Kenkynka1, 
Op. ci t., p. 178 • 
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this phenomenon, it is necessary to understand the policy of the 
Japanese government first. On the eve of the First World War, the 
Japanese Prime Minister, Okuma Shigenobu, realized that as the 
Western Powers were busy in Europe, there was a possibili ty for 
Japan to expand its influence in China. The Twenty-One Demands was 
thus resulted. 224 Okuma's successor, Terauchi Masatake, continued 
this policy. Under the government encouragement, Japanese banks and 
companies expanded their investment in or lending money to Chinese 
mining, railway construction, and industrial acti vi ties. 225 
Table 4.3. Loans from Japanese Banks and Developing Companies to the Maoxin-Fuxin-









Name of Creditor 
Bank of Taiwan 
Bank of Taiwan 
Bank of Taiwan 




Name of Debtor & Mortgage 
Fuxin No.2 
Fuxin No.2 
Shenxin No.1 & Fuxin No.1&3 
Shenxin No.1 & Fuxin No.1&3 
Fuxin No.1 
Fuxin No.2 
Shenxin No.1,2 & 4 








Source: For item 1 and 2, see Kokka Shihon Yushutsu Kenkynkai, ed., Nihon no Shihon 
Yushutsu --- Tai chngoku Syakkan no Kenky'D (Tokyo, Taga Shuppansha, 1986), p.80; for 
item 3 and 4, see RQS. I, pp. 60-61, and Nihon no Shihon Yushutsu, p.197; for item 5, 
see Ibid., p.219; for item 6, see RQS.I, p.48; for item 7, see Nihon no Shihon 
Yushutsu, p.106, and RQS.I, pp.90-94. 
N.B. Ch"CI-Nichi is the abbreviation of the Ch"CI-Nichi Jigyo Kabushiki Gaisha; TOa Imgyt> 
is the abbreviation of the 'Iba Kl>gyo Kabushiki Gaisha. 
T=Tae1, the silver dollar of China 
¥=Yen, the standard currency of Japan 
From the contract between the Shenxin Cotton Mill and the Toa 
Kogyo Kabushiki Gaisha, we can find that the company was almost like 
a bank, as it required mortgages (factory plants, machinery, and 
landed documents) and a guarantor (the Fuxin Flour Company) from the 
debtor. Thus, it is still reasonable to regard these companies as 
224 See Shinobu Seizaburo, (trans. by Zhou Jiqian) Riben zhengzhi shi, Vol.4 
(Shanghai, Shanghai yiwen chubanshe, 1988), pp.100-101. 
225 See Kol\ka Shihon Yushutsu Kenkynkai, Ope cit., pp. 54-62; also see Du 
Xuncheng, Riben zai qiu Zhongguo de touzi (Shanghai, Shanghai shehui kexueyuan 
chubanshe, 1986), pp.357-359. 
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banking companies for the Chinese industrialists. However, it is 
difficult to study the deeper connections between the Maoxin-Fuxin-
Shenxin group and these banks or banking organizations. 226 
After 1922, no more loan transaction between the Maoxin-Fuxin-
Shenxin group and these Japanese banks or companies can be found 
because of the complicated poli tical and economic c,ondi tions In 
China and Japan. Since the early 1920's, Japan entered a period of 
recession and crisis. Under this si tuation, Japanese companies, 
including the Mitsui Group and the Mitsubishi Group which were the 
main supporters of the above Japanese companies, had to look after 
their tlome market and thus their involvement in the China market 
decreased. Anti-Japanese feeling during the 1920's and 1930's also 
created pressure on the Chinese debtor who now had to make use of 
the anti-Japanese boycott In his favor. 221 Therefore, it is 
understandable why there was no more contact between the group and 
these Japane.se firms. 
There were two other cases showing the lending transactions 
between foreign banks and the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group. The first , 
one was in 1929. When Rong Zongj ing bought the Oriental Cotton 
Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. (as Shenxin No.7) from British 
merchants, he mortgaged this mill to the Hongkong and Shanghai 
226 From the materials, I know that flour merchants like Wang Yiting and Sun 
Dousen had also been organizers of the ChO-Nichi Jigyn Kabushiki Gaisha. However, 
there is still no evidence showing the connections between the company's personnel 
and the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group in the lending transactions. The same problem 
exists in the case of the Bank of Taiwan and the Tna Kngyn Kabushiki Gaisha. 
227 Rong Zongjing himself had on several occasions been making use of t~e anti-
Japanese boycott to promote his flour and textiles businesses. For deta1ls, see 
RQS.I, pp.185-186, 208; 352-356; and 358. 
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Banking Corporation for Y2, 000,000228 • The second occasion was in 
1932. This time the group was to buy the Sanxin Cotton Mill and to 
rebuild the factory plant for Shenxin No.9. It asked the Chartered 
Bank of India, Australia, and Chin,a for a loan of Y3,866,710. 
Mortgages included the landed documents of Shenxin No.9, Fuxin No.2, 
No. 4 , and No. 8. 229 In both cases, Rong Zongj ing had inadequate 
capi tal to buy the factory plant. 230 Such a purchase of old 
factories symbolizes the implementation of the "deficit-financing" 
policy of Rong Zongjing --- to expand the scale of production by 
making use of loans and credi ts from market intermediaries ---
during the late 1920's and the early 1930's. 
From the previous section of this chapter, there is a general 
picture that the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group had a lot of 
transactions and a close business relationship with several Chinese 
banks. Its relationship wi th foreign banks was not the same, 
however. There are only two cases presented. Nonetheless, the two 
mills sold had long been under the ownership or management of the 
foreign business communi ty. The Oriental Cotton Spinning and Weaving 
Co. Ltd. (later Shenxin No. 7) had been managed by the Arnhold 
Brothers and Co. before it was sold. 231 Although the Sanxin Cotton 
228 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.61; also RQS.I, p.468. 
229 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.64-65; also see RQS.I, p.406. 
230 Such a situation happened, in fact, also in the transactions with Chinese 
banks. In 1926, the group bought in the Xingzhong Flour Mill as Fuxin No.3, the Fuxin 
owners asked the Bank of China for a 400 J 000 taels of mortgaged loan. For the 
details, see RQS.I, pp.182-184. 
231 See Yan Zhongping, Zhongguo .ianfangzhi shigao (1289-1937), p.332; also see 
Shenxin Kitong qiye shiliao, 2:1, pp.75-77; "Shenxin gechang gaikuang", pp.23, in 
HaoKin FUKin Shenxin zonggongsi sa z/JOunian jiniance. 
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Mill (later Shenxin No.9 and moved to a new site) was originally 
owned by Sheng Xuanhuai, its manager was British. Later, it was sold 
to the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation in 1931. 232 In 
such Sino-foreign loan transactions, it is quite natural to see a 
more important role played by foreign banks. 
More interesting, perhaps, is the fact that no foreign bank 
would make a loan to the group more than once. In the second 
transaction, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation did not 
offer a loan. Instead, it was the Chartered Bank of India, 
Australia, and China which lent the needed capital to the group. It 
shows that the relation between the foreign bank (like the Hongkong 
and Shanghai Banking Corporation) and the group was quite distant 
rather than close, ad hoc rather than long-term. Maybe, difference 
in nationality was a significant factor which might create a problem 
of communication and trust between the two parties. However, this 
explanation cannot be confirmed until more evidence is given. 
4.5. Credits in Machinery Buying 
Another aspect of external financing is the sellers' credits 
in machinery buying. To the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group, credits in 
machinery buying was important to the business financing as the cost 
of machinery purchasing was usually very high. In fact the cost of 
machinery constituted a major portion of expenditure of the group. 
From the accounting records of Fuxin No.1 in 1913, this fact is 
232 See Yan Zhongping, Op.cit., p.329. 
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clearly shown. 233 The value of machinery was 27,916 taels, while 
the total assets valued 91,831 taels. Thus, machinery occupied 
roughly 30% of the total assets of the firm in 1913. Therefore, the 
financing of machinery purchasing had long been a major problem of 
the development of the enterprise. 234 However, with the crediting 
service provided by the sellers of machinery, the problem seemed to 
be solved automatically. 
In the Republican period, machinery buying was done almost 
exclusively by foreign mercantile houses, yanghang, in China. In 
other words, it was yanghang which credi ted the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin 
group in purchase of machinery. Then, why did these foreign 
mercantile houses offer such crediting service to the group? What 
kind of credits was provided to the group? How did the group get 
it? 
To answer these questions, let us look at a piece of 
description from Rang Desheng's memoirs. It was dated in 1909, the 
first time of using "deficit-financing" by the Rong brothers. The 
description is: 
"In summer, (I) asked an American mercantile house, Fobes & Co., for sample. 
According to some source it had recently been selling the newest model of 
flour milling machine on behalf of the Bainailisi (romanize name of machinery 
producer). - (If) a sample is needed, (the yanghang) could send one. But it 
would take one or two months. It arrived in autumn. It was picked up by my 
brother and (he) settled the price. To buy a whole set would be cheaper. In 
233 See RQS.I, p.35. 
234 Of course from the source materials, it is clear that the cost of building 
a new factory planf was also high. However, there was no credit~ng. service provid~d 
by the constructors to the group. Thus, it is hard to include 1t 1nto the analys1s 
of external financing. 
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order to promote the product, (the yanghang) could provide credit. 
,,235 
...... 
From the above description, it is clear that the foreign 
mercantile house was willing to offer selling credit because of its 
plan to promote business. The means of promotion was offering 
seller's credi ts to the customers (manufacturers who needed the 
machinery). Here, seller's credi t refers to the advantage of "paying 
by instalment" enjoyed by the buyer. The method was that the buyer 
had to pay 20% first and the remaining 80% would have to be paid 
wi thin two years. 236 Because of such credi ting, the Rong brothers 
were enabled to increase the production capaci ty of their flour 
mill. 
The foreign mercantile house, Fobes & Co., was one of the 
yangha.ng selling flour milling machines to China. 237 Its policy of 
offering "paying by instalment" to its customers seemed to have 
lasted at least until the late 1910's. An available contract 
supports this fact. This contract was dated on October 1, 1919238 
and was made between Fuxin No. 8 and the Fobes & Co. "Paying by 
instalment" was included in the terms of the contract. Payment was 
made in four periods. The first payment of 25% of the total cost 
235 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit'" p.32. 
236 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.32. 
237 Shanghaishi gongshang xingzheng guanliju, Shanghaishi diyi jidian gongyeju, 
Jiqigongye shiliaozu, comp., Shanghai .inzu jiqi go~ye (Beijing, Zhonghua shuju, 
1979), Vol.l, p.118. In fact, there were other foreign mercantile houses selling 
flour milling machines in Shanghai, for example, the Jardine Matheson & Co. Ltd., the 
Arnhold Karberg & Co., the Buchheisterr & Co., the Rose, Downs & Thompson, Ltd., as 
well as the Samuel & Co. Ltd •• See Ibid., pp.117-120. 
23B See RQS.I, pp.BO-BI. 105 
would have to be paid on the date of signing the contract. The 
second payment of another 25% would have to be paid when receiving 
the telegram of shipment of the commodity from the overseas 
producer. The third payment of another 25% would have to be paid 
when the machinery arri ved at Shanghai. The remaining 25% wouid have 
to be paid one month after the machinery was set up and operated 
smoothly without any problem. 
The sellers of cotton spinning machines offered similar 
credi ting service to the cotton textile sector of the group. In 
1912, Rong Desheng planned to buy a new set of cotton spinning 
machines (from Aisha lisi yanghang) for Zhenxin. The method of 
payment was by instalment: the first 10% must be paid when the 
commodities arrived at Shanghai; the remaining 90% would be divided 
into nine portions which would be paid once every three months. 239 
From the contracts of machinery purchase for Shenxin, we can find 
that this method of payment was common in several other foreign 
mercanti le houses. 2(0 The major difference was the duration of 
paymen t • 241 
According to the interview of an ex-salesman of the Anderson 
Meyer & Co., the period of payment could be further deferred after 
discussion with the foreign mercantile houses. In that case, 
239 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.37. 
240 See RQS.I, pp.87-88. 
241 The duration of payment on these contracts were similar to that between 
Maoxin and the Fobes & Co. --- there would be four periods of payment. But the time 
for the last ' payment was four to six months after completion of installation without 
problems. 
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interest (.5% per annum) would be charged by the latter. 242 Of 
course, foreign mercantile houses could offer such crediting service 
because of the support from foreign banks. 2•3 
To promote business is the main reason for the credi ting 
activities of these foreign m~rcantile houses. In doing so, fo~eign 
mercantile houses would try to have direct contact with the 
manufacturers by sending salesmen to the mills. 2H To offer them 
wi th benefi ts such as credi ts was a business strategy of the 
yangJlang to attract customers. 
Yet, there also existed a kind of business trust between the 
two parties after one or two transactions. In 1915, Rong Desheng 
planned to establish Shenxin. He went with the manager of the Aisha 
lisi yanghang, whom he had worked with in the previous purchasing 
for Zhenxin, to see the new plant site. According to Rong Desheng's 
memoirs: 
"l (Rong Desheng) decided to ask (the manager) to open an account to carry it 
(the purchase of machinery) out quickly. He (the manager) said, 'Mr Rong, I 
have never met a person like you in China. There is no need to open an 
account. Just to sent a telegram to the factory in England to load ready 
products (to China), It (the bill) will be cleared by four months, together 
with the original bills to collect the payment.' I trust him and thus signed 
the contract. (He) also said, 'I wouldn't do this to others. Hunan (has 
ordered) 40,000 spindles bU,t did not sellout yet. I am really unhappy. This 
" d b ' "th ,,,245 is the second t1me to 0 US1ness W1 you .•...•• 
242 See Sh~hai .inzu jiqi gongye shiliao, Vol.I, p.44B. 
243 See Shanghai .inzu jiqi gongye shiliao, Vol.I, p.447-44B. 
244 Rong Desheng himself also met the salesman of a foreign mercantile house in 
1912. See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.37. 
245 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.42. 
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Such business trust was a result of business practice used by 
the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin industrialists to repay the bill of the 
machinery on time. They stressed not to delay paying the bill. 
Though such kind of trust was short-lived and uncommon and after the 
death of this yanghang manager in 1917, Rong Desheng found it 
difficul t to increase the number of spindles. 246 The business 
group in general could win the confidence of the foreign mercantile 
houses, and thus the latter would continue to offer the crediting 
service to the group.H1 
The crediting service provided by foreign mercantile houses 
perfectly matched the Rong brothers' "deficit-financing" strategy. 
I t was also indispensable to the rapid expansion of the group. 
Because of payment by instalment, there was no need for the 
industrialists to prepare a huge amount of initial capital for the 
costly machinery at the beginning. It solved the problem of the lack 
of capital (fixed capital) of the Chinese investors. In short, it 
facilitated the Rong brothers'plans of deficit-financing, 
expansion, and large-scale production. 
To conclude, there were four sources of loans that the Maoxin-
Fuxin-Shenxin group had made use of. "Although it was not able to use 
some means of modern business financing (like the stock market), the 
Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group " still enjoyed the possibility of using 
loans and credi ts, short-term or long-term, prov ided by these 
246 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.45. 
247 50 See RQS. I, p. . 
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banking institutions. In a sense, the entrepreneurs of the Maoxin-
Fuxin-Shenxin group had tried every possible means to explore 
financial resources from the external sector. Behind the formal 
business relations, the entrepreneurs of the big business also made 
use of, or established, their social networks with the bankers, 
particularly those from the qianzhuang. 
Yet, external borrowing also involved the risk of bankruptcy, 
as large loan usually required mortgages. This was especially true 
In loans from modern banks, as they stressed trust on property more 
than personal reputation or status. When the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin 
entrepreneurs approached the modern bankers for loans, they had to 
consider the risk of bankruptcy when the liquidity of cash could not 
be achieved. To release such pressure from the bankers, the 
entrepreneurs had to invent some new devices of financing. Such 
devices were the closed financing efforts of the business group 
which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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5. Attempts of Closed Financing 
This chapter demonstrates the attempts made by the Maoxin-
Fuxin-Shenxin group to build up a closed finance. 248 Such attempts 
refer to the fact that financial resources exchanged among various 
constituent enterprises of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group. These 
attempts also include the estabiishment of a constituent banking 
organization which was used to supply capital for the financing of 
the whole business. The aim of such attempts was to make the finance 
of the business relatively independent of the fluctuations of the 
money market. However, as we will see, although these attempts were 
undertaken, a closed finance was not materialized. In the following 
sections, I will examine the factors leading to the failure of these 
attempts. 
5.1. Guangsheng Qianzhuang: The First Attempt 
The first attempt made by the Rong brothers to achieve "closed 
finance" in their business group was the Guangsheng Qianzhuang which 
was established by their father in 1896. From an institutional point 
of view, the Maoxin-Guangsheng business in fact formed a "closed 
finance". In Chapter 3, I have already demonstrated the fact that 
248 Employed by Hisashi Masaki, who articulates the financial characteristics 
of Japanese old zaibatsu, "closed finance" here means that Ita business group dealt 
internally with demand for funds from its constituent enterprises; not open to 
society as a whole. It also m~ans that even if the constituent enterprises were 
incorporated, they had not yet fully developed the function of raising capital 
publicly by converting capital to security, which is a fundamental feature of the 
modern corporation lt • However, as the Maoxin~Fuxin-Shenxin group did not experience 
a period of incorporatization, the second part of the definition is not included into 
my analysis. For the definition, see Hisashi Masaki, "The Financial Characteristics 
of the Zaibatsu in Japan: The Old Zaibatsu and Their Closed Finance", in Keiichiro 
Nagakawa, ed., Harketing and Finance in the Course of Industrialization: Proceedings 
of the Third Fuji Conference (Tokyo, University of Tokyo Press, 1978), p.33. 
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this qianzhuang played an indispensable role in the early 
capitalization of the business. The qianzhuang's continuing profits 
provided the badly-needed capital to the Rong brothers who started 
to invest in industrial activities. 
Furthermore, Guangsheng Qianzhuang also supplied ' the 
industrial enterprises with credits and loans, and thus functioned 
as a supporting bank. This can be seen from the situation of 1905. 
In that year, the Rong brothers had two plans. The first plan was to 
expand the production capacity of Maoxin by buying a new set of 
steel-made rollers to supplement the stone-made one. The second plan 
was to start another industrial venture, namely the Zhenxin Cotton 
Mill in Wuxi. 
To actualize the first plan, Maoxin's capitalization should be 
increased, from the original Y50,OOO to Y60,OOO. However, the cost 
of the new set of machinery was as high as 80,000 taels. As a 
result, Maoxin had to borrow money from Guangsheng for the 
operation. To materialize the second plan, the Rong brothers had to 
supply the capital of thelr own part. Since they realized that the 
business situation of Guangsheng was quite good in 1905, the Rong 
brothers took some money from the qianzhuang, Y30, 000 for Rong 
Desheng and another Y30,OOO ~ for Rong Zongjing, to put into Zhenxin 
as shares. 249 
From the account of 'Rong Desheng, this Guangsheng Qianzhuang 
was actually a personal b~nk of the Rong brothers' business. Besides 
using the profits and deposits of the qianzhuang for investment in 
249 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit' J pp.26-27. 
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Maoxin and Zhenxin, the Rong brothers also used such funding to 
finance their investment of other kinds. For instance, Rong Zongjing 
invested in the Yudaxiang Company in 1905. 250 
More importantly, Guangsheng was used by the Rong brothers to 
survive the crisis si tuation in the industrial sector. In '1908, 
Maoxin suffered two setbacks from the market. First, the dumping of 
American flour created difficulties in the marketing of Maoxin's 
products. Second, the ship that carried Maoxin's flour sank on the 
way to Tianjin and the company had to pay the loss to the customers. 
Particularly crucial was the second setback in which the cost of 
compensation to the customers was Y50,000. All these were paid by 
the money from Guangsheng. Because of such setbacks, the initial 
capital of Guangsheng was also affected. Thus, at the end of 1908, 
the Rong brothers had to shut it down. 251 
Guangsheng was never the only banker of Maoxin and Zhenxin 
because this qianzhuang was unable to finance the daily operation of 
the industrial establishments. Although Guangsheng had established 
several branch shops in Wuxi, Changzhou, Changshu, and Liyang by , 
1897252 , the list of its services (remi ttance, lending, and 
currency exchange) shows that this qianzhuang was not a large one 
250 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.27. The amount of investment is unclear. Yet, 
because of their involvement in Yudaxiang, the Rong brothers found that Guangsheng's 
cash liquidity was reduced. This shows that the amount of money invested by the Rong 
brothers in Yudaxiang should be quite large. See Ibid., p.29. 
251 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., pp.30-31. 
252 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.13. 
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and it could not issue native bank orders (zhuangpiao)253. The 
qianzhuang could not finan~e wheat purchasing, in which zhuangpiao 
was an important negotiable instrument and virtually a medium of 
exchange. As a resul t, Maoxin and Zhenxin had to make use of 
crediting services of other qianzhuang. 
Besides, Guangsheng suffered from a fundamental weakness. This 
qianzhuang was not intentionally buil t up for closed financing 
purpose. From the above short illustrations, we find that the 
qianzhuang's capi tal, profi t and other financial resources were only 
occasionally used to meet the ad hoc demand of capi tal from the 
industrial enterprises. Capital exchange among the constituent 
enterprises was, in this situation, not regularized and not 
formalized. Guangsheng was, in reality, independent of the other two 
enterprises, Maoxin and Zhenxin. The only common linkage between 
these three companies was the Rong brothers. Although they actually 
used the resources of Guangsheng, the Rong brothers still did not 
have a strong sense of "closed finance" in business decisions. This 
can be supported by the fact that when Guangsheng was suffering 
financial problems in 1908, the Rong brothers regarded the 
qianzhuang as a less-profi table business and decided to shut it 
down. To close it l'laS to -free themselves from a troublesome and 
less-profi table investment. Yet, such closure actually meant for the 
Rong brothers the loss of a controllable access to the financial 
market. 
253 From the classifications in Chapter 4, thi~Guangsheng was neither a huihua, 
nor a yuanzi qianzhuang as it could not issue native bank orders. 
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After the closure of Guangsheng, there was no other financial 
intermediary owned by the Rong brothers. Instead of having direct 
access to the financial market through its. constituent enterprises, 
Maoxin and Zhenxin now reached the market through some special 
agents. In Chapter 4, we have learned that Maoxin and Zhenxin had to 
rely on the supply of loans and credi ts from several qianzhuang, 
including the Jusheng Qianzhuang. The Xincheng Bank also offered 
loans and credits to the Rong brothers. As mentioned before, there 
existed a special social relationship and personal trust between the 
Rong brothers and the owners or managers of these financial 
intermediaries. With these networks, Maoxin and Fuxin managed to 
survi ve several crises and continued its steady expansion and 
growth. 
5.2. Gechang Wanglai: A Channel of Closed Financing 
Immediately after the closure of Guangsheng, the Rong brothers 
had no more constituent banking agency in the financial market. Yet, 
there existed another way of closed financing. It was the internal 
financial arrangements between different enterprises of the business 
group, namely, gechang wanglai which can be translated as inter-mill 
financial exchange. 254 Literally, gechang wanglai means the 
financial exchange or internal borrowing between two or more 
constituent enterprises of ' the business group. As demonstrated in 
254 This 'can be seen on the accounting records of individual companies, either 
Fuxin or later Shenxin. However, the accounting accords of Maoxin and Zhenxin were 
not a~ailable. Information about the early history of these two companies mainly came 
from the memoirs of Rong Desheng and the collections of source mater,ials J RQS. 
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Table 5.1, gechang wanglai between Maoxin and Fuxin was one of the 
major items of financial arrangements between the two companies. 
Table 5.2 also demonstrates that financial resources obtained 
through such arrangements continued to consti tute a considerable 
portion of assets on the accounting records of the mills. 
Table 5.1. Balance Sheet of Fuxin No.1 in 1913 





raw materials & 
other materials 
cash 
Value (taels) Items Value (taels) 
Inter-mill Financial Exchange 
Between Maoxin and Fuxin 
Deposit in outside 
Total 
Source: BQS.I, p.35. 
27,916 Paid-up capital 
38,431 Shareholders' deposit 














N.B. (From the document cited) The paid-up capital in 1913 was Y40,000 and was 
converted according to the ratio between yuan and tael (1: 0.7). The profit was 
Y32,000 and was converted into 23,743 taels. The profit was divided into 13 portions 
--- ten for shareholders as additional dividends, one for obsolescence of machinery, 
while two portions were given to staffs and workers as bonus. The dividend was 
further divided into 400 portions. The profit in 1913 was Y32,000: shareholders' 
dividends were Y24,615, obsolescence was Y2,461.50, while bonus was Y4,923.50. 
What would be included in such financial arrangements? Profit 
from the better-off mills was the most obvious one. This can be seen 
from a description on the development of Fuxin No. 2 through the 
assistance of Fuxin No.l: 
" ...... an examination of the accounting records of (Fuxin) reveals that, in 
addition to 40,000 taels as capital, No.1 also transferred to No.2 44,422 
taels under the entry of "( gechang) wanglai" in 1913 and 1914. And so, the 
capi tal of No. 2 can be regartled as something coming mainly from the profit of 
No.1.,,255 
In fact, such internal financial arrangements were important 
to the development of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group in general. 
Through this kind of financial arrangements, surplus from a 
255 See RQS.I, pp.36-37. 
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profitable sector or company of the group could be spared and used 
to assist the development of its constituent enterprises, either 
infant or losing ones. Cases were plenty. For instance, Fuxin No.l, 
No. 2, and No. 3 all were reported to have used such a channel to 
finance the establishment of other infant factories of the 'same 
en terpr i se. 256 
Table 5.2. Balance Sheet of Fuxin No.1-3 (1914-1918) (unit: 1000 taels) 
Items Years 
1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 
Assets Fixed Assets: 29.5 30.0 34.2 36.6 36.7 
Machinery 
Liquid Assets: 
Raw Materials & 53.8 42.4 75.5 283.0 261.8 
Other Materials 
Cash 0.2 0.3 0.9 0.5 1.4 
Inter-mill Financial 74.3 50.7 190.9 193.8 195.9 
Exchange between 
Maoxin and Fuxin 
Deposits Outside 1.4 33.1 3.0 34.1 19.8 
Others 60.8 386.0 
Total 159.2 156.5 304.5 608.8 901. 6 
Capital & Capital 29.0 29.1 29.0 108.3 216.6 
Liabilities Provident Fund & 1.8 f . 4.5 8.6 11.8 49.0 
Obsolescence 
Shareholders' 23.5 9.7 54.5 27.5 60.5 
Savings 
All Kinds of 45.2 33.3 43.3 120.1 26.9 
Liabilities 
Godown Warrants fIeld 24.9 24.9 127.3 136.7 232.0 
Total 124.4 101.5 262.7 404.4 585.0 
Profit 34.8 55.0 41.8 204.4 316.6 
(In YI000) 48.0 75.5 57.7 283.1 438.5 
N.B.1. In 1914, the capital amounted to Y40,OOO and was converted into Y1:0.725 tael; 
in 1915, the capital amounted to Y40,OOO and the ratio of conversion was Y1:0.728 
tael; in 1916, the capital amounted to Y40, 000 and the ratio of conversion was 
Y1:0.725 tael; in 1917, the capital amounted to Y150,000 and the ratio was Yl:0.722 
tael; in 1918, the capital amounted to Y300,000 and the ratio was Y1:0.722 tael. 
. 2. Fuxin No.3 started operation in 1916, and thus the data of 1916-1918 were for 
both No.1 and No.3. 
Source: RQS.I, p.43. 
Short-term credi ts or negotiable instruments (bills of credi t) 
of the mills was another item of gechang wanglai. This is 
particularly important in the financing of enterprises of the same 
256 See RQS.I, pp.37, 46, 80, and 112-113. 
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industry. For instance, during the early development of Fuxin No.1, 
Maoxin was reportedly to offer some help to the business of the 
n~wly-built Fuxin. Such assistance included allowing Fuxin to use 
Maoxin's purchasing system, brand name, and marketing system. 257 
Although these activities might not involve cash, they would 
probably involve various kinds of credi ts and negotiable instruments 
issued by either one of them. In the following years, such close and 
interlocking business relationship continued and extended to other 
branches of the flour milling sector. This is the reason why gechang 
r.,anglai appeared continuously on the accounting records of the 
enterprises. 
Such a financial arrangement also . included the capi tal 
exchange between the cotton mills (Zhenxin or Shenxin) and flour 
mills (Maoxin and Fuxin). In 1913, Zhenxin borrowed some money from 
Maoxin to pay for the expenses of construction. 258 Inter-mill 
financial exchange was materialized under a common ownership-
management. In the case of Zhenxin-Maoxin inter-mill borrowing, the 
transaction could be actualized only because of Rong Desheng's 
personal will. In later years, financial exchange between different 
sectors of the business group, particular ly between Fuxin and 
Shenxin, became more difficult, though not impossible. Fuxin was 
under the management of Wang Yuqing, another co-founder and owner of 
the enterprise. The ability of the Rong brothers to use such 
resources from Fuxin to assist Shenxin was then undermined. 
257 See RQS.I, pp.34-35. 
258 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.38. 
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Gechnng wnngla.i signifies a higher degree of interlocking 
relationship among different sectors wi thin the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin 
group which reduced the deg~ee of dependence of the group upon its 
external financial intermediaries. Because of such a channel of 
capital exchange, the constituent enterprises of the Maoxin-Fuxin-
Shenxin group (at least Maoxin and Fuxin) could enjoy a higher 
degree of capi tal liquidi ty. As mentioned, infant or worse-off 
sectors could be saved, and expanding sectors could be supplied with 
needed capital. Although the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group needed to 
borrow a huge amount of loans from banking agencies, gechang wanglai 
in a sense reduced the degree ' of dependence of the consti tuent 
enterprises upon those intermediaries in the financial market and 
thus became less vulnerable to market fluctuations. 
Besides, the connections between constituent enterprises (at 
least between Maoxin and Fuxin) of the business group could be 
further promoted. Because of greater demand for capital and credit, 
as well as the need for a closer connection in financial management 
between different sectors of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group, a more 
regular pattern of financial management, or even an 
institutionalized method of financial arrangement evolved. This laid 
down the foundation of the establishment of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin 
Headquarters Company. 
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5.3. The Headquarters Company: An Institutional Device 
Established in 1921259 , the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin Headquarters 
Company was an institutional device employed by the Maoxin-Fuxin-
Shenxin group in managing closed financing efforts. As we will see, 
it performed key functions in closed financing management of the 
business group. Nevertheless, such a device did not represent a 
complete closed financing institution with which the business group 
would be unaffected by fluctuations of the money market. The 
effectiveness of the device was affected by the overall financial 
situation of the business group. 
The background of the establishment of this Headquarters 
Company was not in the source materials, including Rong Desheng's 
memo i rs. 260 Yet, from the timing of its establishment, we can 
infer the rationale behind its foundation. In short, there were 
several problems encountered by the already large-scale Maoxin-
Fuxin-Shenxin group during the late 1910's and the early 1920's. To 
establish the Headquarters Company was one way to solve these 
259 Although it was formally proposed to establish in 1919 and the construction 
was finished in 1921, the origins~of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin Headquarters Company 
can be traced back to the marl{eting office (pifachu) of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin 
group in Shanghai. Originally, the office coordinated the marketing and purchasing 
matters of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group. Besides, it was the office of Rong 
Zongjing, the head of the business group. 
During the early days of the operation, this marketing office of Maoxin and 
Zhenxin was located inside the Guangsheng Qianzhuang in Shanghai. After the closure 
of Guangsheng, the office was moved to another place called Sanyang Jingqiao. Later, 
it was moved to Jiangxi Road, the location of new building of the company. See "Fu-
Mao-Shenxin zonggongsi gaikuang", p. 1 J Haoxin Fuxin Shenxin zonggongsi sa zhounian 
jiniance; also see Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.31. 
260 In his memoirs, Rong Desheng only stated that there was a proposal to 
establish the Headquarters Company. However, he did 'not provide the rationale behind 
the establishment. See R.ong Desheng, Op.cit., p.49. 
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problems which existed In management261 , coordination262 , as well 
as financing. Impo'rtant to our discussion here is the problem of 
financing. 
The problem of financing here was closely related to the 
problem of large-scale production and rapid expansion during the 
second half of the 1910' s. Before 1921, the Maoxin enterprise 
expanded from one factory to four, Fuxin from four factories before 
the WWI to eight, Shenxin from one to three. The flour mills 
increased its number of rollers from 64 in 1915 to 301 in 1921. 263 
The cotton milling sector increased its number of spindles from 
12,960 sets in 1916 to 74,280 sets in 1921. 264 
To finance such an expansion, the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group 
adopted two strategies. The first strategy was the policy of "high-
capi tal-accumulation-rate". As mentioned in Chapter 3, the major 
shareholders of the business group strictly regulated the rate of 
accumulation and dividend distribution, so as to reach a higher 
degree of capi tal accumulation. The second strategy was to get 
261 The problem of management mainly refers to the difficulties faced by the 
factory managers on labor issue. This problem was realized by Rong Desheng himself 
in 1919. (See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.48.) In later days, it turned out to be a 
conflict between two systems of labor management. The contractors and their 
contracted laborers, gongtou, resisted the introduction of some new laborers whom 
were not recruited through cont~actors but training centers established by the 
company itself. For the conflict, see RQS.I, pp.155-164; also see Rong Desheng, 
Op.cit., pp.53-54. 
262 This problem refers to the coordination of different constituent enterprises 
of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group. It includes coordinating efforts of raw material 
purchasing, machinery buying, product marketing, as well as other business decisions. 
The establishment of the Headquarters Company was to solve this problem by a rather 
centralized or~anization of business. This kind of business structure can be seen in 
the following paragraphs of this section. 
263 See RQS.I, p.106. 
264 See RQS.I, p.109. 
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mortgaged loans from modern banks. As clearly shown in Chapter 4, 
both Fuxin and Shenxin borrowed money from the Japanese banks and 
developing companies. To have access to more capital from modern 
banks, the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group also began to invest in modern 
banks, like the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank since 1919. To 
implement these strategies, there was a need to build a centralized 
organization to coordinate all the financing efforts. 
Besides, there was a need to coordinate all the financial 
arrangements among the consti tuent enterprises of the business 
group. Since the early 1910' s, Maoxin and Fuxin was expanding. 
Between them a kind of financial arrangement, namely gechang 
wanglai, was made to facilitate the expansion. Through such a 
financial arrangement, capital could be exchanged between the 
surplus sectors to the needed ones. During the second half of the 
decade, the Rong brothers also started a new cotton milling 
enterprise, Shenxin, after they broke away from the Zhenxin 
partnership. As a new establishment, Shenxin would demand financial 
assistance from the already well-established flour milling sector. 
Thus, to plan for more inter-mill capital exchange, particularly 
between the flour milling sector and the cotton textile sector, 
there existed a need to establish a more institutionalized form of 
inter-mill or inter-enterprise financial exchange. 
In terms of organization, the Headquarters Company was in 
theory characterized by a hierarchical structure. Under the 
Headquarters Company, there were several departments serving 
different purposes, namely general · affairs, document and 
121 
corresponding file management, accounting, wheat and flour 
purchasing and marketing, cotton and textile purchasing and 
marketing, other materials buying, electricity, as well as 
transportation. Like a holding company, the Headquarters Company was 
supposed to centralize all the power in business operation~ The 
managers of individual factories only had to deal with production 
and factory management. Purchasing, marketing, and financing matters 
of the constituent enterprises would all be under the control of the 
Headquarters Company which would in turn be under the personal rule 
of the general manager, Rong Zongj ing. 265 
Specific to our concern are the functions of the Headquarters 
Company in financial managements. To the individual consti tuent 
enterprises, the Headquarters Company performed some banking 
functions, including receiving deposits from the constituent 
enterprises and lending money to them. This can be supported by a 
piece of description of member of the accounting staff in the 
Headquarters Company. 
"Surplus capital (profit) of individual mills should be deposit into the 
Headquarters Company. The interest rate was a little bit higher than that of 
modern banlts and qianzhuang. The Headquarters Company represented the 
individual mills in capital raising, and the interest rate was the same of 
that of modern banks and qianzhuang plus 2.5%. The difference between 
(between the interest rate of the Company and that of the banking agencies) 
was used as the working ca;ital of the Headquarters Company.,,266 
265 See "Fu-Mao-Shenxin ionggongsi gaikuang", p.l; . also see BQS. I, p. 96. 
However some source materials reveal that the Headquarters Company was in fact 
, . . . . 
merely the Shanghai sales representative of various const1 tuent enterpr1ses 1n 
various cities. Under the general manager, no functional organ was formed to run the 
respective sector of operation. See Ibid., p.97; also see Lee Muk-miu's analysis, 
"Rongjia qiyeshi yanjiu", pp.69-70. 
266 See RQS.I, p.96. 
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From the accounting records of the Headquarters Company demonstrated 
in the following table, this function of the Company can be further 
articulated. 
Table 5.3. A Simplified Illustration of the Lending-Deposit Relationship between the 
Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin Headquarters Company and the constituent enterprises of the 
Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group, 1927 (Unit: Taels) , 
Lending to Individual Companies 
Name Amount 
Maoxin No.l 10,471.01 
Maoxin No.4 323,350.95 
Fuxin No.2 255,452.04 
Fuxin No.5 795,207.25 
Fuxin No.6 29,848.15 
Shenxin No.l 289,902.89 
Shenxin No.2 1,485,987.79 
also 1,681,636.48 
Shenxin No.3 3,283,359.41 
Shenxin No.4 628,217.36 
Shenxin No.5 1,198,241.35 
Total 9,981,241.35 

















In general, the flour milling sector saved more and borrowed 
less than the cotton textile sector. Between 1923 and 1932, usually 
more than 50% of Shenxin's total capitalization was borrowed from 
the Headquarters Company. 267 In Maoxin, only 30-40% of 
capi talization came from such internal borrowing. 268 In Fuxin, 
such kind of funding was nearly none. 269 I n the two years after 
1927, the amount of deposi ts of the flour milling sector in the 
267 The percentage of Shenxin's borrowing from the Headquarters Company in the 
enterprise's total capital ization varied from period to period. In 1923 I .i t . was 
51.3%; in 1925, 55.2%, 1929, 55.1%. Yet, in 1932, it was 18.4%. For the stat~st~cs, 
see RQS.I, p.280. 
268 In 1923, it was 36.9%, in 1925, 43.2%. But it was zero in 1932. 
269 It was 0.8% in 1923, 0% in 1925, and 4.2% in 1932. 
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Headquarters Company exceeded its borrow ing from the Company. 270 
Between 1927 and 1931, Fuxin No.5 also 'lent a considerable amount of 
capital to Shenxin No.4 in Hankou. Such an amount of loan 
consti tuted a major part of Shenxin No. 4' s total debi t. 271 Such a 
phenomenon was, indeed, a resul t of the better market si tuation 
encountered by the flour milling sector. 
From another two events, we can see the function of the 
Headquarters Company in coordinating financial resources of the 
consti tuent enterprises of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group. The first 
event happened in 1921, when Shenxin No.4 was proposed to be set up 
in Hankou. Yet, the paid-up capital of the mill (Y300,OOO) had not 
been fully raised (only about Y280,OOO of capital had been 
collected). Thus, all the construction fees and operation costs had 
to be temporarily borrowed from the Headquarters Company in 
Shanghai. 272 The second event happened in 1924, when the debts of 
Shenxin No.2 mounted up to Y2,OOO,OOO. The Headquarters Company put 
these debts on its own account to reduce the burden of interest. 273 
That means the Headquarters Company cleared up the debts of Shenxin 
No.2 by lending money to the mill. In doing so, although there still 
existed a debt of Y2,OOO,OOO on the account of Shenxin No.2, its 
credi tor became its own related company the Headquarters 
270 In 1927, the amount of deposit of flour mills was Y557 ,790, while the amount 
of borrowing was Yl,964,350. In 1928, the figures changed; depo~it was Y890,l10, and 
borrowing was Y624,410. In 1929,_ the figures were: Y1,360,330 of deposit, Y900,130 
of borrowing. See BQS.I, p.277. 
271 See RQS.I, p.278. 
272 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.51. 
273 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.54. 
124 
Company, not the banking agencies. Thus,the Headquarters Company 
internalized the cost of borrowing and reduced the risk of 
bankruptcy of Shenxin No.2. 
Although it had closed financing functions, the Headquarters 
Company achieved little success in establishing a closed financing 
system because of no guarantee of . funds from its consti tuent 
enterprises. Its basis of deposit could not be widened. The amount 
of deposit from the constituent enterprises, as clearly shown in 
Table 5.3, was usually far less than the amount of loans to the 
constituent enterprises. However, the constituent "-enterprises' 
demand for capital was always expanding. To fill up the gap, thus, 
the Headquarters Company had to make use of the intermediaries of 
the financial market. 
Of course, to evaluate the effectiveness of the Headquarters 
Company in establishing a closed financing system, we must also 
consider all other financial strategies used by the owners of the 
business group at the same time. As mentioned earlier, the owners of 
the business group possessed other footholds in the financial 
market. They invested in banks 1 ike the Shanghai Commercial and 
Savings Bank and the Bank of China. Through these two banks, the 
business group could successfully get more loans from the banking 
group. Through the social circles of these banks, the owners of the 
business group could also build up more social networks with other 
bankers than before. As a result, they might not realize the 
necessity to set up a closed financing system on the basiB of the 
Headquarters Company. 
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On the other hand, from the contracts between the constituent 
enterprises and banking agencies, we can find that individual 
enterprises or companies seemed to be qui te independent in the 
matter of external borrowing. They could usually use their own 
company name to sign borrowing contracts directly with the banking 
agencies. 27! The Headquarters Company seemed to have played little 
role in this issue. 
To explain this complicated phenomenon, it is necessary to go 
back to see the relationship between the constituent enterprises and 
the Headquarters Company. In principle, the Headquarters Company 
headed the individual enterprises of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group. 
As mentioned before and as shown in Figure 5.1, the relationship 
between them was, In theory, a hierarchical one. Nevertheless, the 
Headquarters Company turned out to be the common property of the 
constituent enterprises --- the construction expenditure of the 
Company was paid by the individual enter'prises. 275 Besides, the 
Headquarters Company did not hold the shares of the consti tuent 
enterprises. Only overlapping in ownership linked the two parties 
up. As a result, I would rather treat the relationship between the 
Headquarters Company and the constituent enterprises as horizontal. 
The Headquarters Company in reali ty became a coordinator rather than 
a commander of the constituent enterprises. (See Figure 5.2) 
Because of such horizontal 'relationship, the individual enterprises 
274 For these contracts, see all those collected in RQS.I. In fact, all the 
loans made to the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group were made to an individual company, or 
mill, rather than to the Headquarters Company. 
275 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.49, and 52. 
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could independently make loan contracts with the banking agencies. 
Of course, other members of the group would be consulted before loan 
arrangements were made. Meanwhile, there were rooms for Rong 
Zongjing's potential rivals in the business group, like Wang Yuqing, 
to challenge his personal rule and position as general manager. 
The original design of using the Headquarters Company to 
achieve a higher degree of financial coordination finally failed. In 
the early 1930's, when the Shenxin Cotton Mill encountered severe 
indebtedness and market faiJure, Fuxin under Wang Yuqing responded 
inconsiderately. To avoid further involvement in Shenxin' s financial 
crisis, Wang and other Fuxin owners decided to break their 
enterprise from the Headquarters Company and set up an independent 
Fuxin Head"quarters Company in 1933. Since then, Rong Zongj ing could 
not intervene into the matters of Fuxin. 216 Later, Rong Zongjing 
tried to make use of Fuxin' s surplus to help Shenxin, but Wang 
refused to cooperate and denied all the responsibilities of being 
the guarantor of the Rong brothers. 271 
276 See RQS.I, p.377; also see Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.65. 
277 See RQS.I, pp.494-495. 
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Figur~ 5 .1. Hierar~hical Relationship between the Headquarters Company and the 





Shenxin No.1 (Shanghai) 
Shenxin No.2 (Shanghai) 
Shenxin No.3 (Wuxi) 
Shenxin No.4 (Hankou) 
Cotton Textile Shenxin No.5 (Shanghai) 
Sector Shenxin No.6 (Shanghai) 
Shenxin No.7 (Shanghai) 
Shenxin No.8 (Shanghai) 
Shenxin No.9 (Shanghai) 
Maoxin No.1 (Wuxi) 
Maoxin No.2 (Wuxi) 
Maoxin No.3 (Wuxi) 
Maoxin No.4 (Ji'nan) 
Fuxin No.1 (Shanghai) 
Fuxin No.2 (Shanghai) 
Fuxin No.3 (Shanghai) 
Flour Milling Fuxin No.4 (Shanghai) 
Sector Fuxin No.5 (Hankou) 
Fuxin No.6 (Shanghai) 
Fuxin No.7 (Shanghai) 
Fuxin No.8 (Shanghai) 
Others (including a metal-tool making factory, two 
warehouses, and two packaging factories, and 
later the Staff's Savings Department) 
Source: Bongjia qiye shiliao, Vol.l, p.283. 
N.B. Maoxin No.3 was burnt down in 1926 and was not rebuilt afterwards. 
Figure 5.2. Horizontal Relationship between the Headquarters Company and the 
Constituent Enterprises of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin .Group 
r--iThe Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin Headquarters Company I 
~The Fuxin Flour Milling Enterprise I 
The Owners of the ~The Maoxin Flour Milling Enterprise I 
Maoxin-Fuxin- ~ 
Shenxin Group ~The Shenxin Cotton Milling Enterprise I 
~Other Related Companies and Factories I 
In short, the Headquarters Company performed certain closed 
financing functions for the ~Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group. However, it 
was still far from the ideal type of closed financing. Although 
deposits from its constituent enterprises continued to flow into the 
account of the Headquarters Company, the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group, 
including the Headquarters Company itself, had to continue to borrow 
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huge amount of loans from the banking agencies. This si tuation could 
not be changed unless the business group had access to the financial 
market directly through its constituent enterprise the 
establishment of the Staff's Savings Department (tongren chuxubu). 
5.4. Staff's Savings Department: One Step Further 
In 1928, the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group established a Staff's 
Savings Department. Being a bank-like organization, the Department 
received deposits from the staff of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group 
and lent money exclusively to the consti tuent enterprises. It 
signified a further step taken by the business group in forming a 
closed financing system. 278 
The rationale behind the establishment of the Staff ' s Savings 
Department was simple. It was an attempt to explore a new source of 
funding to release pressure from maturing bank loans. In 1927, 
because of heavy- indebtedness of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group, 
particular ly the Shenxin enterprise279 , the Rong brothers realized 
that they had no cash to repay the maturing loans: 
"My brother (Zongjing) and I discussed the (financial) matter and found that 
we had no cash to clear the debts, if (we) wanted to expand through 
increasing the number of machinery. I proposed to establish a bank. a plan of 
forming a savings department was proposed by colleagues in the enterprises. 
Thus, the decision was made (to form a saving department) and began to hire 
278 It does not mean that tHe previous channels of closed financing, like inter-
mill financial exchange and the saving-borrowing mechanism under the Headquarters 
Company no longer existed. In fact, the Department was an additional organization of 
the Company to assist the business group in achieving a closed finance. 
279 Between 1923 and 1932, the amount of capital from external borrowing was 
always composed of more than 60% of total capitalization of the Shenxin enterprise. 
But it only occupied roughly 50% or less in Maoxin and Fuxin. See RQS.I, p.278. 
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employees (for this department).,,280 
As shown above, Rong Desheng originally proposed to establish 
a bank. It turned out to be a Staff's Savings Department, an organ 
under the Headquarters Company. The reason behind such a change of 
decision is unknown. Yet, it is qui te clear that the purpose of 
setting of this Department was to reduce the pressure from the 
bankers. As shown in the last chapter, there was a change in 
bargaining power between the business group and modern banks during 
the' late 1920's and early 1930's. During the 1920's, the banker 
could not send a team of investigators into the indebted company of 
the business group but the situation changed in the 1930's. It 
seemed that the business group had less and less bargaining power 
over the contract terms. To release the group from such pressure, 
Rong Zongj ing began to employ such strategies as investing in 
several qianzhuang in order to get credits and loans from them. 
The staff's saving is clearly another kind of such new 
sources. Through its directly-managed savings department, the 
Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group could become less dependent of the loans 
from banking agencies. To make use of the staff's deposit, the 
business group could also enjoy more loans at a lower interest 
281 
rate. 
The origins of "staff's savings" in the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin 
group could be traced back to 'the "shareholders' savings" of the 
280 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.58. 
281 The organizers of the Staff's Savings Department hoped to save Y200, 000-
300,000 of interest by lowering the interest rate of borrowing from the Department 
by the enterprises. See RQS.I, p.276. 
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previous decades. From Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, we can find that 
"shareholders' savings" was one of Fuxin's financial sources. 282 
Staff's saving might only be an extension of previous form of 
lending from shareholders. 
Though not a bank itself, this Department modelled closely 
after the modern banks since the organizers did not want to risk 
legal conflicts. 283 Thus, this Department also possessed a 
foundation fund of Y1,OOO,OOO. Besides, it also had various kinds of 
short-term and long-term saving accounts offered to the 
depos i tors . 28~ 
However, the department only opened to the staff of the 
Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group, not to the public. The possible 
rationale is that an exclusive savings department might not have 
judicial conflict with the current banking regulations. The 
organizers also hoped that such a saving could promote the 
relationship between the enterprise and the employees so far as they 
were now having a common interest. 285 From the organizers' point 
of view, the Department could become a resourceful means to 
establish the social relationship and trust between the two the 
282 However, not many documgnts indicate the nature of "shareholders' savings". 
Substantial cases are also lacking. Thus, any further comment would be speculative. 
283 See RQS.I, p.276. 
284 See "Tongren chuxubu zhangcheng", pp. 2-5 J see l1aoxin Fuxin Shenxin 
zonggongsi sa zhounian jiniance. 
285 See "Quangao tongren chuxu xuanyan", p.l. iri Haoxin Fuxin Shenxin zonggongsi 
sa zhounian jiniance. 
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business group and its staff members. 286 
Saving interest rate of the Department was negotiated in 
person between the deposi tor and the Department. Usually, the 
interest rate was a bit higher than the current interest rate of 
both qianzhuang and modern banks. The loans lent to the constituent 
enterprises287 Hould be at an interest rat'e much lower than that of 
the banking agencies. In doing so, the organizers hoped to save 
about Y200, 000-300,000 of interest per year. 288 
Indeed, the efforts of the Staff's Saving Department in 
raising more fund for the business group was quite impressive. As 
shown in Table 5.4, staff's savings composed of a major portion of 
deposi ts in the business group. Such a source grew steadily and 
continually. 
286 In fact, the organizers regarded the older staff of the business group as 
people who were relatively better off. Besides, they also considered the means to 
catch the psychology of the staff and promote their interest in the savings 
department. For further details, see RQS.I, pp.276-277. 
287 The relations between this Staff's Savings Department and the Headquarters 
Company was not clearly articulated. However, as it was under the structure of the 
Headquarters Company, its account should also be under that of the ,Headquarters 
Company. Thus, the lending was offered through the method of lend1ng from the 
Headquarters Company. 
288 See RQS.I, p.276. 
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Table 5.4. Annual Surplus in Deposits in the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin Headquarters 
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Was the department an effective means of closed financing? 
Indeed, as it was directly controlled by the Headquarters Company, 
the Department lent its fund exclusively to the Company and the 
constituent enterprises of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group. Having 
such an amount of loans from the Department, the owners of the 
business group could have more financial support for their plans of 
re-investment and expansion. 289 From this perspective, the 
Department could be regarded as an effective means. 
However, being a further step towards closed financing, the 
effort seemed to be too li ttle, too late. From the accounting 
records of the Headquarters Company, we can find that such a deposit 
was too little when compared with the total debit. For instance, the 
total clebi t of the Headquarters Company in 1932 was Y90, 080,441.28. 
Yet the amount of staff's deposit was only Y4,384,900.20, roughly 
4.9% of the total debi t. 290· This si tuation improved just a li ttle 
289 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., p.59. 
290 See Shenxin xitong qiye shiliao, 7: 1, p. 99. However, this source is 
different from the data provided by RQS. Without further details, the author does not 
intend to make any reconciliation between these two figures. 
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in the following year when staff's saving constituted about 13.5% of 
the total debi t. 2'91 All in all, staff's saving still could not 
become a major source of loan to the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group. 
Perhaps it was not the fault of the Department as it was 
originally aimed at providing an addi tional source rather than 
substituting all the external sources of loans. Yet, to finance such 
a giant firm in the late 1920's was really a big deal. The demand 
for capital, both fixed and working, was definitely huge. As the 
Department was open merely to the staff of the business group, the 
basis of deposit was then limited. 
The Staff's Savings Department also faced severe crisis. This 
crisis was closely related to the creditability of the Maoxin-Fuxin-
Shenxin group itself. By the midst of June of 1934, rumors of 
bankruptcy of Shenxin spread all over Shanghai and most of the 
depositors withdrew their matured savings in the Department and did 
th . t 292 not renew elr accoun s. Although the Department still existed 
afterward~, its creditability might have been too ' hard to 
rebu i Id. 293 
~ 
291 In 1933, the total debit of the Headquarters Company was Y38,622,782.31, 
. while the deposit from staff only mounted to Y5,216,424.30. See Shenxin xitong qiye 
shiliao, 7:1, p.110. 
292 See RQS.I, p.408. 
293 Lee Muk-miu insisted' that such cr1S1S virtually caused the closure the 
Department to close, or made it exist only in name rather than in reality. (See Lee 
Muk-miu, "Rongjia qiyeshi yanjiu", p.86. However, in the accounting records of the 
Shenxin Headquarters Company (Shenxin zonggongsi) in 1935 and 1936, the entry of 
"staff's saving" still existed. It was Y4,285,492.65 in 1935, and 3,207,139.34 in 
1936. Therefore, I do not believe that the Department became extinct from the reality 
after 1934. For the accounting records, see Shenxin 'xitongqiye shiliao, 7:1, pp.115, 
121-122. 
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Closed finance was a strategy of business financing that 
emerged gradually in the minds of the owners of the Maoxin-Fuxin-
Shenxin group. At the outset of business, the Rong brother's 
GUllngsheng Qillnzhua.ng did contribute to the funding of the business 
group. However, as a device unintended for business financing, the 
qillnzhua.ng did not survive the financial crisis of 1908. In later 
years, because of gradual expansion of the industrial business, a 
larger amount of capi tal was needed. Such demand for internal 
funding pressed for the regularization of financial exchange among 
the constituent enterprises of the group. In a sense, the 
Headquarters Company was set up to regularize such inter-mill 
financial exchange, apart from performing other managerial 
functions. To achieve a higher degree of closed financing, the 
business group took a further step of building the Staff's Saving 
Department in 1929. Nevertheless, such closed financing efforts of 
staff's saving were not enough for the tremendous demand of business 
expansion. By the 1930's, the group still relied heavily upon loans 
from banking agencies which were not owned by them. Thus, the ideal 
of closed finance was yet to be materialized for the Maoxin-Fuxin-
Shenxin group. 
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6. Conclusion: Entrepreneurship, Social Networking, 
. and Economic Rationalization 
The study of financial arrangements of the Maoxin-Fuxin-
Shenxin group shows that Chinese big business was financed by 
various channels which eventually enabled it to reach a high degree 
of capital liquidity. It is obvious that the giant firm did achieve 
the principle of business financing, that is to minimize all the 
costs of production on the one hand, whi le on the other hand to 
maximize the liquidity of capital. What the case of financing of the 
Maoxin-Fu~in-Shenxin group exemplify, in the broader perspective, 
are relevant to three aspects, i.e~, entrepreneurship, social 
networking, and economic rationalization. 
6.1. Entrepreneurship 
In the discussion of the development of modern industrial 
enterprises, scholars such as Yen-p'ing Hao, Sherman Cochran, and 
Wellington K.K. Chan, stress the existence of an entrepreneurial 
spi ri t in Chinese business. The term "entrepreneurship" here is used 
. 294 in Schumpeterian terms. Indeed, this view has also been shared 
by other scholars of the field. For example, Lee Muk-miu emphasizes 
that the Rong brothers were innovative and far-sighted, and they 
k k . h' . d . d t' 295 were also ris -ta ~rs In t elr ventures In mo ern In us rles. 
294 For the detailed discuision on the term entrepreneurship, which is closely 
related to "development" by Schumpeter, see Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of 
Econo.ic Developtllent, particularly pp.57-94. 
295 This is clearly stated by Lee Muk-miu who presents that the Rong brothers 
were far-sighted, progressive, innovative, and dared to take risk in business 
decisions. They were also eager to expand their business for more profit in the 
future, and were inspirited to compete with their business rivals. Besides, Lee also 
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In the study of the business group's financing process, it is 
clear that an entrepreneurial spirit was also indispensable in all 
aspects of financial arrangements. The entrepreneurs creatively 
adopted certain strategies to respond to the ~arket and business 
situations. For instance, In financing big business ~ the 
entrepreneurs of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group had to make every 
effort in minimizing the outflow of capital from within the business 
group, as they realized the importance of capital accumulation in 
the expansion of the market share. To achieve this goal, the 
entrepreneurs innovated the so-called "high-capital-accumulation-
rate" policy, which was to reduce the frequency of distributing 
dividends (guanli) or bonus issues (hongli) among shareholders. 
Such a policy, however, was strongly rejected by other 
contemporaries of the Rongs. Therefore, when the Rong brothers 
wanted to implement such a policy in the Zhenxin mill, some other 
Zhenxin shareholders pressed the Rong brothers to leave the top-
management circle of the mill. These shareholders did not welcome 
the "high-capi tal-accumulation-rate pol icy" for such a strategy 
signified th~ sacrifice of their present income (from dividends or 
bonus issues) for future expansion of the business. Even to other 
industrial enterprises, such"a policy of "high-capi tal-accumulation-
rate" counter-acted the contemporary business practice of frequently 
regards the Rong brothers' concern on social welfare as another factor of success. 
See Lee Muk-miu, "Rongjia qiyeshi yanjiu", pp.172-178. 
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distribution of profi t through div'idends and bonus issues. 296 For 
example, in order to attract investors to the Dasheng Cotton Mill, 
Zhang J ian had to offer high interest of shares and frequently 
distributed dividends among shareholders; because of the 
distribution of large amount of dividends, Dasheng suffer~d from 
lack of capital and thus was vulnerable to the risk of bankruptcy in 
an economic recession. 297 Yet, the Rong brothers implemented their 
policy of capital accumulation, and thus the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin 
group had managed to reduce the outflow of capital from the business 
and was equipped with more capital to finance their big business. 
The efforts of internal financing could not totally satisfy 
the needs of capi tal of the gigantic business group because the 
demand for both working and fixed capital was still high. 
Recognizing the limits of using shareholders' fund in investment, 
the Rong brothers creatively made use of loans and credits from all 
sources to actualize their expansion plans. Such a strategy of 
"deficit-financing", as I have demonstrated in Chapter 4, was first 
adopted when Rong Desheng saw the opportuni ty of accepting the 
sellers' credi t in machinery purchasing in the late 1910' s. In 
latter years, loans and credits constituted another major source of 
capital to finance the business group. This strategy was effective 
296 Cases in other businesses show that companies in the late Qing and early 
Republican period had to offer high interest of share in order to attract investment. 
These companies had to frequently distribute their dividends among shareholders so 
as to keep the shareholders' capital in their companies. These practices of offering 
high share interest and distribution of dividends were quite common in such industry 
as cotton textile. See Yan Zhongping, Zhongguo .ian£angzhi shigao, 1289-1937, pp .144-
146; also see Rang Chao, The Developlllent of Cotton Textile Production in China, 
p.145. 
297 For details of Dasheng' s case, see Dasheng xi tong qiyeshi bianxiezu, Dasheng 
xitong qiyeshi (Nantong, Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 1990), pp.124-142. 
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as it could supply the business wi th capi tal in addi tion to 
shareholders' fund. 
The attempts of bu'ilding up closed financing by the Rong 
brothers is another example of "creative efforts tl of the 
entrepreneurs to introduce a new source of supply of a production 
factor. Attempts of closed financing included the coordination of 
financial resources of the consti tuent enterprises by means of 
gechang wanglai, inter-mill financial exchange. Having realized the 
banker's unwillingness to continue to lend money to them, the Rong 
brothers began to establish direct linkage with the money market. 
They first invested in some modern banks and then tried to establish 
a bank themselves. The proposal of establishing ~ bank turned out to 
be the idea of the Staff's Savings Department. Although the 
Department was far from achieving the "ideal-type" of closed finance 
as demonstrated by the Japanese zaibatsu298 , its closed-financing 
efforts eventually constituted a considerable portion of funding in 
the financing of the business. 299 
298 In fact, the success of Japanese zaibatsu in establishing a closed finance 
was a result of huge profit and capital accumulation they achieved. Thus, they might 
find no need to obtain capital from external borrowing. In China, political conflicts 
and economic depression strongly hindered the marketing, purchasing, and financing 
systems on which the business was based. Thus, the Chinese business could not 
accumulate that much of capital which could support the whole production processes. 
For further details of the Japanese zaibatsu's financial characteristics, see Masaki 
Hisashi, "The Financial Character.::i.stics of the Zaibatsu in Japan: The Old Zaibatsu 
and Their Closed Finance", in Nagakawa Keiichiro, ed., Harketing and Finance in the 
Course of Industrialization: Proceedings of the Third Fuji Conference, pp.33-54. 
299 This strategy of closed financing was a common characteristic shared by 
other big businesses of the day~ So far as I know, Dasheng's Huaihai Industrial Bank 
(Huaihai Shiye Yinhang) , Yongan' s Yinyebu, the. National Industrial Bank of China of 
Zhou Xuexi's enterprises, China'Development Bank of Liu Hongsheng's enterprises, were 
all formally functioning as banks of the industrial sector. Besides the saving and 
remittance services, the Nanyang Brothers' Tobacco Company did attempted to form a 
bank in 1922 but it withdrew the proposal as the political and economic conditions 
were not favorable. On Dasheng, see Dasheng xitong qiyeshi, pp.185-188; on Yongan, 
see Shanghai shehui kexueyuan jingji yanjiusuo, comp., Shanghai Yongan ,gongsi de 
chanshengl fazhan he gaizao (Shanghai, Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1981), pp.74-83. 
In fact, there was a Wing On Bank established by the Cuo family in Hongkong in 1934. 
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In spi te of the fact that entrepreneurship existed in the 
Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group, it did not guarantee the smooth 
implementation of its "creative innovation". The Rong brothers have 
been regarded as persons with a strong personality as well as a deep 
commi tment to the ideal of one-man management300 , nevertheless they 
could not materialize their investment plans without the support of 
some other people. To implement the entrepreneurial innovations, an 
entrepreneur needs to establish social networks with other people 
whom he could mobilize as a "social resource". 
6.2. Social Networking 
As mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, social 
networking connotes a range of social relationships through which a 
sense of belonging and particularistic trust can be generated 
It was highly probable that the bank was used to finance the business in both 
Hongkong and Shanghai. Yet, as no further source materials are available on this 
matter, I cannot make further comments on this issue. For general information of this 
Wing On Bank, see Zhonghua .inguo ershiliunian quanguo yinhang nianjian, Vol.1, 
Chapter 7, pp.9-10; on Zhou Xuexi's enterprises, see Sheng Bin, "Zhou Xuexi ziben 
jituan de longduan qingxiang", LisJJi yanjiu, 1986:4, pp.8S-86; Hao Qingyuan, Zhou 
Xuelli zhuan (Tianjin, Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1991), pp.232-236; also see Chun Fu, 
"Zhou Xuexi yu · Beiyang shiye", in Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Tianj inshi 
weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui, comp., Tianjin .,.,enshi ziliao xuanji, No.1 
(Tianjin, Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1978), pp.20-21; for source "materials of the 
China Development Bank, see Shanghai shehui kexueyuan jingji yanjiusuo, comp., Liu 
Hongshe~ qiye shiliao, (Shanghai, Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1981), Vol.1, pp.290-
297, also see Vol. 2, pp. 284-291; also see Zhang Meizhi, "Zhongguo xiandai qiye de 
jingying xingtai --- yi Liu Hongsheng qiye weili de gean yanjiu (1911-1949)", Master 
thesis, Guoli Taiwan Shifang Daxue Lishi Yanjiusuo, 1987, pp.166; on Nanyang, see 
Nanyang xiongdi yancao gongsi shiliao, pp.492-495. 
300 According to Sherman Cochran, Rong Zongjing was also committed to the ideal 
of one-man management. Yet, from the memoir of Rong Desheng, I find that it was Rong 
Desheng who faced the pressure from the board of directors of Zhenxin and thus 
realized the benefits of unlimited company --- the ideal of one-man management as 
interpreted by Cochran. After all, I would like to suggest that the Rong brothers 
were both committed to the ideal of one-man management. For Sherman Cochran I s 
argument, see his article, "The Mentality of a Shanghai Capitalist: Rong Zongjing 
(1873-1938)", paper presented in the annual meeting of the Association for Asian 
Studies, Chicago, April 6-8, 1990. Special thanks should be given to Professor 
Sherman Cochran who permits me to quote his article. For Rong Desheng's comments on 
the Zhenxin board of directors, see Rang Desheng, Op.cit., p.42. 
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between the entrepreneur and his patrons (or clients), Social 
networks, as shown in the case of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group, 
are concentric in nature. Generally speaking, the core of the social 
networks was brotherhood between Rong Desheng and Rong Zongjing. 
Around them was a group of kin-tied people, such as sons-in-law, 
affinity members, and kinsmen. Outside this group of people was 
another group of non-blood-tied people who were linked up with the 
Rong brothers by regional-ties, colleague relationship, partnership, 
or friendship. Outsiders were those excluded from these three layers 
of social networking, The effectiveness of each layer in financing 
depends on two factors: first, the resourcefulness of this network 
to the business; and second, the closeness of such network to the 
core actor. 
In the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group, social networks played the 
role of strengthening the linkages among the principal decision-
makers, the Rong brothers, and the minor shareholders wi thin the 
group. As already illustrated in Chapter 3, the Rong brothers cbuld 
implement the so-called "high-capi tal-accumulation-rate policy" only 
with the support of their partners who were also top-level staff 
members of the business group. Besides, the closed financing 
strategies also required hhe cooperation of other shareholder-
managers in the group. All these show that social networks were 
important to the entrepreneur. 
In fact, the organization of the Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group, 
in the form of unlimited company, strengthened the role of social 
networks to its policy implementation for 'the group. Under the form 
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of unlimited company, many people were excluded from the ownership 
circles, and were regarded as outsiders. While some family and 
kinship members had already been shareholders in the business, the 
Rong brothers gradually built up more and more different linkages 
with other non-Rong shareholders, like Wang Yaochen and Ding 'Ziren, 
in order to ' strengthen the ties with them. In short, intensified 
social networking resulted in exclusive share-holding. 
The Maoxin-Fuxin-Shenxin group also exploited social networks 
in external financing. As shown In Chapter 4, the Rong brothers took 
advantage of being a depositor in the qianzhuang. In order to gain 
more loans from some qianzhuang, Rong Zongj ing even invested in 
them. In addition, Rong Zongjing established a marriage tie with 
native bankers like Sun Zhizhai. Even in their relationship with 
modern bankers, the Rong brothers also established trust through 
social networking by investing in these banks and thus became a 
member of the board of directors. Being a member of the board of 
directors, Rong Zongj ing could not only influence the bank's 
decision to his favor, but also extended his relations to other 
investors who were also bankers or famous merchants in Shanghai. 
Regional ties, family, or kinship relationships also existed between 
the Rong brothers and other people related to some modern banks. 
From the cases shown in Chapter 4, it is obv ious that the Rong 
brothers made good use of such networks in financing. 
Social networks strongly demonstrated its strength in crisis-
si tuations. Here, crisis-si tuations can be understood" as the time of 
bankruptcy, as recalled by Rang Desheng 'in his memoirs. The Rong 
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.  
brothers experienced four occasions of financial crises during the 
pre-1937 period of business development. In these crises, the Rong 
brothers' business survived by making use of the resources, 
political or economic, from different social networks. As shown in 
the preceding chapters, people like Li Yucheng and Zhou Xuanqing, 
who had friendship and/or regional ties wi th the Rong brothers, 
offered help in three crises experienced by the business. In the 
fourth crisis, as more people were involved, social networking. 
became more complex. In the hierarchy of differential social 
relations, brotherhood played the strongest role in supporting Rong 
Zongjing to survive the crisis. As revealed by Rong Desheng himself, 
he brought all his property deeds and deposit to Shanghai and acted 
as a guarantor of his elder brother. 301 
Nonetheless, since the social networks centered on the core 
figures (the Rang brothers), such networking would break down when 
they passed away. After the death of Rong Zongjing in Hong Kong in 
1938, the big business spli t into three parts, one under Rong 
Desheng's leadership, one under the leadership of Rong Zongjing's 
eldest son, and one under the lead~rship of Li Guowei. Under these 
three person's direction, a number of sub-divisions emerged during 
the late 1930' sand throug·hout the 1940' s. 302 The big business, 
which was held together through its owners' social connections, 
disintegrated when the networking was broken down with the owner's 
301 See Rong Desheng, Op.cit., pp.67-68. 




Business In modern China, as in other countries, was and is 
conducted in a context of social networks. Social networks here 
existed not simply in financial matters but also in other aspects of 
management, for instance, labor management, marketing, and political 
dealings. Networks became a "social resource" in which businessmen 
could make use of each other so as to facilitate their businesses. 
In this dissertation, such "social resources" can be clearly seen in 
the matter of financing. 303 
My emphasis of social networking does not deny the importance 
of personality in the history of financing of the business. It is 
beyond doubt that the Rong brothers possessed a strong will and 
responded "creati vely" to the problems in financing namely, the 
under-development of the money market and high costs of production. 
Thus, they had the policy of high-capi tal-accumulation, closed 
financing, or external borrowing. It is not my intention to 
dichotomize the roles of social networking and entrepreneurship in 
the matter of financial management. Instead, my opinion is that an 
entrepreneur needs, or works in, social networks to reduce risk, to 
tighten his relationship with other groups of people, and to 
mobilize resources in need~ 
Putting this study in a broader perspective, one may realize 
that the financing efforts and strategies were quite dynamic in an 
303 I am not saying that social networks were the only prime determinant of 
business growth and success. As mentioned by S. Go~don ~edding, th~re ~re some other 
factors that release efficiency. See S. Gordon Redd1ng, Weak Organ1zat10n and Strong 
Linkages: Managerial Ideology and Chinese Family Business Networks", in G~ry 
Hamil ton, ed., Business Networks and Eco~ic DeveloJ1lllent in East and Southeast As~a, 
pp.44-45. 
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under-developed money market. However, one. may also think that the 
existence of social networking in business operation might hinder 
the development of economic rationalization in the Weberian sense, 
as trust in China was particularistic rather than universalistic, 
based on personal relationship instead of contract. In the next 
section, I will conclude my inquiry by looking into the concept of 
economic rationalization and its applications to this case study. 
6.3. Economic Rationalization 
Economic rationalization here refers to the orientation of 
profi t-maximization rather than personal considerations in the 
business decision-making process. It can be revealed by the reliance 
of uni versal istic trust rather than by particularistic trust in 
economic transactions. 30( These observations have always been 
viewed as characteristics of the Western commercial system, which in 
turn originated from the concept of contract and the maintenance of 
law and order by the government. 
Putting the above generalized conceptions of economic 
rationalization in the context of the development of a financial 
system, one can conce i ve it as an open, impersonal money market 
arising from the economy to facilitate the free flow of capital. 
Within this money market, banks, stock exchange, or bond exchange 
can have free transactions between the buyers and sellers among whom 
no personal connections is presupposed. Behind · this market, there 
304 For the summary of the concept of trust in .both Western and Chinese sense, 
see Wong Siu-lun, "Chinese Entrepreneurs and Business Trust", in Gary ~amilton, J ed., 
Business Networks and Bcono.,ic DeveloJ1lllent in East and Southeast As~aJ pp. 13-29 • 
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exists a legal system which guarantees private property rights of an 
economic man . 
. However, the study of the financing system of the Maoxin--
Fuxin-Shenxin group suggests that the business group and its 
entrepreneurs preferred personal means of financing to the m'eans of 
stock market. They raised capital among family members, kinsmen, or 
other familiars; and they would make use of the traditional type of 
banking (qianzhuang), in which personal trust was stressed in loan 
transactions because of underdevelopment of Chinese money market. 
They would not use modern banking which stressed uni versalistic 
trust on property and contract. Even though the Rong brothers had 
realized the problem of the lack of capital, they did not approach 
modern bankers except those with a personal relationship to them, 
such as Chen Guangfu or Song Hanzhang. Under this condition, no one 
(not even the big business) would be too enthusiastic about 
financing business by means of stock market and thus the market had 
difficulty to develop. 
To say that such particularistic trust directly hindered the 
process of economic rationalization is still problematic. There 
exists a need to balance between external borrowing and raising 
capital through issuing new~shares. Not to rely on the open money 
market clearly reflected the intention of the Rong brothers --- not 
to lose control of the big business that they created. Besides, a 




private property rights. Yet, it was not the 
responsibility but the obligations of the political 
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or legal authorities to provide such a guarantee. The prevailing of 
wars and political crises during the late Qing and the Republican 
period, in~eed, were a more fundamental hindrance to the development 
of an open money market in China. 
To conclude this study, I must point out that the Maoxin-
Fuxin-Shenxin group had to make efforts to finance its modern 
industrial business in a social context emphasizing particularistic 
trust. The entrepreneurs of this business group had to make use of 
social networks, from which particularistic trust was generated, and 
to draw upon all kinds of financial support that they needed. Such 
a system of financing might create problems in the development of 
economic rationalization in China. Yet, from the impressive 
financing results of the business group, one cannot but appreciate 
Chinese businessmen's entrepreneurship, their techniques of social 
resources mobilization and their unique strategies for developing 
business in a difficult period. 
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Appendix (for p.22) 
Table 2.5. Capitalization of the Maoxin and Fuxin Enterprises up to 1936 
(Unit: Y=yuan) 
Name\Year 1901 1903 1904 1912 1914 1918 1919 1920 
Baoxing Y39,000 ---
--- --- --- --- --- ---
Kaoxin No.1 --- Y50,OOO Y60,000 Y277,780 Y277,780 Y600,000 Y600,000 Y600,000 
No.2 --- --- --- --- --- Y160,000 Y160,OOO Y160,000 
No.3 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
No.4 --- -- - --- --- --- --- --- Y250,OOO 
Fuxin No.1 --- --- --- Y40,OOO Y40,OOO Y300,000 Y500,000 Y500,OOO 
No.2 --- --- --- --- YlOO,OOO Y100,OOO Y100,000 Y100,000 
No.3 --- --- --- --- Yl50,000 Y150,000 Y150,000 Y150,OOO 
No.4 --- --- --- --- --- --- Y300,000 Y300,000 
No .5 --- --- --- --- --- Y300,OOO Y300,OOO Y300,000 
No.6 --- --- --- --- --- --- Y400,000 Y400,000 
No.7 --- --- --- --- --- --- Y300,OOO Y300,000 
No.8 --- --- --- --- -- - --- --- Y600,000 
Total Y39,OOO Y50,OOO Y60,OOO Y317,780 Y567,780 Y1,610,OOO Y2,810,000 Y3,660,000 
(to be continued) 
Name\Year 1921 1922 1923 1926 1928 1932 1936 
Kaoxin No.1 Y600,000 Y600,OOO Y600,OOO Y600,000 Yl ,200,000 Y1,166,670 Y1,200,000 
No.2 Yl60,000 Y160,000 Y160,000 --- +No.1 +No.1 Y484,650 
No.3 --- --- --- --- +No.1 +No.1 +No,l 
No,4 Y250,000 Y250,OOO Y250,OOO Y250,000 Y250,OOO Y416,670 Y416,670 
Fuxin No,l Y500,000 Y500,000 Y500,OOO Y500,000 Y500,000 Y500,000 Y500,OOO 
No,2 YlOO,OOO Y100,OOO Y100,000 Y100,OOO Y1,900,0001Y2,322,500 Y3,000,000 
No,3 Y150,000 Y150,000 Y150,000 Y300,000 Y300,000 Y500,000 Y1,000,000 
No,4 Y300,000 Y300,000 Y300,000 Y300,000 tNo.2 +No,2 +No.2 
ijo,5 Y500,OOO Y650,000 Y750,000 Y1,000,000 Yl,500,000 Y1,500,000 Yl,500,OOO 
No.6 Y400,000 Y400,OOO Y400,OOO Y400,000 Y400,000 +No.3 +No.3 
No,7 Y300,OOO Y300,000 Y300,000 Y300,000 Y1,500,000 Yl,500,OOO Y1,500,OOO 
No.8 Y600,000 Y600,OOO Y600,000 Y600,000 +No.2 +No.2 +No,3 
Total Y3,860,OOO Y4,010,000 14,110,000 Y4,350,OOO Y7,550,OOO Y1,905,840 Y9,601,320 
Source: Rang Desheng, Lenong tiding Iingnian jishi; RQS.I; Kaolin FUlin Shenlin Eonggongsi sa gbounian 
jiniance (as HFSZSZl in the following). 
For Baoxing in 1901, see Rang Desheng I Op.cit., p. 20; Maoxin No. 1 in 1903, see Rong Desheng, OPt cit. , 
p.24; Maoxin No,l in 1904, see RQS.I, pp.15-16; but Rong Desheng's memoirs stated that the date was 1905, 
and I follow the former date as the source IUaterial shows the shareholding deed of Maoxin. For Rang's 
data, see Rang Desheng, Op.cit" . p.27; 
Maoxin No.l in 1912, see RQS.I, pp,29-30 (as 200,000 taels), but in p.lll the unit has been converted into 
yuan as shown in the table; 
Fuxin No.l in 1912, see RQS.I, pp,33-34, and Rang Desheng, Op.cit. p.37; 
Fuxin No.2 in 1913, see RQS,I, pp.36-37; The predecessor of Fuxin No;4 was a factory leased from Zhongxing 
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Flour Kill in 1913, but this is not included in our account; Fuxin No.3 in 1914, see RQS.I, p.37; 
Kaoxin No.2 in 1918, see "Kaoxin .di er lIianfenchang gaikuang", "Kaoxin gechang gaikuang", p.5, KFSZSZJ; 
Maoxin No.1 in 1918, see RQS.I, pp.43-H; Fuxin No.1 in 1918, see RQS.I, p.45; Fuxin No.1 in 1919, see 
RQS.I, p.78; Fuxin No.4 in 1919, see RQS.I" p.78; Fuxin No.5 in 1918, see "Fuxin diwu lIianfenchang 
gaikuang", in "Fuxin gechang gaikuang lt , p.11, IfFSZSZJ; also Rang Desheng, p.43; Fuxin No.6 in 1919, see 
RQS.I, p.48; Fuxin No.7 in 1919, see RQS.I, p.80 and Rang Desheng, p.48; 
M a0 x i n No. 4 i n 19 2 0, see HQ S. I , pp. 7 7 -7 8; F u x i n No. 8, see RQ S. I, p. 8 0; F u x i n No. 5 in 19 21, 19 2 2, 19 23 , 
1926, see RQS.I, p.182; . 
In 1926, as Fuxin No.l had been ruined down by fire, No.3 was then renamed as No.1 and Xinghud Flour Mill 
was "later bought and took the f omer pas it ion 0 f No. 3 in the account book, see RQS. I, pp .182-3; Maox in 
No.2 was also rebuilt in this year, but there is no record about the account of this factory; 
For all the accounts for 1928, see "Kaoxin Fuxin Mianfenchang yilanbiao", in IfFSZSZJ; 
For all the data for 1932, see RQS.I, p.282; for 1936, see RQS.I, p.550. 
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